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Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land
Development Process
By Ricmw B. CuN

GHA_*

DAvD H. KEAR=**

As a building development evolves from drawing board into
reality, the vested rights rule establishes a stage of progress when
reliance upon governmental assurances estops the government
from asserting new or different regulations.'
"Construction,"at the very least, means getting off the ground by
either going up or down, not just thinking about it....2

I. Introduction
Governmental regulation of the uses of land has become commonplace in our society. As each new law or regulatory procedure is
created, however, so too is the potential that the new rule may interfere with the completion of a land development project already
planned or being constructed. Is the builder of that project obliged
to submit to the new rules, or may the builder continue under the
rules as they existed at some earlier time?
When confronted on one side by a new law restricting land use
and on the other by a developer who alleges a commitment to a
particular project, a majority of courts will consider the possible
existence of a "vested right." Sympathetic application of what is
generally known as the "vested rights doctrine" will preclude the
* Associate Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law. B.S., 1966, University
of California at Berkeley; J.D., 1969, University of California at Davis; LL.M., 1971,
The George Washington University.

** B.A., 1969, Pennsylvania State University. Member, Third Year Class.
Although both authors shared in the concept of this Article, a necessary allocation
of energies prompted its division into chapters. Professor Cunningham accepts responsibility for Chapters 1, 2, and 4 and Mr. Kremer for Chapter 3.
1. Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965,
977-78, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 707 (1977).
2. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Rockford, 47 IMI.App. 3d 131, 143, 361
N.E.2d 832, 840-41 (1977) (quoting Kansas Quality Constr., Inc. v. Chiasson, 112 Il.
App. 2d 277, 282-83, 250 N.E.2d 785, 787 (1969)).
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government from further regulation or interruption of the builder's
project. Conversely, if the builder or landowner is unable to satisfy
the requirements of that doctrine, the project will be subject to the
new regulation and thus postponed, limited, or even prohibited.
The issue of vested rights frequently arises in situations in
which new governmental regulations, often of a restrictive environmental nature, are imposed on a land developer who has prepared
plans, invested capital, prepared a building site, begun construction,
or otherwise embarked on a particular course of development. When
the developer has progressed so far that it offends general notions of
fairness to impose regulations that might preclude further activity,
many courts, relying on theories analyzed below, declare that the developer has acquired a vested right and that the government may
restrict that development no further. Judicial reliance on the vested
rights doctrine, however, is unfortunately characterized by inconsistent application and confused rationales. In fact, the doctrine is not
a single rule but instead a variety of judicial and legislative policies
related only by the ease with which use of the term "vested" 3 forecloses the searching analysis necessary to a proper dissection of the
problem. Thus, the rationale applied by a particular court in such
a situation might be based on rigid concepts of private property
rights, 4 theories of equitable estoppel, 5 generalized prohibitions
against retroactive application of new laws,6 or vague concepts of
fairness .7
Much of the difficulty in the doctrine's application undoubtedly
has resulted from its humble origins; most of the vested rights cases
in which the doctrine is discussed concern small-scale land development projects which take only a few months to construct and are
3. The term "vested" is uniformly recognized as imprecise, inaccurate, or even
meaningless as commonly applied. See 5 AMEuCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 21.5 (A. Casner
ed. 1952). The term is further discussed at notes 55-57 and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 11-67 & accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 93-147 & accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 148-76 & accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal. 3d
888, 893, 513 P.2d 129, 132, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 (1973); Town of Largo v. Imperial
Homes Corp., 309 S.2d 571, 573 (Fla. App. 1975); Hill v. Board of Adjustment, 122
N.J. Super. 156, 162-65, 299 A.2d 737, 741-42 (App. Div. 1972). ALl MODEL LAND
DEv. CODE § 2-309(1)(c) (1976) allows recognition of a vested right based merely
on an application for a permit when "it is determined that the former ordinance or rule
should be made applicable in a particular case in the interest of justice ......
.See
also Comment, The Variable Quality of a Vested Right, 34 YALE L.J. 303, 307 (1925)
[hereinafter cited as Variable Quality of a Vested Right].
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proposed by individual entrepreneurs.8 As a result, the rules evolved
by the case law are generally unsuited to resolution of the complexities
presented by modem, multiphase, large-scale projects which represent
a period of several years and perhaps millions of dollars in planning,

preparation, and land acquisition costs. 9 The traditional rules similarly fail to accommodate the variability, sophistication, and procedural
complexities found in modem planning and regulatory techniques.
This Article attempts to incorporate the several vested rights
rationales within a broader body of jurisprudence and to suggest a
theory by which a reformulated rule of vested rights may be appro-

priately applied to modem practices of land development regulation.
Formulation of a rule better adapted to modem circumstances requires a reexamination of the rights that attend property ownership
and a reevaluation of the extent to which our society will encourage,
8. "A typical situation involves the purchase by an oil company of a corner lot
zoned for commercial use, issuance of a building permit authorizing the construction of
a gasoline service station, and then - depending on how fast news of the proposed development travels - neighborhood opposition, resulting in a successful application to
municipal authorities to rezone the area so as to prohibit gasoline station use. The
legal question posed is whether the amendatory zoning regulation can be invoked to
cancel or revoke the oil company's building permit and halt construction of the service
station." Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13, 18 (1973).
9. "[Rlecent experience [indicates] that many of the large-scale development techniques used in the late 1960s and early 1970s will probably not be used again in the
foreseeable future. This especially applies to the purchase of very large tracts of land
and the investment of large sums of money in major public facility improvements prior
to the marketing of properties to consumers. Most knowledgeable persons in the industry now agree that projects which use these techniques will not be viable when there
is extensive regulation of development at the local level and cyclical variations in the
national economy. All current evidence points to the fact that the private sector simply
will not initiate many large-scale projects in the future, if present public policies are
continued. Upward pressure on development costs due to labor and material price increases have always been problems, but they are problems which the development industry has the capacity to adjust to in a slowly improving economy. It can be expected
that current constraints on development due to market uncertainties will be overcome
and development will resume. The uncertainties and related cost impacts of new public
policies, however, are problems of an entirely different magnitude, and the industry has
no apparent way to adjust except to reduce other risks by undertaking only smaller
projects of very short duration." URBr LAND INsTrruTE, LARGE-ScALE DEVELoPMENT
3 (1977). Observations by the author in northern California also indicate that, although
large-scale projects are not a part of the development pattern in that area for the foreseeable future, there will be a multitude of smaller-scale projects, usually of mixed type,
middle density residential design. These projects, usually encompassing several hundred
dwelling units, present most of the problems of their larger counterparts, except for fewer
problems of land agglomeration and fewer construction phases. These observations are
shared by many others. E.g., Heyman, Planned Unit Development: The Bargaining
Process and Environmental Impact Statement, in FnoNTans oF Pr.-NF UNUr DEVELoP mNT 154 (R. Burchell, ed. 1973).
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sanction, or tolerate claims of immunity from additional regulation.
The discussion that follows therefore will analyze the several recognized and potential rationales implicit in the vested rights cases. In
so doing, it necessarily will explore the theoretical bases of the right
to develop real property, especially in relation to the law of permits.
Those factors will then be discussed in the context of the historical
evolution and present application of the vested rights doctrine in
California. After having established that framework, the Article suggests a new formulation of the vested rights doctrine which attempts
to clarify and accommodate many of the highly subjective factors
inherent in traditional vested rights controversies.

II. Major Theories and Rationales Underlying the
Vested Rights Doctrine
Courts regularly employ a variety of rationales to explain their
use of the vested rights doctrine. One common approach is to presume that a perfunctory reference to vested rights explains the legal
theory involved and the reason for its application to the facts of the
case. The vested rights doctrine is thus often treated as though it
were a self-executing rule of independent origin. Another practice,
perhaps reflecting a desire to use a more defensible mode of analysis,
is to adopt a theory previously established in that jurisdiction. Unfortunately, when that theory happens to be inappropriate to the issues
at hand, its use results in a strained attempt to match the facts to the
elements of that particular theory. Both patterns appear to result
from a general lack of awareness of the several related theories that
potentially are applicable to the vested rights problem. 1o
This portion of the Article gathers and interrelates several of the
theories and rationales that appear to be relevant to the vested rights
question. When appropriate, cases from outside the land development field are used to establish the strength and usual application of
10.

One recent opinion recognizing the distinctions among the several related theories

involved is Reichenbach v. Windward at Southhampton, 80 Misc. 2d 1031, 1038-41, 364
N.Y.S.2d 283, 291-94 (Sup. Ct. 1975), which postulates a constitutional doctrine of
vested rights and a distinct equitable doctrine of equitable estoppel. A Missouri case,
Murrel v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842, 851 (Mo. 1966), had earlier recognized similar distinctions, acknowledging that a variety of theories was available: "We rest our decision
on the basis of estoppel, and do not reach the constitutional question of whether the
ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary and confiscatory or the question of vested rights."
These distinctions were blurred, however, in Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 977, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 707 (1977), dismissing "the

vested rights rule" as but "a special expression of the general estoppel doctrine."
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each theory. Each theory is then applied to the vested rights problems
presented by complex land developments.
Land Development Rights
Need for the Inquiry

Formulation of the vested rights doctrine is necessarily premised
on some implicit assumptions regarding fundamental aspects of the
law of real property. Use of the term "vested right" refers, of course,
to a right to develop land; the characterization of a right as vested
usually means that it is secure, recognized, or presently existing. Accordingly, the description of a right to develop land as vested implies
that the right was established and became secure at some earlier time,
either by virtue of some interest" inherent in land ownership or by
virtue of a power 12 or authorization resulting from the relationship
between the landowner and the government.' 3 Unfortunately, defining the term in such a simple fashion is deceptive because it tends
to obscure some highly divergent views of the origin and evolution of
the development right. An inquiry into the derivation of the common
law right to develop land thus becomes the primary point of departure
for an examination of the vested rights question.
Modern History of the Common Law Development Right

Because there is no general consensus on the derivation or scope
of the right to develop land, comprehension of vested rights claims
requires some appreciation of the variety of factors that have influenced real property theory. Those factors demonstrate the familiar
observation that real property concepts, rather than representing a
fixed doctrine, have instead reacted to the political and economic
forces of history with remarkable flexibility.' 4 English and American
11. An "interest" was the term adopted by RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 5 (1936),
to describe any of the aggregate of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities enjoyed
by an owner of real property. The use of such all-inclusive terminology is appropriate
here because of the wide divergence of opinion regarding the nature of the right to develop land.
12. A "power" was defined in RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 3 (1936), as the ability
on the part of a person to produce a change in a given legal relation by doing or not
doing a given act.
13. The relationship between the landowner and the government may be such as
to empower the landowner to make a claim of equitable estoppel, discussed at notes
104-24 & accompanying text infra, or may be dependent on development permits, discussed at notes 61-91 & accompanying text infra.
14. The classic statement is that of Philbrick in Changing Conceptions of Property
in Law, 86 U. PA. L. Rv. 691 (1938); updated by Cribbet, Changing Concepts in the
Law of Land Use, 50 IowA L. REV. 425 (1965) and Roberts, The Demise of Property
Law, 57 CoRwL L. REv. 1 (1971). See also Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate
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history is replete with these changes and demonstrates that real property interests, including the right to develop land, have always been characterized not by their inviolate sanctity but by a continual process of
definition and realignment. I" An examination of ancient history is
not necessary, however, as the development rights controversy can be
sufficiently understood in the context of the last six decades of American law.
Early in the twentieth century, the prevalent theory that explained the landowner's legal power to develop land held that by
virtue of ownership there existed an inherent right to develop in order
to establish a reasonable use or, more often, the highest and best use
of the land. Thus stated, the development right, although always subject to some private restrictions, was traditionally considered to be
restricted only by public nuisance laws.'
Since the early decades
of this century the development right has been further restricted by
building codes, 17 zoning laws,1s and subdivision regulations;1 9 since
Is That the Question?, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 253 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
15. See generally 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PRoPERTY ch. 3-4 (rev. ed.
1977 [hereinafter cited as POWELL]. For a summary of recent English experience see
D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW ch. 21 (1975)
and Duerksen, England's Community Land Act, 12 URB. L. ANN. 49 (1976).
16. See Ragsdale & Sher, The Court's Role in The Evolution of Power Over Land,
7 URB. LAW. 60, 66-72 (1975).
17. The first of the modern building construction codes was the 1905 edition of the
National Building Code, published by the National Board of Fire Underwriters and
later followed by a variety of regional model codes promulgated by various groups of
building officials. D. TAYLOR, A GUIDE FOR CODES ADOPTION AND CODES ENFORCEMENT
3 (1974). Those codes were accompanied in some urban areas by tenement housing
codes, which controlled the density and manner of construction of multifamily housing
units. L. VEILLER, A MODEL HoUsING LAW (1914). Building codes are probably now
used by about one-half of the government units in the United States. See NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 254-56 (1968).
See
generally 1 & 3 R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 3.06, 17.02 (2d ed.
1976-77) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
18. Although a number of cities had established various districting ordinances
around the turn of the century, the first of the modem comprehensive zoning ordinances
is generally considered to be New York City's 1916 Resolution. See 1 A. RATHXOPF,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.01 (4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as RATHKOPF].
Within a few years many states and localities had independently produced their
-

own zoning ordinances, Annot., 38 A.L.R. 1496 (1925), or had adopted state enabling

acts or local ordinances modeled on New York's or on the several model ordinances
which were promulgated in the late twenties. See generally 1 ANDERSON, supra note
17, at § 1.14; RATHKOPF, supra; N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW, ch. 35
(1974-75) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS). The constitutionality of municipal zoning
was approved by the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926), and the system became known as Euclidean zoning.
19. Subdivision regulations, although existing in various forms in earlier periods,
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the 1950's, by pollution regulations; 20 since the 1970's, by an expanding
and confusing array of environmental controls 21 and mandatory municipal or regional planning restrictions; 22 and finally, most recently, by
an emerging design ethic which attempts to determine the natural
and intrinsic capabilities or limitations of the land itself. 23 Under the
received a major boost with the 1928 publication of the Standard City Planning Enabling
Act by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Judicial reaction to subdivision regulation
was receptive, and the process was treated as though it were relatively noncontroversial.
R. FzmiLca & P. LEv, MODEL SuBDMvSION REGULAT-ONS TEXT
COMMENTARY 1-4
(1975); Reps, Control of Land Subdivision by Municipal Planning Boards, 40 CORNELL
L. RE:v. 258 (1955). See generally, 1 & 4 ANDERsoN, supra note 17, at §§ 1.15, 23.01.
20. The first of the modem federal pollution control measures was the Water Pollution Control Act, enacted in 1948 and amended repeatedly. Act of June 30, 1948,
ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (current version codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V
1975)). It prompted widespread state legislation of a similar nature. See Edwards,

The Legislative Approach to Air and Water Quality, 1 NAT. RsouRcEs LAw. 58 (1968);
Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution Control, in FEDmE.L ENvIRoNmENTAL LAW
682 (1974). California's pioneer air pollution legislation was first enacted in 1947.
1947 Cal. Stats. ch. 632, § 1, at 1640 (repealed 1975, current version at CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE §§ 39000-44563 (West Supp. 1977)). It reflected a pattern of city
and county air pollution control that persisted throughout the country until amendment
of the federal scheme with the passage of the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No.
90-148, § 1, 81 Stat. 485 (1967) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857-57(1) (Supp. V 1975)).
Pollack, Legal Boundaries of Air Pollution Control - State and Local Legislative Purpose
and Techniques, 33 LAw & Commr p. PROB. 331 (1968).
21. Environmental restrictions have expanded beyond concerns for air and water
quality to include federal, state, and local regulation of noise, solid waste generation,
erosion, and a multitude of other interrelated concerns usually addressed by environmental impact analyses prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-47 (Supp. V 1975), or any of the several similar state acts. See, e.g., California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §§ 21000-176 (West 1977);
Washington State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21
c.10-.910 (Supp. 1977). Of greater potential impact are several provisions of the federal water and air pollution control acts, which mandate long-range planning to prevent
the advent of new sources of pollution in air management areas. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21 (1976) (Environmental Protection Agency regulations promulgated under the
"nondegradation" policy of the Clean Air Act § 10, 42 U.S.C. § 1857o-5 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975)). Federal law also encourages area-wide waste water treatment and land planning under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 208, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1288 (Supp.
1977). See generally, D. MANDELKER, ENVmONmENTAL AD LAND CONTROLS LEGIsLATIoN, ch. 5 (1976).
22. City and regional planning existed for many years in most jurisdictions as a
device for establishing general policies but had no direct regulatory effect. The real
possibility of legal impact was theorized by Charles Haar's major contribution, In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan, 68 HAav. L. REv. 1154, 1175 (1955). In the
last few years a growing trend has evidenced a judicial and legislative willingness to
accept a regulatory role for comprehensive plans. See, e.g., Mandelker, The Role of the
Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MicH. L. REv. 899, 951-73
(1976). The process is not without substantial problems of application. Green v.
Hayward, 275 Or. 693, 552 P.2d 815 (1976).
23. Many planners have urged the development of a system of analysis of the
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impact of these statutory and judicial restrictions, all based on everexpanding concepts of police power, the nature of the right to develop
land has become increasingly uncertain.2 4 Indeed, controversy regarding the changing nature of the right to develop relates not to
whether change has occurred but rather to how far that change has
progressed. Thus, while some courts and commentators persist in the
traditional view that there exists an almost inviolate right to develop,
subject only to minimal control by building codes and simple Euclidean
zoning designations, 25 it would be more accurate to say that the priinherent capability of specific parcels of land to withstand or support various types and
densities of development. Generally known as land capability or carrying capacity
analysis, these systems often combine concerns for sensitive or hazard-prone land characteristics with a series of subjective estimates of the land's ability to withstand urbanization. A basic description of the goals of such a scheme appears in Ian McHarg's
book, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969).
General design considerations and suggested regulatory techniques are set out in C. Tirunow, W. TONER, & D. ERLEY, PERFORMANCE
CONTROLS FOR SENSITIVE LANDS (1975).
A brief description of the process is contained
in JUERGENSMEYER & WADLEY, FLORIDA LAND USE RESTmCTIONS ch. 22 (1976). Some

of the best-known applications of the system are in the Lake Tahoe Basin in California
and the Adirondack Park in New York. A recent proposal for a similar system is contained in J. CLARK, THE SENIBEL REPORT: FORMULATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
BASED ON NATURAL SYSTEMS (1976).
24. Uncertainty inevitably follows in the wake of societal change. Professor Richard
Powell noted the change in the law that affected basic assumptions regarding property:
"As one looks back along the historic road traversed by the law of land in England and
in America, one sees a change from the viewpoint that he who owns may do as he
pleases with what he owns, to a position which hesitatingly embodies an ingredient of
stewardship; which grudgingly, but steadily, broadens the recognized scope of social
interest in the utilization of things.
To one seeing history through the glasses of religion, these changes may seem to
evidence increasing embodiments of the golden rule. To one thinking in terms of political and economic ideologies, they are likely to be labeled evidences of 'social enlightenment,' or of 'creeping socialism,' or even of 'communistic infiltration,' according to the
individual's assumed definitions and retained or acquired prejudices. With slight attention to words or labels, time marches on towards new adjustments between individualism
and the social interests." 5 POWELL, supra note 15, at 746.
25. This position often carries considerable overtones of political philosophy. See,
e.g., McClaughry, Farmers, Freedom, and Feudalism: How to Avoid the Coming Serfdom, 21 S.D.L. REV. 486 (1976); Berger, supra note 14, at 292-93. The continued vitality of this view reflects to a great extent the rather mystical qualities which our society ascribes to real property ownership.
Babcock & Feurer, Land As a Commodity
"Affected With the Public Interest," 52 WASH. L. REV. 289, 291-99 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Babcock & Feurer].

It persists as well in what has been termed "the fee simple

fable that land can be used in any way one pleases." F. BOSSELMIN, D. CALLIES, & J.
BANTA, THE TAKING IssUE 318-19 (1973).
For references to the fundamental American
value of unfettered acquisition and use of private property which appear often in some
jurisdictions, see the opinions of former Chief Justice Bell of Pennsylvania, e.g., Exton
Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 67, 228 A.2d 169, 182 (1967).
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vate landowner's right to develop can best be understood as the direct
converse of the expanding scope of the police power; the private development right contracts as the public exercise of the police power
expands. 26
The prevailing view has thus recognized that the scope of the
right to develop land has been substantially reduced in the last few
decades. The derivation and existence of that right, however, has
not yet been substantially questioned. The generally accepted view
is that the right to develop land is inherent in its ownership and exists
as an attribute of ownership unless obliterated by legislative action.27
That view describes the origin of the right but does not necessarily
imply that the ability or power to exercise the right is so secure or
insulated from interference as to be regarded as vested. Indeed, all
courts apparently recognize that the existing right is always subject
to legitimate police power qualifications and restrict the exercise of
that power only when they perceive that vesting has occurred. Necessarily, the prevailing view holds that the development right exists as
a function of real property law but does not become vested until some
chain of judicial or statutory events has solidified its status, a process
which might be analogized to the vulcanization of raw rubber. It is
the chain of events constituting the process of vesting which is important, and it is that process which is little understood.
Both the process of vesting and the scope of the development right
inevitably seem to be dependent on the role of government. As will
be demonstrated below, aggressive exercise of governmental police
power may affect the very existence of that right. The focus of the
inquiry must therefore shift to an examination of the proper role of
government in exercise of the police power.
A consideration of the role of government in the establishment
of development rights introduces a potentially ambiguous element into
the analysis. If development rights are conceptualized as inherent in
26. This process of police power expansion and concomitant contraction of the
landowners interests has been recognized in several recent opinions by Mr. Justice
Stevens. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-21 (1977)
(Stevens, J.,
concurring). See also Large, This Land Is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 1039, 1041 (contrasts the contraction of
property rights in land with the expansion of property rights in chattels and personal

status).
27. A good popularized statement of the "inherent" theory is contained in W.
Rmi.LY, THE UsE or LAND 140 (1973): "Historically, Americans have thought of these
rights as coming from the land itself, up from the bottom like minerals or crops. As a
result, land-use regulations have been viewed as restrictions on each landowners preexisting rights rather than as grants of rights as he did not have before."
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land ownership and neither derived from government nor dependent
on governmental authorization, a judicial respect for traditional concepts of property2 8 would tolerate only minimal governmental intervention in the chain of events that leads to vested status. Under such
circumstances, a claim to a vested development right derived primarily
from property ownership would probably stand against all but the
most unusual or urgent goverment interference. Thus viewed, government involvement is rather passive and has little bearing on the
vested rights problem. Theoretically, however, governmental agencies
could occupy a much more active role, as is suggested by the current
pervasive influence of government on the entire land development
process. Modern practice indeed supports a governmental role that,
rather than recognizing and acquiescing in an already established development right, instead creates the right and dictates the process by
which it may become vested.29 Although the two roles are presented
here as a dichotomy, they in fact represent the extremes of the continuum found in present practice. The two extremes are based on
distinct theories but are usually perceived as a confusing hybrid because of their similar application and nearly identical terminology.
The distinction is best illustrated in the context of the permit systems.
Permit Systems and Early Permit Theory
Land use regulation in the United States since the 1920's has
become increasingly dependent on the widespread use of building
permits, occupancy permits, and similar documents which certify and
symbolize the satisfaction of various regulatory requirements. 30 Thus,
most local governments use the building permit to signify that all
appropriate procedural and substantive requirements of the building
codes, zoning regulations, and subdivision laws have been met. Most
of the vested rights case law has developed in reference to these permits, which are traditionally considered, consistent with the majority
view of inherent development rights, merely to supplement or qualify
an already existing development right.
The universal reliance on the permit system in turn has had a
subtle but profound impact on the evolution of development rights
28.

"Property" as used here refers to the general institution of property as that

legal protection given to an "owner's" reasonable expectations of control, exclusion, and
economic value.
29. Many modem systems expressly provide that development authorization may
be obtained only from government. See notes 61-65 & accompanying text infra.
30. See 8 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL ConRoa rIoNs § 25.147 (3d rev. ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as McQunLAN]; 2 lAnmoPF, supra note 18, at ch. 55 § 2 (3d ed.

1972).
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theory. The vast majority of the cases conceptualizing development
rights arose under zoning law, involved permits, and were thus inevitably molded by the precepts and techniques of municipal Euclidean
zoning.31 As a result, discussion of common law theories of development rights is now impossible without some understanding of the
evolution of the traditional permit system.
Statutory imposition of any regulatory permit scheme immediately
requires that the nature of the permit be determined. Because a well
organized municipal permit process predated the advent of zoning,
that system was utilized by the newly emerging zoning system as a
readily available tool for administration and enforcement.32 It was
only natural that, as questions arose concerning the nature and legal
effect of the new permits used in zoning, the courts analogized those
zoning permits to the other permits and licenses commonly granted
by municipal governments. 3s A frequently cited 1928 case, Brougher
v. Board of Public Works, held that a building permit was similar to
other municipal licenses and might therefore be revoked unless "the
licensee 'had done something under the license from which the mere
privilege would ripen into a vested right."' 3 4 The "mere privilege"
represented by a municipal license at the turn of the century applied
to a number of rather mundane activities, primarily various services
and occupations, frequently involving highly personal qualifications.35
To equate licensed activities such as horseshoeing or the keeping of
hogs and swine with the much more substantial interests associated
with the development of land is, of course, very misleading, as the
function and relative value of the activities are quite different.3 6 An
earlier case of the same general period accordingly observed that a
building permit was "not a . . . pure personal privilege" but instead

represented "a regulation of the right of ownership of land" from
which a 'landowner reasonably may infer that, so long as he complies
31.
32.
33.

See note 18 supra.
3 ANERsoN, supra note 17, at §§ 17.02, 17.05.
See, e.g., McQutmLAN, supra note 30, at §§ 25.147, 25.152; 1A C.

ANTiEu,

MuNmcPAL., CoPol AloN LAw § 7.129 (1976).

34. 205 Cal. 426, 434, 271 P. 487, 490-91 (1928) (quoting Southern Leasing Co.
v. Ludwig, 168 App. Div. 233, 235, 153 N.Y.S. 545, 547 (1915) (emphasis added)).
See notes 51-54 & accompanying text infra.
35. McQunsAN, supra note 30, at § 26.10-.14.
36. If the distinction rests on the inherent nature of real property, it involves a
number of considerations which are subject to question. See e.g., note 25 supra. Thus,
Justice Tobriner sharply discounted claims for special treatment of real property apart
from other rights or values similarly subject to regulation or constitutional protection.
San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 213-14, 529 P.2d
570, 574-75, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150-51, (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976).
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with the requirements under which the privilege has been granted,
he may claim protection until further legislation impairs his rights. 3 7
The extreme range of views regarding the inherent nature of a
building permit continues to the present day, with judicial pronouncements ranging from the statement that the permit is a personal, nontransferable privilege 3 8 to a holding that a permit becomes attached to
the land and is thus freely transferable as though it were an interest
in land.39 That range of views has been further confused as more
sophisticated zoning models have come into general usage. Those
systems, building on the New York-Euclid models, developed innumerable variations and complexities,4 but each relied on a heirarehy
of land uses and activities that variously required lesser or greater degrees of government regulation and approval.
In the first category were those uses of land considered desirable
or appropriate in a zoning district, termed "permitted" uses. Applicants were assured of the issuance of a permit for this category because
the specific type of use previously had been determined by the legislature to be allowable in that district. 41 In almost all ordinances, for
instance, the single-family residence occupies a preferred position and
is rarely prohibited by land use regulations. 4 2 The single family
dwelling represents one of the least objectionable forms of development and is most often accorded a privileged and sacrosanct status by
the courts. 43 Because it was uniformly considered a permitted use
under the common cumulative zoning arrangement, the denial of a
37. General Baking Co. v. Board of Street Comm'rs, 242 Mass. 194, 196-97, 136
N.E. 245, 246 (1922). This case was relied on in part by Brougher v. Board of Public
Works, 205 Cal. 426, 433-34, 271 P. 487, 490-91 (1928), note 34 supra.
38. Palmetto Petroleum, Inc. v. City of Mullins, 251 S.C. 24, 27-28, 159 S.E.2d 854,
856 (1968).

39. Ackerman Fuel Oil Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 136 N.J.L. 93, 54 A.2d 661
(1947).
40. The discussion here must of necessity be general and conclusory, due simply
to the immense quantity of traditional zoning decisions and authorities. Accordingly,
notes 41-50 will cite recognized treatises and exemplary cases, foregoing detailed citations for recognized general propositions.
41. See, e.g., RATHKOPF, supra note 18.
42. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 685-A5 (West 1964); ALI MODEL LAND
DEV. CODE § 1-202(3)(d) (1975).
An unusual contrary policy exists in California's
coastal zone. South Coast Regional Comm'n v. Gordon, 18 Cal. 3d 832, 558 P.2d 867,
135 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1977).
43. A classic statement of praise for the detached single-family dwelling appears in
Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 492-95, 234 P. 381, 386-87 (1925).
Some of the psychological and cultural bases for that position are explored in Berger,
supra note 14, at 263-67.
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permit to construct a single-family dwelling was highly unlikely.

Con-

versely, because it was a type of land use with the highest probability
of fulfillment, the landowner had an excellent opportunity to secure
vested rights to construct and occupy a dwelling.
When discussing the use of building permits, subdivision approvals, or other elementary forms of traditional regulatory control,
many courts refer to those regulatory permits as documents that must
be granted "as of right."44 Under such a system, the prevailing rule

is that the government regulators are obliged to grant the necessary
permits whenever an applicant has demonstrated prima facie com-

pliance with the applicable regulations:

"The granting or withhold-

ing of a building permit is not a matter of arbitrary discretion and

generally if the applicant complies with the applicable laws he is
entitled to a permit as a matter of right, regardless of the opinion

or action of the issuing officials." 45 The rule is widely applied and
is undoubtedly derived from the prevailing practice of using permitted use categories that do not require the exercise of administrative discretion.
In contrast to the permitted use classification is the increasingly
popular process of denominating special categories of uses that will
be permitted only after the affirmative action of a governmental administrative body. Although issued under a variety of labels, "special
permits" are now available in most jurisdictions for a multitude of uses
that, although potentially appropriate in a district, will only be author44. The concept of development as of right was, of course, an underlying premise
of the early Euclidean model. The system was designed to be self-executing, in which
any would-be developer could simply ascertain the appropriate zoning restrictions and
then apply for and receive the necessary construction or building permits without being
required to receive the discretionary approval of an administrative official. See, e.g.,
NATIONAL ComassxssoN oN UnBAN P oBLms, BumInN THE AmEwcAN Crr 202 (1968);
1 WLLIAMS, supra note 18, at § 16.06. See generally Note, Administrative Discretion
in Zoning, 82 HAiv. L. REv. 668 (1969); Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function
in Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60.
45. Bills v. Township of Grand Blanc, 59 Mich. App. 619, 623, 229 N.W.2d 871,
874 (1975); City of Buffalo v. Kellner, 90 Misc. 407, 416, 153 N.Y. Supp. 472, 477
(1915). The traditional and almost universal recognition of this rule is thus summarized: "So long as the application is in order and the proposed use of the property
complies with applicable municipal ordinances... the applicant is entitled to a permit,
and it is the duty of the administrative officer to issue one to him." 2 PATHKoPv, supra
note 18, at ch. 55 § 3 (3d ed. 1972). The assumption that the building permit must
be issued often takes the form of a rule that mandamus will lie to require the administrative officer to perform the ministerial act of issuing the permit. See, e.g., 4 ANDERsoN,
supra note 17, at § 26.05. The rule is occasionally cited in California. See, e.g., Ellis
v. City Council, 222 Cal. App. 2d 490, 497, 35 Cal. Rptr. 317, 321 (1963).
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ized after the satisfaction of various conditions precedent. 46 These
permits are by nature always subject to discretionary approval.
Unfortunately, courts often discuss both the permitted and the
special uses as though they involved similar situations requiring similar
forms of regulatory permits and were subject to the same rules of law.
The similar treatment of dissimilar regulatory processes has resulted
in a confused body of permit law. A court's initial characterization
of a particular form of regulatory permit either as one which must be
granted as of right or as one subject to discretionary review has predictable consequences; the choice of nomenclature applied to the
permit has the talismanic effect of dictating the outcome of the vested
rights controversy. Thus, if a court considers all building permits
within the "as of right" category, it will mandate the issuance of the
permit even if the issuance actually depended on a substantial exercise
of discretion. Unfortunately, a large number of courts rely exclusively
on stare decisis to determine the nature of a particular permit without
an examination of its role as established by the applicable legislation.4T
A detailed examination of the case law exposes the fallacy of that practice and demonstrates that the characterization of the permit cannot
be determined in a dogmatic fashion; the choice instead is directly
dependent on the degree of subjective discretion which is delegated
by the legislature to the permit-issuing decisionmakers. 48 When the
standards established by the permit law are so strict or detailed that
they eclipse the exercise of discretion, then the permission to develop
must be granted once the standards have been satisfied. Because the
governmental action is merely ministerial, the landowner may then
insist upon a right to the permit's issuance. 49 In contrast, when sub46. Modem practice employs the discretionary permit technique under a variety
of terms, including special use permits, special exceptions, conditional use permits,
planned unit development controls, and similar terms. See generally 2 ANDERSON,
supra note 17, at § 9.18. The several forms of discretionary approvals were consolidated
by ALI MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-201 (1975) as "special development permits,"
whose issuance is to be based on findings and conclusions resulting from the proceedings
of an administrative hearing. The Code takes pains to note that special development
permits always involve the discretion of the issuing agency, in contrast to the "general
development permit" which is to be granted as of right on compliance with the terms
of the ordinance. Id. at § 2-101(2). The several forms of discretionary permits are
discussed at notes 61-91 & accompanying text infra.
47. E.g., Burroughs v. Board of County Comm'rs, 88 N.M. 303, 540 P.2d 233
(1975).

48.

5

WILLIAMS,

supra note 18, at § 148.07.

See also ALI

MODEL LAND DEV.

§ 2-202 (1975), and commentary thereto.
49. E.g., Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 11 Or. App. 177, 501 P.2d 85 (1972).
See text accompanying note 30 supra.
CODE
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jective criteria clearly allow the application of broad discretion, there
is no longer a "right" to issuance of the permit, but its issuance is
instead regarded as a matter of administrative judgment. Thus, as
subjective and discretionary criteria expand, there is a corresponding
decrease in situations in which a landowner can demand the issuance
of a permit as of right.50 In the terminology developed above, as the
exercise of subjective discretion increases, there is less opportunity for
the landowner or developer to claim the establishment of a vested development right. Here, much more than elsewhere, governmental
intervention determines the existence and scope of the development
right.
Another feature of the common law evolution of development
rights theory was the early and frequent reference to the distinction
between a government-granted "privilege" and a "right." No doubt
some of the confusion over the stature to be awarded building permits
derives from philosophical disagreement regarding the nature of governmental action. Thus, in the abstract, permission or authorization
that is created solely by specific governmental action might be expected
to be restricted, conditional, or otherwise limited in nature and therefore rather ephemeral and incapable of being made secure by the
vesting process. Alternatively, any governmental authorization could
be viewed as relatively guaranteed and secure and therefore more
easily vested precisely because of its official stature.
The distinction between rights and privileges was frequently made
in the jurisprudential writings of the early twentieth century and reflected a basic assumption that legal rights, by definition, were worthy
of legal protection but that mere privileges derived from governmental
largess warranted no particular protection from the legal system.5 '
Although use of that distinction has now been generally discredited
by leading courts,52 its continued presence in the vested rights cases
should be recognized as a spurious distinction.
The right-privilege distinction is merely conclusory. It relies on
the circular reasoning53 that, because an interest is not worthy of legal
50. See generally, 5 WLLAMS, supra note 18, at § 148.04; 3 ANDERsoN, supra
note 17, at § 19.03.
51. Van AIstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HAnlv. L. ERy. 1439 (1968); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733, 740,

768 (1964).
52. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, (1972); Bagley v. Washington
Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 503-04, 421 P.2d 409, 413, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401,
405 (1966).
53. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HAslv. L. REv. 1439, 1458-60 (1968).
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protection, it is a mere privilege; as a privilege, it deserves no legal
protection. If it were significant enough to be worthy of protection,
however, it would be a right; as a right, it would deserve and receive
legal protection. References to the early land development permits as
"licenses" reflected the same conclusory categorization. A license was
understood to be a revocable privilege or interest, as distinct from other
54
more secure interests which had the character of irrevocable rights.
If it is recognized that the right-privilege or right-license distinctions are conclusory, much the same may be said for general usage
of the term "vested." 55 That term is frequently applied in a circular
fashion to describe any interest that is protected by the law. Hence,
to assert that a person has a vested right is merely to announce the
conclusion that a court will protect that interest. It thus becomes a
truism for a court to assert that "[i]f a permittee has acquired a vested
property right under a permit, the permit cannot be revoked" 56 or that
a vested right is "an interest which it is proper for the state to recognize and protect, and of which the individual may not be deprived
arbitrarily without injustice." 57
Use of the term "vested" is in many ways unfortunate, as it tends
to focus attention on the alleged right or interest being asserted5 8 and
too often diverts attention from the several elements of the analytical
54. "This is not a permit respecting a pure personal privilege, nor is it dependent
in its nature upon governmental permission, where there may be revocation for sufficient legal reason even in the absence of express power to revoke." General Baking
Co. v. Board of Street Comm'rs, 242 Mass. 194, 196, 136 N.E. 245, 246 (1922). Analogous distinctions are commonly made between a real property license, which is revocable, and an easement, which is not. Although the nature of the interest in land
is similar, the distinction turns on an analysis of the several characteristics of the
interest that render it subject to revocation. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §
8.110 (A. J. Casner, ed. 1952); 3 POWELL, supra note 15, at ff 427. See generally
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 519 (1944).
55. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592 n.9, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376,
128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976); 2 D. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 41.06 (4th ed. 1973); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692, 696 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Hochman]. One author concluded that "the term 'vested right' . . . is one of convenience and not of definition. It cannot mean more than a property interest, the infringement of which would shock society's sense of justice." Variable Quality of a
Vested Right, supra note 7, at 307 (footnote omitted). Metro Homes, Inc. v. City
of Warren, 19 Mich. App. 664, 670, 173 N.W.2d 230, 234 (1969), cert. denied 398
U.S. 959 (1970).
56. Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 784,
194 P.2d 148, 152 (1948).

57.
58.

Miller v. McKenna, 23 Cal. 2d 774, 783, 147 P.2d 531, 536 (1944).
Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L.

BEv. 540, 561 (1956)

[hereinafter cited as Greenblatt].
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process that must be used to determine whether the right indeed merits
legal protection. The oddly nonanalytical results which often follow
seem to reflect the fact that vested rights analysis carries its own
mystique. Most courts treat the analysis as a process of metaphysical
transformation, in which an asserted property interest acquires or
achieves increased stature through the intervention of external events.
The enigmatic language in Brougher is illustrative; the court stated
that a building permit may be revoked unless the permittee had done
something under color of the permit by which "the mere privilege
would ripen into a vested right."59 The term instead should be recognized as the end product of a process that weighs and analyzes a
private interest to determine whether it is of sufficient status to receive
legal protection. Defining a vested right as a right that has been
subjected to analysis and thereby determined to be deserving of legal
protection is a more accurate statement. 0o
Modern Permit Systems

The vast majority of urban American land regulatory agencies now
require that any development,0 ' occurring or proposed within their
jurisdictions, take place only under the authority of a regulatory permit. In most areas the permit will merely be the familiar building
permit, but in more62 modern parlance it will be denominated a "development permit."

An application for a development permit may be processed by
any combination of agencies. It can be reviewed and the permit issued by the same regulatory agency that performs the planning and
administers the land use regulations, such as the new regional agencies
which have been established to control a broad span of development
59. 205 Cal. 426, 434, 271 P. 487, 490-91 (1928) (quoting Southern Leasing Co.
v. Ludwig, 168 App. Div. 233, 235, 153 N.Y.S. 545, 547 (1915)). See text accompanying note 34 supra.
60. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d 839, 844, 402 P.2d
868, 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. 796, 799 (1965), in which the court recognized the futility of
relying on the conclusory term, and instead chose to analyze the underlying reasons
for the claim.
61. Development is often broadly defined to include, e.g., "the performance of
any building or mining operation, [or] the making of any material change in the use
or appearance of any structure of land ......
ALI MoDEL LA D DEV. CODE § 1-202
(1) (1976). A much more inclusive definition is contained in CAL. PuB. REs. CODE
§ 30106 (West 1977). The pattern is widespread. See, e.g., N. J. STAT. ANN. §
40:55D-4 (West Supp. 1977).
62. E.g., ALI MODEL LAND DEv. CODE § 2-102 (1976); CAL. Put. REs. CoDE
§ 30101.5 (West 1977). Under some systems, a single development permit process
might combine the traditionally separate approval processes of zoning, subdivision control, and other special regulatory devices.
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activities.6 3 Alternatively, the development permit may be reviewed
and issued by a related agency, which merely checks the application
against the standards and interpretations promulgated by the regulatory agency. The latter practice is the norm among traditional municipal governments, in which the building permit is issued by a city
department other than the planning department.
When a development permit is required by law for all forms
of development activity, apparently the requirement of government
authorization totally preempts any claim to an inherent right to develop
the land without government authorization. 6 4 Because the salient
characteristic of most new permit systems is a broad delegation of
discretionary authority,65 the new permits will seldom be issued as of
right but will instead almost invariably be recognized as subject to
highly subjective standards and criteria. This widespread and, in
many areas, longstanding requirement of a permit has also changed
the expectations of developers and landowners. The public should
be fully aware of the permit requirement, and cannot claim surprise
or frustration of a justified expectation of an unhindered inherent right
to develop land. 6 This awareness does not mean that there will be
a lack of challenges to the existence of a regulatory permit scheme or
of challenges to its policies but means that the imposition of the process
is understood to preclude the continuance of previously unfettered
development activity.
When a permit is used to authorize development activity, the
See, e.g., ALI MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-102 (1976); CAL. PuB. REs. CODE
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7005 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 6083, 6086 (1975 & Supp. 1977).
64. See text accompanying note 30 supra. Lack of a claim to an inherent right
does not deny the possibility that authority to develop might arise in a landowner by
operation of equitable estoppel, under which the inequitable actions of the regulatory
agency, rather than the actions of the landowner, are the source of the authorization.
See notes 98-100 & accompanying text infra. Nor does it deny that arbitrary or unreasonably regulatory practices might be determined to be constitutionally invalid.
This latter qualification, however, may occur without being predicated on an inherent
right to develop.
65. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra. Many of the new permit systems
rely on a technique known as impact zoning or discretionary review, in which no final
regulatory designation is applied to a particular parcel of land until a development
project has been proposed for that site and its potential impact thoroughly analyzed.
See, e.g., W. REILLY, THE USE OF LAND 177-92 (1973); Yannacone, Rahenkamp &
Cerchione, Impact Zoning: Alternative to Exclusion in the Suburbs, 8 UaB. LAW. 417,
441-43 (1976).
63.

§ 30601 (West 1977);

66.

See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 521, 542 P.2d 237, 246,

125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 374 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
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643

terms and conditions of the permit define the scope of the development
that may occur under its aegis. In short, the permit defines and quantifies the extent of the governmentally-granted development right..
Thus, courts confronted with regulatory systems that depend entirely
on governmental permission for development authority have recognized that the permit process establishes the scope of the development
interest by setting limitations on the nature of the use, its bulk, density,
arrangement on the site, or even its potential duration. 67
Because the permit system at once establishes the authority to
develop and also the scope of the development right, the conclusion
follows that the system carries with it the ability to determine whether
and at what point the granted right should be considered permanent
or irrevocable. Legislative bodies, therefore, occasionally attempt
to forestall occurrence of vested rights controversies by establishing
a statutory rule of irrevocability.0 8 The legislation establishing a
permit system might simply adopt the common law rule of vested
rights applied in that jurisdiction, leaving it to the courts to determine whether and when a developer's claims constitute a vested development right. The adoption of the common law rule can be accomplished either by omitting any statutory reference to the problem
or by expressly adopting a paraphrase of the appropriate rule.o
The second major approach to establishing a protected point of
irrevocability is to make a legislative declaration that a newly instituted permit system is specifically intended to grant an irrevocable
authorization to develop, despite its general regulatory prohibitions.
This technique is generally known as a savings clause. The declara67.

The breadth of conditions considered appropriate in the issuance of special

permits is documented in 3 ANonusoN, supra note 17, at § 19.29-.32; 5 WLLAMS,

supra note 18, at ch. 151. ALI MonEr. LAND DEy. CoDE: § 2-103 (1976), distinguishes
the breadth of appropriate conditions depending on whether the development permit
to be granted is under an as of right or special (discretionary) system. The latter
category encompasses the highly flexible conditions and restrictions that may be imposed under a planned unit development system.
68. It is not settled whether a legislative statement of irrevocability may operate
to the exclusion of other private interests, such as those claimed by neighbors of a
project, when a permit is made irrevocable despite their objections, see, e.g., Rathkopf
v. Remsen St. Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 923, 924, 238 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (1963), or to the
detriment of public interests in enforcement of new legislation. The latter is an exception noted in Camparo v. Township of Woodbridge, 91 N.J. Super. 585, 589, 222
A.2d 28, 30 (1966). California courts have recently noted the possibility of common
law exceptions to the statutory determination of irrevocability. See note 135 infra.
69. The original California Coastal Zone Act. See notes 284-303 & accompanying
text infra.
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tion may exist as a blanket immunity 0 or amnesty, 71 which grants
protection to any developer as of the date of application for or granting of a permit, 72 or in the form of the familiar grandfather provision,
in which a particular statute or ordinance exempts from its proscriptions any projects or activities that fall within a specifically exempted
category defined by the legislature.3 Such provisions are generally
considered valid, perhaps because they are not so much a new grant
of legislative authority as they are a decision by the legislature not
to exercise its power over a particular category of developments.
Perhaps the most significant shift from early Euclidean practices
is the frequent application of modem land development permit systems
to projects that involve several phases of construction, with at least
two separate stages of planning and authorization involved for each
phase. Although subdivision procedures for years have relied on the
preparation and review of first a preliminary and then a final plan of
development, a similar multistep process of authorization has recently
become commonplace for planned unit development and similar flexible special approval techniques, which are authorized under the
auspices of special permits, floating zones, or specific rezoning actions.74
Whatever the nomenclature involved, the basic process under any
of the systems described above remains the same. A developer submits a tentative or preliminary design proposal, often merely in conceptual form.7" That proposal is reviewed by the regulatory agency
and, if approved and adopted by it, establishes the operative guidelines for the actual development of the parcels involved. The approval
may be in the form of a rezoning of the developer's parcel or merely
the acceptance by the agency of the proposals proferred by the developer. A second step of final, or precise, planning is then pursued.
The precise plan, prepared by the developer according to the dictates
of the preliminary plan review, is then submitted for detailed regulatory review and adoption, after which it constitutes the binding regulation for the development of the parcel. 76 Primarily owing to the
70. Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d
34, 40, 423 P.2d 824, 829, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677 (1967).
71. Camparo v. Township of Woodbridge, 91 N.J. Super. 585, 589, 222 A.2d 28,

30 (1966).
72. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, § 6 (West Supp. 1977).
73. See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1150 (1973).
74. Sternlieb, Burchell, Hughes & Listoken, Planned Unit Development Legislation, 7 UaB. L. ANN. 71, 77 (1974).
75. See Rockway v. Stefani, 23 Or. App. 639, 543 P.2d 1089 (1975).
76. See, e.g., Millbrae Ass'n For Residential Survival v. City of Millbrae, 262 Cal.
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existence of this multistep approval process, considered essential to

the planning and analysis of complex land development projects, the
modem application of the vested rights doctrine has become overly

burdensome and confused.
If, for instance, the first step of a two-step process is seen as the
stage at which the actual discretionary decisionmaking occurs, the
second step might be considered to be merely ministerial.77 If the

second step is indeed ministerial and mandatory for the agency, a
78
court could direct that a developer receive second-step authorization.
Such a situation would be analogous to the general doctrine discussed
above regarding as of right permits.79 That possibility, however, appears to apply to only a narrow range of cases because multistep, large-

scale land development projects almost invariably involve a variety of
interlocking discretionary requirements. Hence, although the California courts have mandated approval of a final subdivision map when

there was no difference in the applicable legal requirements between
the tentative and final maps,8 0 they have regularly refused to mandate
permit issuance or recognize a vested right when there were additional
discretionary factors involved in the approval of the second stage.

Thus, in Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional
App. 2d 222, 239-41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251, 263-65 (1968); Moore v. City of Boulder, 484
P.2d 134, 136 (Colo. App. 1971); see generally ALI MoDEL LAND DEv. CODE § 2-211
(1976).
77. See Lincoln Property Co. No. 41 v. Law, 45 Cal. App. 3d 230, 234-35, 119
Cal. Rptr. 292, 294-95 (1975); Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n v. City of Los
Angeles, 31 Cal. App. 3d 403, 410, 107 Cal. Rptr. 359, 363 (1973). In Great Western
Savings the court interpreted the California Subdivision Map Act provisions, 1943 Cal.
Stats. ch. 128, § I (current version at CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66410-99.37 (West Supp.
1977)), to require that after acceptance of a tentative map, the only function remaining to the regulatory authorities was the "administrative, ministerial, and mandatory"
duty to approve the final tract map. Other jurisdictions, e.g., Connecticut, have consistently adopted an administrative characterization for the function of approving or
disapproving particular subdivision plans. J & M Realty Co. v. City of Norwalk, 156
Conn. 185, 189-90, 239 A.2d 534, 536-37 (1968).
78. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. App.
3d 403, 414, 107 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366-67 (1973). A similar rule appears to have developed in other jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., BK Dev. Corp. v. City of Norwalk,
156 Conn. 369, 374-77, 242 A.2d 781, 784-85 (1968); Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Township
of Freehold, 120 NJ. Super. 595, 598, 295 A.2d 397, 399 (1972).
79. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
80. See note 77 supra. An important facet of the Great Western Savings decision involved the statutory directive that the final map "shall be accepted" once the
final map is shown to have complied with the provisions and conditions of the tentative
map. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 409-10, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 363. Great Western Savings
was expressly distinguished on that ground in Save El Toro Ass'n v. Days, 74 Cal. App.
3d 64, 68-70, 141 Cal. Rptr. 282, 284-85 (1977).
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Commission,81 the California Supreme Court rejected the ministerial
issuance claim advanced by the developer of a large multistage project.
The court noted that the building permit ordinance of the regulatory
municipality contained an open-ended clause clearly requiring compliance with "'other pertinent laws and ordinances,' "82 reasoning that
the clause thereby held open the grounds on which the final decision
was to be made. 83 Similarly, in People v. County of Kern,84 ministerial issuance of building permits was rejected when the conditions
of subdivision approval clearly required additional zoning actions that
were necessarily discretionary in nature. The court said, "Because
the County retained discretion to deny the application to rezone the
property [the developer] does not have an), vested right in the development such that any future action by the County pursuant to its police
power would be ineffectual."85 The ministerial issuance claim is yet
more difficult to frame when there clearly exist additional legal requirements that are independent of the ministerial process. Thus, if
additional zoning8 6 or planning 8 7 requirements remain unmet, their
presence serves to dilute the argument for ministerial issuance. Certainly the regulatory agency cannot be required to issue a permit in
satisfaction of one of its responsibilities when to do so would defeat
the performance of another and independent responsibility of equal
or greater importance. California courts thus have been unmoved by
requests for ministerial issuance when the additional required discretionary authorizations arise from separate statutory powers. 88 The
81. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1083 (1977).
82. Id. at 795, 553 P.2d at 553, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (quoting ORANGE Co.,
CAL., BLDG. CODE § 302(a) (1973)).
Section 302(c) of the Uniform Building Code
provides that: "The issuance or granting of a permit or approval of plans and specifications shall not be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, any violation
of any of the provisions of this Code." Similar provisions exist in many municipal
ordinances. See, e.g., Weiner v. City of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 697, 705, 441 P.2d
293, 299, 68 Cal. Rptr. 733, 739 (1968) (Los Angeles code).
83. A similar result obtained in Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast
Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 71, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 672-73 (1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977), which observed that the Avco court had mentioned and
apparently discounted the ministerial issuance theory. See text accompanying note 323
infra.
84. 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1974).
85. Id. at 839, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
86. See Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal.
App. 3d 57, 72, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 673 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
87. See Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors, 71 Cal. App. 3d 655, 664-69, 139
Cal. Rptr. 741, 745-48 (1977).
88. Id. Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63
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latter problem merely introduces another, larger concern. The development process is bedeviled by a multiplicity of permit requirements
arising either from one agency with several responsibilities, as when
a single agency exercises both zoning and subdivision powers, or from
separate agencies exercising separate powers. This problem is increasing as additional regulatory agencies are created to deal with
emergent environmental problems.8 9
There is little sense to a regulatory process that imposes complex
subdivision approval procedures, only to follow them with a separate
zoning approval process which reviews much of the same material.90
Some planned unit development ordinances have therefore attempted
to avoid the obvious duplication by adopting a unitary approval process
which is designed to reconcile the two processes. 91 Such a process
of consolidation would prevent the present duplication of analysis and
review, saving time for both the developer and agency and securing
important economic and quality benefits for the general public.
In many ways the ministerial issuance problem is but a microcosm
of the greater vested rights conundrum. The necessity for giving the
developer some assurances on which to base his necessary business.
planning92 becomes ever more pressing when the project requires
numerous stages over a span of several years. Yet recognition of
the reluctance of the regulatory agency to take actions that forestall
its ability to recognize and respond to changed conditions as they
impinge on its several responsibilities is also necessary. A partial
resolution of these conflicting concerns is suggested in Chapter IV of
Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); People

v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1974).
89.
90.

F. BossEi.m", D. FE.uum & C. SiEmoN, THE PERMIT EXPLOSION (1976).
E.g., 5 WmLAms, supra note 18, at §§ 156.09, 163.81.
91. UrnAN LAND INsTrrurE, LARGE-ScALE DEVEL MENT 79-80 (1977). See
ALI MODEL LAND DEV. CODE Commentary to Article 2 at 21, and §§ 1-202(1), 2101(1), 2-203 (1976) (same format adopted).
92. A later opinion in the dispute at issue in People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal.
App. 3d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1974), contains a resolution by the county supervisors asserting their desire to give the developer "a decisive and unequivocal answer"
regarding future use of the property, the purchase of which was undertaken "in reasonable and good faith reliance upon a long standing policy and practice.., to more or
less ministerially and automatically approve a developer's final subdivision map when
the developer had complied with all conditions of the County approved tentative
subdivision map ....
[The developer's] willingness to pay $600,000.00 for the 285
acres was entirely dependent upon receipt by [the developer] from the County of some
reasonably reliable indication that the County would approve and allow [the] development proposal." People v. County of Kern, 62 Cal. App. 3d 761, 780, 781-82, 133
Cal. Rptr. 389, 401, 403-04 (1976) (subsequent case).
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this Article but is dependent on some of the doctrines of equitable
estoppel.
Equitable Estoppel
A majority of courts presume that the rationale underlying the
9
vested rights doctrine is found in the concept of equitable estoppel.
Numerous decisions therefore recite and evaluate various considerations of a general equitable nature in order to determine whether those
factors have created vested rights in the claimant. Unfortunately, although courts purport to rely on estoppel theories, they often fail to
consider the totality of the elements usually thought necessary to establish an estoppel against a government regulatory agency. Whether
that failure stems from lack of information, inattention, or a desire to
avoid the outcome dictated by a consideration of the requisite elements, the result is almost always an imperfectly formulated rationale.
Occasionally, the result is a misapplication of the law.
In 1970 California's Supreme Court set out the general elements
of equitable estoppel in the carefully researched case of City of Long

Beach v. Mansell:
The venerable doctrine of equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais,
which rests firmly upon a foundation of conscience and fair dealing, finds its classical statement in the words of Lord Denman:
"[T]he rule of law is clear, that, where one by his words or conduct
wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state
of things, and induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his
own previous position, the former is concluded from averring
against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same
time ....

"Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order
to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be
estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that
his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party
asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended;
(3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts,
and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury." Keeping
93.

The apparent majority rule in the United States is set out in Annot., 49

A.L.R.3d 13, § 3 at 26 (1973), and in Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the

Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 UrB. L.
ANN.63 [hereinafter cited as Heeter].

It is the contention of this Article that a variety

of other rationales underlie the vested rights doctrine as well. Estoppel is also the
apparent emerging rule in Great Britain and Canada. See Joseph, Determinationsand
Estoppel in Planning, 125 NEw L.J. 279 (1975); Bentley, Estoppel in Public Law:
A Reply, 125 NEw L.J. 379 (1975). If that is the case, the British rule has arisen

under a system quite unlike the American.

See materials cited at note 15 supra.
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in mind the admitted generality of this formulation and the flexibility which is necessary to its proper concrete application within
the broad equitable framework we have expressed, it may be said
that the elements here stated are basic to the general doctrine of
equitable estoppel as it exists in this and other jurisdictions. 4
The general doctrine of equitable estoppel recited above is not
the rule actually applied in land development cases. Instead, courts
have evolved rough rules of zoning estoppel to deal with the particular
type of claims raised by land developers. A major study of the case
law produced a rule of zoning estoppel which consolidates those
factors regularly discussed by courts in land regulation cases:
A local government exercising its zoning powers will be estopped
when a property owner, (1) relying in good faith (2) upon some
act or omission of the government (3) has made such a substantial
change in position or incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and
95 unjust to destroy
the rights which he ostensibly had acquired.
General Concerns in Applying Estoppel Against Government
Although there are some major distinctions between operation of
the general doctrine of equitable estoppel and that applied in zoning
disputes, both rules share a common threshold problem: the ancient
rule that courts must refuse to apply estoppel against the government.9 6
The rule retains its currency in a few areas,17 but in many jurisdictions
it has now been sufficiently qualified to make estoppel at least theoretically available against the government in a variety of situations. The
great majority of jurisdictions now demonstrate a substantial willingness to entertain claims of equitable estoppel against governmental
entities engaged in land use regulation. 98 The trend is welcomed by
94. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 488-89, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 42, 476 P.2d 423, 442 (1970) (quoting Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. 2d 297, 305, 431 P.2d 245, 250, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 661, 666 (1967) (citation omitted)).
95. Heeter supra note 93, at 66. The rule as stated therein is essentially that
enumerated in many cases. E.g., Sakoisky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433,
435 (Fla. 1963).
96. 2 K. DAvis, A smSma-ATV LAW § 17.01 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DAvis];
Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 338 (1948).
97. Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 247-51, 506 P.2d 470, 474-78
(1973) (majority and dissenting opinions, with exhaustive citations); Lewis Cox &
Son, Inc. v. High Plains Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 538 S.W.2d
659, 663 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1976). See Comment, Application of the Doctrine of
Estoppel to Land Use Control and Municipal Taxation, 23 BAYLoR L. Rxv. 590 (1971).
98. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 15 (Fla.
1976); Benson v. City of De Soto, 212 Kan. 415, 423-25, 510 P.2d 1281, 1288-89
(1973); Re-Lu, Inc. v. City of Kenner, 284 So. 2d 866, 868 (La. Ct. App. 1973);
Murrell v. Wolff, 408 S.W.2d 842, 851 (Mo. 1966); Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 32 N.J.
448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960); Lefrak Forest Hills Corp. v. Galvin, 40 App. Div. 2d 211,
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many commentators and courts, who have urged that the quasi-immunity from equitable estoppel enjoyed by various governments should
fall for the same reasons that a large number of courts and legislatures
have repudiated the broad protections afforded the government under
theories of sovereign immunity.9 9 Generally these arguments, recognizing that "repudiation of representations is dirty business,"' 0 0 urge
that the government should not be able to claim immunity and thereby ignore the manifest injustice which results from the misleading acts
of its agents. Indeed, many of the cases which do allow the application of equitable estoppel against the government in land regulation
matters proceed on precisely that premise.
To state a willingness to consider the doctrine, however, is by no
means to guarantee that relief will be forthcoming. Probably a majority of jurisdictions now recognize equitable estoppel as a valid claim
against the government but continue regularly to deny relief under
that theory on the facts of specific cases. The rationales for judicial
hesitance to abandon totally the government's immunity from equitable
action are varied and reflect pragmatic considerations, ranging from
protection of governmental finances to a need for flexibility. Also
relevant are the more theoretical underpinnings suggested by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.10 1 Some of the reasons for the refusal are therefore those which earlier prevented consideration of the
doctrine and continue to be based on the simple observation that the
government is not a private person; rules of equitable estoppel which
may be applied in dealings between private parties are often assumed
to be inappropriate when the result would be to interfere with important governmental functions and activities. Thus, for example, many
jurisdictions continue to distinguish between governmental and proprietary functions performed by the governmental entity and hold
that, although estoppel may be readily applied against proprietary
338 N.Y.S.2d 932, aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 796, 345 N.Y.S.2d 547, 298 N.E.2d 685 (1973);
Reichenback v. Windward at Southampton, 80 Misc. 2d 1031, 364 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1975);
DAvis, supra note 96, at § 17.04 (Supp. 1976); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 338, § 7 (1948 &
Supp. 1976).
99. 2 DAvis, supra note 96, at § 17.01, 17.03, 17.05, 17.09; Comment, Never
Trust a Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against the Government, 42 So. CAL. L. REv. 391, 39396 (1969); Comment, Estoppel Against the Government in California, 44 CAL. L. REv.
340 (1956).
100. Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 680, 707 (1954).
101. The reasons traditionally advanced are recounted in Comment, Never Trust
a Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against the Government, 42 So. CAL. L. REv. 391, 393-401
(1969); Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. Cm. L. RFv. 680, 683-97

(1954).
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actions, it should be applied against governmental or sovereign activities only in unusual circumstances. 10 2 Others recognize the applicability of the doctrine against the government but repeatedly rule that
it should be applied only in rare and unusual circumstances. 103
Estoppel Against Government in Land Development Matters

Those cases that decline to estop a government regulatory agency
in land development matters reflect a variety of reasons for the denial,
including any of the traditional concerns discussed above or the absence of one of the necessary elements of estoppel.10 4
A close examination of the case law yields a related factor of
considerable import. The generally accepted rule of zoning estoppel
appears to place primary emphasis on the conduct of the landowner
or developer rather than the equally important conduct of the governmental body. 10 5 The zoning estoppel rule totally fails- moreover
to consider a major qualification recognized in most discussions of
the general doctrine of equitable estoppel: that estoppel should not
be invoked where to do so "would operate to defeat the effective
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public." 00 The zoning
estoppel rule thus always tends to favor the developer, first by stressing
reliance and next by failing to assess the often considerable governmental and public interests at stake. The combination of these two
elements, which greatly favors the developer at the expense of the
government, may explain much of the discomfort felt by some courts
in granting relief to a land developer on a theory of zoning estoppel.
The general absence of the second element is particularly note102. See, e.g., Metropolitan Park Dist. v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 85 Wash.
2d 821, 827, 539 P.2d 854, 858 (1975). Extensive citations are found in 28 Am. Jur.

2d Estoppel and Waiver §§ 129-33 (1966), and 31 C.J.S. Estoppel §§ 138, 140-41
(1964).
103. E.g., People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 838, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67,
73 (1974). See generally, Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 338 (Supp. 1976).
104. See, e.g., Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 15 Cal. 3d 720, 725, 543 P.2d 264,
267, 125 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1976) (developer knew that previous permit had expired
when he sought further approvals relied on as the basis for estoppel); Haymon v. City
of Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185, 188-89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (developer held to
have constructive knowledge of restrictions, not able to claim uninformed reliance);
Ryan v. Department of Revenue, 68 Wis. 2d 467, 471, 228 N.W.2d 357, 359 (1975)
(failure to show facts sufficient to create an estoppel when claimed reliance was not
justified).
105. A similar process occurs in matters of retroactivity. See notes 159-63 & accompanying text infra; Greenblatt, supra note 58, at 561.
106. County of San Diego v. California Water & Tel. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 817, 826,
186 P.2d 124, 130 (1947). See note 107 infra.
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worthy.107 That element cautions against estopping a government if
to do so would thwart the exercise of sovereign powers or threaten
public interests. The public protection element embodies the vestiges
of the former total prohibition against any estoppel of government and
probably represents the most logical basis for that overbroad rule.
Indeed, it appears to recognize the very area in which there is an
inherent distinction between applying the rules of estoppel against a
private person and against a government agency. The public protection element, therefore, would be expected to figure prominently
in discussions of governmental regulatory actions. Oddly enough,
beyond an obligatory recital in the treatises, 10 8 it appears infrequently
in the case law. 10 9 Whether its absence results from a highly developed sense of protection of real property rights, from being absorbed
in the larger rationales which protect governmental immunity, or from
the particular facts of the cases is not clear.
At least one jurisdiction, California, appears to have applied the
doctrine extensively.110 Long Beach v. Mansell, quoted above for the
general elements of equitable estoppel, specifically addressed the doctrinal "tension" between the "principle favoring avoidance of manifest
injustice, and that seeking to preserve the public interest.""' After
an extensive discussion of the facts, the court postulated a general
standard for equitable estoppel against the government:
107. Many commentators have observed that traditional zoning cases essentially
reflect a conflict between competing private interests, with concerns for the public weal
having been made subordinate to the interests of various groups of landowners. In
that context, zoning rarely is concerned with substantial public considerations. Babcock
& Feurer, supra note 25, at 300.
108. E.g., 28 AM. JuR. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §§ 128-30 (1966); 31 C.J.S.
Estoppel §§ 138, 140 (1964).
109. The rule was directly discussed in Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wash. 2d 161, 17375, 443 P.2d 833, 839 (1968), and City of Milwaukee v. Leavitt, 31 Wis. 2d 72,
73-74, 142 N.W.2d 169, 171-72 (1966). City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d
462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970) (see text accompanying notes 110-12
infra), was cited with approval in Eden v. Board of Trustees, 49 App. Div. 2d 277,
284, 374 N.Y.S.2d 686, 692 (1975). The "revoked permit" cases, cited in Annot.,
6 A.L.R.2d 960 (1949), can be interpreted as involving a strong public policy (represented by the permit or laws on which the permit was based) which would be
thwarted if the government were estopped from denying the validity of the permit.
110. County of San Diego v. California Water & Tel. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 817, 186
P.2d 124 (1947), established the present California rule. Representative later cases
include: City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr.
23 (1970); Department of Public Works v. Ryan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 39 Cal.
App. 3d 804, 812-13, 114 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504-05 (1974); Pettitt v. City of Fresno,
34 Cal. App. 3d 813, 822, 110 Cal. Rptr. 262, 268 (1973), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S.
810 (1974).
111. 3 Cal. 3d at 496, 476 P,2d at 448, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
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The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the
same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to
such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the
considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would
result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is a sufficient dimension
to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would
result from the raising of an estoppel22
As thus constructed, the rule requires a four-step analysis: (1)
Are the general elements of equitable estoppel present, including some
detriment to the party who is claiming reliance? (2) Is there an important public policy at stake? (3) If estoppel were applied against
the government, would its application frustrate the attainment or
recognition of that important public policy to a significant degree?
(4) The potential frustration of the policy must be weighed against
the hardship suffered by the relying party; the court should consider
estoppel only to prevent manifest injustice, but should nevertheless
deny estoppel if the frustration of the public policy is so great as to
be deemed unacceptable. In practice, the analysis detailed above
usually appears as a single equation which at once weighs the inherent
importance of the public policy, the degree of its frustration, and the
hardship on the relying party.
The situations in which the public policy analysis has been applied
by California courts vary greatly. Those cases most easily categorized
involve laws that have rather obvious prohibitory or regulatory purposes. Several cases have refused to estop the government despite
allegations of hardship to a party who has relied when the policy to be
protected was a statutory licensing requirement; to estop the government from denying the validity of a license would allow a potentially
unqualified person to practice, or prey on the citizenry in violation of
statutes enacted to protect the public."13 Other cases have declined
to estop the government when to do so would result in the violation
of a statute of frauds provision regarding the form of a lease," 4
statutes mandating the contractual format to be followed by public
agencies," 5 or the statutory qualifications for tax exemptions."16
112. Id.
113. E.g., Packer v. Board of Behavioral Science Examiners, 52 Cal. App. 3d 190,
196, 125 Cal. Rptr. 96, 100 (1975).
114. State v. Haslett Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 252, 257, 119 Cal. Rptr. 78, 81 (1975).
115. Id.; Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 90-92, 124 P.2d 34, 37-38 (1942);
Advance Medical Diagnostic Lab v. County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. App. 3d 263, 27273, 129 Cal. Rptr. 694, 728-29 (1976); Santa Monica Unified School Dist. v. Persh.
5 Cal. App. 3d 945, 953, 85 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (1970).
116. Goodwill Industries v. County of Los Angeles, 117 Cal. App. 2d 19, 27, 254
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While applying the same rule, the courts have readily allowed estoppel
when, having weighed the circumstances, they determined that the
impact on public policy that would result from an estoppel of the governmental unit would result in no harmful or deleterious effect, because
that impact did not involve depriving the public of the protection of
statutory 1 7 or constitutional provisions." 8
The difficult cases are those in which the elements of estoppel
are present, the public policy is designed for the protection of the
public and is recognized as important, but the hardship on an individual is extreme. The telling question then becomes whether the
frustration of that policy is of less importance than the individual's
hardship. The entire doctrine is thus reduced to a value judgment
of great difficulty, reflecting highly subjective views of equity and
the changing theories of development rights discussed above. 1 9 Several recent California cases illustrate some of the problems involved
in applying the rule.
In Pettitt v. Fresno, 20 the owners of a beauty shop belatedly
discovered that, owing to an unfortunate combination of events, the
building permit under which the shop had been remodeled had been
erroneously issued. The structure was thus in technical violation of
the ordinance because authorized by an invalid permit. Attempts
to obtain a variance or other administrative relief failed. At trial
the owners urged that the city should be estopped to deny the validity of the permit it had issued. The trial court agreed, concluding
that the owners had reasonably spent substantial sums in reliance on
the permit and held that their reasonable detrimental reliance was
sufficient to invoke an estoppel. In reversing the decision, the court
of appeal held that, when invalid permits are involved, the public interest represented by the zoning ordinance always outweighs the
private injury suffered by the individual landowner, as the controversy is no longer strictly between the municipality and an individual
litigant. "To hold that the City can be estopped would not punish
the City, but it would assuredly injure the area residents, who in no
P.2d 877, 879 (1953). See also Paterson v. Board of Trustees, 157 Cal. App. 2d 811,
820-21, 321 P.2d 825, 830 (1958).
117. Crumpler v. Board of Administration, 32 Cal. App. 3d 567, 584, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 293, 305-06 (1973); Berkeley Lawn Bowling Club v. City of Berkeley, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 280, 289, 116 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (1974).
118. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 500, 476 P.2d 423, 450-51,
91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 50 (1970).
119. See notes 14-29 & accompanying text supra.
120. 34 Cal. App. 3d 813, 110 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973).
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way can be held responsible for the City's mistakes." 1 21 The harshness of the result in that case is primarily owing to the fact that the
court did not entertain a specific evaluation of the individual harm,
which was doubtless extreme, but instead relied on the conclusion
that "in this situation the courts have expressly or by necessary implication consistently concluded that the public and community interest in preserving the community patterns established by zoning
laws outweighs the injustice that may be incurred by the individual
in relying upon an invalid permit to build issued in violation of zoning
laws." 22
The outcome of Pettitt represents an unfortunate refusal to engage in specific equitable balancing. The rule there adopted, that
the interests represented by invalid permits are always outweighed
by the public interest, may have been based on the special role of
the permit in regulation law 123 or on rules of agency and tort liability
that have always been part of the "invalid permit" cases. 124 Neither
appears to be an adequate basis for refusing to engage in the detailed balancing now required in other cases that entertain claims of
estoppel against the government.
A contrasting approach is illustrated by People v. Department
of Housing and Community Development,125 in which a county district attorney sought the rescission of a state permit which had been
issued without an environmental impact report and which therefore
arguably was invalid ab initio. The permit had authorized the construction of a mobilehome park and had been relied on by a permittee who incurred substantial expenses in construction and other outlays. The court of appeal, recognizing the strong California rule
that equitable defenses should only rarely be invoked to defeat important environmental concerns or other policies adopted for the
public protection, specifically addressed the impact on the permittee,
"seeking to determine whether nullification of the developer's permit
will cause injustice of 'sufficient dimension' to warrant judicial refusal
to force environmental procedures which should have preceded his
project." 126 Noting that the developer's expenses of $40,000 repre121. Id. at 823, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 268 (1973). It would be possible, of course,
to make the same argument whenever the interests of a private party and a regulatory
entity were compared.
122. Id.
123. See text accompanying notes 30-60 supra.
124. Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 960 (1949).
125. 45 Cal. App. 3d 185, 119 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1975).
126. Id. at 197, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (1975).
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sented "an undebatable quantum of prejudice," 1 7 the court determined that the developer's losses were largely irrecoverable, whereas
the project was one that "conformed with local land use regulations
at its inception hence not recognizable as a gross despoilation of the
environment. The state's failure to commence its suit before the citizen incurred heavy losses created an injustice which outweighed any
adverse effect of the state's failure to make timely environmental inquiries." 1 28 The court's detailed discussion of the many considerations involved was in marked contrast to the uncritical deference
shown in Pettitt and other cases 29 to the public interest represented
by the regulation.
The careful consideration given conflicting interests became a
central feature of the decision of Raley v. California Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency," 30 a case involving vested rights claims to a 26 acre
regional shopping center. Although the trial court's decision for the
developer involved elements of both vested rights and equitable estoppel analyses, the court of appeal, in reversing, held that the trial
court's determination had been fatally marred by its failure to "con31
duct the balancing process requisite to estoppel in land-use cases."'
The trial court had discounted the environmental consequences of the
project with the assumption that they represented but an isolated
case, thereby making its analysis vulnerable to reversal. "The weighing process . . . can be fulfilled only by matching the land developer's
injury against the environmental consequences of his project ...
The trial court erred by failing to conduct an inquiry and to make
findings concerning the relative harm suffered by the developer, on
the one hand, and by the policy of environmental equilibrium on the
3
other."' 2
There is now little doubt that the rule of equitable estoppel can
be applied, as in the California cases described above, to overcome
many of the infirmities that have plagued the rule in the past. The
potential scope of the rule in its application in cases involving more
than one regulatory agency remains to be determined.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 200, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
129. E.g., People ex tel. Department of Public Works v. Ryan Outdoor Advertising
Inc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 804, 812-13, 114 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504-05 (1974).
130. 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977). See text accompanying
notes 328-36 infra.
131. Id. at 975, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
132. Id. at 976, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
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Estoppel Involving Multiple Governments

An essential feature of the estoppel doctrine is the recognition
that a party must bear the responsibility for conduct on which other
parties might rely. Many of the vested rights cases have therefore
applied estoppel against governmental entities whose officers acted
to cause detriment to a developer who relied on those actions or assurances. The tight symmetry of that pattern is destroyed when
multiple governments are involved, and the question is thereby raised
whether application of estoppel against one government for the actions taken by a different government's agency is appropriate.
As the complexities of the regulatory process increase, the number of governments involved inevitably increases. Despite attempts
at consolidation of functions and coordination of government agencies, 133 there remain numerous instances in which several different
governments or levels of government are involved in regulation of a
single development proposal. A particularly clear example of the
problem occurred after passage of the California Coastal Act. The
new, restrictive law was enacted by the statewide electorate and
administered by a newly created state agency. The acts or statements upon which developers would base a claim of detrimental reliance were usually those of a city or county government. If a claim
of estoppel were to be made, the actions of the local governments
had to be imputed to the new state agency, which in many cases had
not yet been in existence when the acts occurred or statements were
made. Most of the cases dealing with developers' claims in the coastal zone did not discuss estoppel but instead were able to rely on the
specific statutory exemption contained in the California Coastal Zone
Conservation Act of 1972.13 That provision established as a matter
of statutory policy that the regional commission would grant statutory exemptions to projects already undertaken under the auspices
of the local government but did not address the problems presented
35
by an estoppel theory of exemption.
133. See F. BossnrmAN, D. FEUmEm & C. SIEmoN, THE PERMI EXPLOSION (1976).
134. Former CAL. Pu. tIES. CODE § 27404, 1972 Cal. Stats. at A-186-87 (current
version at CAL. Pun. REs. CODE § 30608 (West 1977)). See notes 291-94 & accompanying text infra. The Act was added by initiative measure, Nov. 7, 1972 (current
version at CAL. PuB. lREs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977)). See notes 283-327
& accompanying text infra. It should be noted that the term vested right as used in
the statute necessitates some further administrative or judicial determinations before
the exemption is operative.
135. California courts only recently have declared multiple theories exist under
which developers might claim an exemption from the Act. See notes 295-326 & accompanying text infra. The primary theory is under the statutory provision; the second
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What rule should apply when, as in the coastal zone, several
levels of government regulate proposals for development and a developer urges estoppel against a governmental entity other than the
one on whose acts the claims of reliance are based? Much of the
difficulty in answering that question hinges on the philosophy underlying estoppel. If the purpose of estoppel is to force the government
to honor its commitments, the argument might well be made that a
second governmental entity should not be estopped or bound by actions of the first because that second government did not make the
actions or assurances. Conversely, if the purpose of estoppel is to
protect persons who relied, whether the identity of the government
now regulating them is identical to that of the government on whose
acts they have detrimentally relied is immaterial.
Some courts dealing with the problem of estoppel against multiple
government agencies have developed a nascent rule of "estoppel by
privity." A leading California case 136 noted that estoppel may bind
not only a governmental agency but also those in privity with that
agency: "Privity does not depend upon whether the parties constitute independent legal entities .... In general, it may be said that
such privity involves a person so identified in interest with another
that he represents the same legal right."' 37 The cases that thus far
have applied this rule to governmental entities have applied estoppel
against a state board of education because of the actions of a city
education board, 138 against a state highway department because of
the actions of a county road department, 13 9 against a state retirement
board because of the actions of a city retirement board, 140 and
is a common law vested right exemption created under the prevailing California vested

rights doctrine.

Sierra Club v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal.

App. 3d 149, 156, 129 Cal. Rptr. 743, 748 (1976).
The ambiguity as to whether one
or more theories of exemption existed under California law was considered an appro-

priate ground for abstention by the federal district court in Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 396 F. Supp. 533, 538-41 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
The California Supreme Court appears to recognize that any of several vested rights
theories may be available to developers in the coastal zone. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 791, 798, 799, 553 P.2d
546, 549, 550, 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389, 390, 394 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.

1083 (1977).
136. Lerner v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 382, 380 P.2d 97, 29
Cal. Rptr. 657 (1963).
137. Id. at 398, 380 P.2d at 105-06, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
138. Id.

139.

Department of Public Works v. Volz, 25 Cal. App. 3d 480, 488-90, 102 Cal.

Rptr. 107, 112-13 (1972).
140. Crumpler v. Board of Administration, 32 Cal. App. 3d 567, 583, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 293, 302-05 (1973).
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against a state board of control because of the failure of a city
department to provide the necessary claim forms. 1 1 In each case
the superior level of government was estopped because of actions taken by a quasi-independent but inferior governmental agency.
Would these cases be authority for estoppel against a state or regional
land regulatory agency based on the land regulation actions of a city
or county? When one government is clearly the successor in interest
to another, a strong case could be made to apply the estoppel against
either or both governments because the second has fallen heir to the
duties and responsibilities of the first. 1 42 Beyond that narrow category, however, the opportunities expand for the second government
to represent different interests or concerns. 1 43 Certainly the small
cities that had issued development permits in what was to become
California's coastal zone did so in light of considerations vastly different from the strong environmental and statewide interests represented by the newly established regional coastal commissions.14 4 In
such situations, to urge that the governments were so "identified in
interest" that they could be said to represent the same legal right
would be difficult.' 45 Nevertheless, some cases have implied that

two agencies of the same government are necessarily in privity because they represent the rights of the same government. 46 The reported cases noted above, however, always appear to involve the
agent-principal relationship, which itself was a major factor in the
traditional rule which declined to apply equitable estoppel against
any government because of the problem of overbroad and unauthorized acts by its agents and subordinates. 47 Absent an agent-principal
141. Hartway v. State Bd. of Control, 63 Cal. App. 3d 502, 503, 137 Cal. Rptr.
199, 200 (1976).
142. Numerous privity cases apply rights and liabilities to persons who formally
succeed to the interests of another. E.g., Citizens Suburban Co. v. Rosemont Dev. Co.,
244 Cal. App. 2d 666, 680-81, 53 Cal. Rptr. 551, 561 (1966). See also Department
of Public Works v. Volz, 25 Cal. App. 3d 480, 102 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1972).
143. E.g., Central Coast Regional Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n v. McKeon
Constr. Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 154, 112 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1974).
144. See, e.g., Coastal Southwest Dev. Corp. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 55 Cal. App. 3d 525, 537, 127 Cal. Rptr. 775, 778 (1976).
145. See note 137 & accompanying text supra.
146. Lerner v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 382, 398, 380 P.2d
97, 108, 29 Cal. Rptr. 657, 666 (1963). This passage in Lerner cites Davis's treatise
on administrative law, supra note 96, at § 18.05, which concerns privity in the context
of res judicata and collateral estoppel, subjects involving very different policy considerations.
147. See notes 96-100 supra; 2 DAvis, supra note 96, at § 17.05. This remains the
position in many states. See, e.g., Ryan v. Department of Revenue, 68 Wis. 2d 467,
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relationship, there appears to be little reason for imputing the acts of
one regulatory agency to another, thereby inhibiting the second agency
in the exercise of its responsibilities.
Polices That Disfavor Retroactive Legislation
Problem of Retroactive Laws
Official acts of a legislative body will become effective at some
defined moment or period. The traditional pattern is to adopt legislation that is prospective in nature, therefore affecting only those
transactions or events occurring after passage of the statute. In
contrast, retroactive or restrospective, legislation gives new legal significance to events or transactions that preceded enactment of the
legislation; very often the result is that actions that were legal when
begun, and which already may be completed, are suddenly rendered
illegal.
For several centuries the common law courts have therefore generally accepted the proposition that legislation that has such a retroactive effect is unfair and perhaps unconstitutional. 1 48 The general
premise has been that legislation must by its nature be prospective
in effect, reflecting a general philosophy that statutory law should
provide forewarning or guidance in order that people may be able
to plan their conduct with reasonable certainty of its legal consequences. 149 Thus, in the period between 1915 and 1930, when the
nation's first comprehensive land use controls were proposed, adopted,
and refined, a widely held assumption" was that any retroactive
land use regulations would be unacceptable. Early cases and treatises contain numerous admonitions based on reasons at once philosophical, practical, and legal that zoning must be prospective in nature.' 5 ' The assumption has not changed dramatically and continues
470, 288 N.W.2d 357, 359 (1975) (actions taken by employee of one governmental
agency did not estop different agency).
148. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775 (1936). In a much-cited passage, Smead claims
Roman antecedents for the concept, popularized in British and American law by Coke

and Blackstone. Id. at 775-81.
149. Hochman, supra note 55, at 693; Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights,
6 TEx. L. REv. 409, 418-20 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Smith II].
150. Some of the early land use controversies decided by the Supreme Court resulted in considerably harsher results than many modem observers might expect. Thus,
precedent in the 1920's was not at all clear on the acceptability of strong police power
regulations. See Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).

151.

See Comment, Retroactive Zoning Ordinances, 39

YALE

L.J. 735 (1930), and
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to be of paramount importance in many modem land regulatory
1 52

statutes.
A specific constitutional prohibition becomes relevant when legislation effects retrospective criminal laws or more onerous punishments;

such legislation is prohibited by the ex post facto ban of article I,
section 10 of the Constitution.' 53 In contrast, police power legislation affecting civil matters is not subject to a specific constitutional
prohibition against retroactive application" and is by no means conauthorities cited therein. "The purpose of zoning . . . is said to be the crystalization
of present conditions and the constructive control of future development ....
Hence
it has been generally assumed that any attempt to make zoning ordinances retroactive
would meet with the opposition of the courts and might result in their declaring the
ordinance as a whole unconstitutional." Id. at 737. This passage is quoted with
approval, with other authorities, in the major case of Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211
Cal. 304, 310-11, 295 P. 14, 17-18 (1930). For contemporary authorities contra, see
Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REv. 231, 237-40 (1927) [hereinafter cited as Smith I]; Note, Constitutional Law, Vested Rights, Effect of Change
in Zoning Ordinance, 41 HAIv. L. REv. 660, 667-68 (1928). It is important to note
that many of the authorities above are discussing existing nonconforming uses, not
projects in a stage of planning or construction short of completion. See note 177 &
accompanying text infra.
152. Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13 (1973).
153. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-93, 399-400 (1798) (opinions
of Chase and Iredell, JJ.); Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73
MIcH. L. REv. 1491 (1975).
154. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides that "No State Shall ... pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....
"
Many Commentators have noted that each of the prohibited actions reflects a consistent theme against legislative actions which are retroactive in character. Bills of
attainder, which are essentially penal (although not necessarily criminal) in nature,
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958), are special legislative acts "that apply . . .
to named individuals . . . in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial ...
"Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in special legislative acts which take away the life, liberty, or property of particular named persons
because the legislature thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punishment."
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315, 317 (1946). The essential nature of a
bill of attainder is to replace judicial functions with a legislative determination of
guilt and imposition of a penalty. It is a narrow and specific doctrine inapplicable
to the situations described in this Article. See id. at 321-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722 (1951).
Ex post facto laws relate only to criminal matters. See note 153 supra. Indeed,
in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), it was assumed that retroactive legislation affecting civil matters would be subject instead to the prohibition regarding
the impairment of contract. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See generally, Crosskey,
The Ex Post Facto and the Contracts Clauses in the Federal Constitution, 35 U. Cm.
L. REv. 248, 249 (1968). The contract clause prohibition, although of apparent general application, has long been found not to restrict legislative power exercised for
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sidered automatically invalid. 155 Indeed, the suggestion is often
made that the goals of civil legislation can be achieved by both prospective and retroactive application and are in no way dependent on
the deterrent goals frequently present in criminal legislation. Retroactive civil legislation is therefore tested for its legality by general
principles of fairness' 5 6 or, more recently, by judicial interpretation
1 57
of the due process guarantees of the 5th and 14th amendments.
The due process concerns are of substantial import; they appear to
legitimate police purposes.

"It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of

statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are
necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into
between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which, in its various ramifications, is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the
Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the
people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals. Familiar
instances of this are where parties enter into contracts, perfectly lawful at the time ...
all of which are subject to impairment by a change of policy on the part of the State,
prohibiting the establishment or continuance of such traffic - in other words, that
parties, by entering into contracts, may not estop the legislature from enacting laws
intended for the public good." Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
For the derivation of the doctrine that the contract clause is nevertheless subject to
the inalienable police power, see B.

WRIGHT, THE

CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CoNrs-

196-213 (1938); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARv.
L. REv. 512, 872-84 (1944); cf. cases cited in 16 AM. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law §
298 (1964). The present view is that contracts are always subject to the legitimate
exercise of the state's powers. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506-09 (1965);
Veix v. South World Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
155. Absent the qualifications mentioned above, the Supreme Court has long recognized that no further specific prohibitions exist. "[R]etrospective laws which do not
impair the obligation of contracts, or partake of the character of ex post facto laws are
not condemned or forbidden by [the Constitution]." Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 380, 413 (1829). These prohibitions, of course, have been supplanted by
the due process clause. See note 157 infra. See also Hale, The Supreme Court and
the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REv. 512, 884-86 (1944); Greenblatt, supra note 58,
at 550-61; Smith II, supra note 149, at 414-21. Many courts accept the rule that
retroactive civil legislation is permissible under the proper facts, and not automatically
proscribed. E.g., In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592-93, 546 P.2d 1371,
1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976).
156. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775 (1936); Smith I, supra note 151, at 234-37.
157. "[Nlor shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... ..
U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Greenblatt, supra note 58,
at 543-44, 554-61; Hochman, supra note 55. The effect of this provision is extended
to actions by state or local governments by the 14th amendment. The 5th amendment's similar prohibition, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation," imprecisely termed the taking clause, is often used in land use
regulation cases in a manner indistinguishable from the use of the due process clause.
See F. BossEL tsn, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssUE (1973).
TUTION
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be a factor of implicit rather than explicit consideration, however, as

the due process safeguards are only occasionally cited in land use
cases as the specific basis of constitutional protection against retroactive legislation 58 and even when expressly discussed, are almost
never discussed in detail.
In the absence of clearly defined federal or state' 59 constitutional
prohibitions against retroactive effect, courts confronted with questions of retrospective legislation have proposed a number of tests to

determine the legality of a particular retrospective statute. Tests
that are singular or talismanic have regularly failed.' 0 0 Modem courts
instead recognize that they are forced to rely on a variety of factors
that weigh the public and private interests affected by the legislation

and thus attempt to determine whether, on balance, the principles
of fairness or due process are offended.'"'

As stated recently by the

California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Bouquet:
In determining whether a retroactive law contravenes the due
process clause, we consider such factors as the significance of the
state interest served by the law, the importance of the retroactive
application of the law to the effectuation of that interest, the extent
of reliance upon the former law, the legitimacy of that reliance,
the extent of actions taken on the basis of that reliance, and the
158. E.g., Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776,
795-98, 124 P.2d 148, 155-56 (1948). This case introduced to California law the
concept that due process had been violated when proper notice and hearing procedures
were not followed in revoking a permit. The passage clearly refers to procedural due
process, not substantive due process in the sense used by retroactivity cases. Due
process has been asserted, albeit with mixed success, in several recent California coastal
zone cases. See Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State, 41 Cal. App. 3d 835, 844, 116
Cal. Rptr. 487, 493 (1974); Sea Ranch Ass'n v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Comm'n, 396 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.D. Cal. 1975). Due process rationales are conspicuously absent in major cases. E.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South
Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
159. Several states retain constitutional prohibitions against retroactive legislation,
which appear to be of mixed effect. See, e.g., 2 J. SuT mLAm,
STATUTES AM STATUTORY CONSRUCTION § 41.03 (C. Sands ed. 1973).
160. Smith 1, supra note 151, at 247-48; Smith II, supra note 149, at 409-11.
161. The rule, as here paraphrased, is perhaps best stated by Hochman, supra note
55, at 696-97. That version of the test has been explicitly adopted by a number of
courts. See, e.g., Presbytery of S. E. Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232, 241-42 (Iowa),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975); Peterson V City of Minneapolis, 282 Minn. 282,
288, 173 N.W.2d 353, 357-58 (1969); Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y,
186 Neb. 786, 790-91, 186 N.W.2d 904, 906-07 (1971); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J.
219, 225-29, 320 A.2d 496, 499-500 (1974). For California cases see note 162 infra.
The general approach, though not as precisely stated, is certainly in evidence elsewhere. E.g., Chrysler Properties, Inc. v. Morris, 23 N.Y.2d 515, 518-19, 245 N.E.2d
395, 399 (1969).
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extent to which the retroactive application of the new law would
162
disrupt those actions.

Within the considerations named, those which predominate are the
significance of the state interest represented by the statute and the
unfairness which may result owing to the reasonable reliance by various parties on the law that existed at the time of the now prohibited
conduct.

163

Analysis of Retroactivity Rules

The principles applicable to retroactive legislation bear a kinship
to the doctrine of equitable estoppel but should be carefully contrasted.
In the context of land development cases, the courts' consideration of
the type and extent of the reliance by the person against whom the
new law would be applied (the landowner or developer) is similar in
both doctrines. One major difference, however, is the apparently
greater inclination shown in retroactivity cases to consider not only

the private detrimental reliance but also the opposing, public side of
the equation, which is represented by "the significance of the state

interest served by the law." 164 Thus, courts that have recently examined problems of retroactivity have assumed that retrospective

application would, on balance, be valid if that application were necessary "to subserve a sufficiently important state interest."165 If the
assumption is made that the portion of the equation involving factors

of private reliance would be weighed similarly under both the estoppel
and retroactivity doctrines, how might the equation's other major
element, the retroactivity factor of "significance of the state interest
served by the law," be evaluated in the context of land use questions?
162. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976).
The rule as restated by Bouquet had earlier application by California's appellate courts.
See Loop v. State, 240 Cal. App. 2d 591, 49 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1966); Flournoy v. State,
230 Cal. App. 2d 520, 532-37, 41 Cal. Rptr. 190, 198-201 (1964).
163. Hochman, supra note 55, at 727. See Flournoy v. State, 230 Cal. App. 2d
520, 532-37, 41 Cal. Rptr. 190, 198-201 (1964).
164. See Greenblatt, supra note 58, at 561, comparing cases which use vested rights
terminology with those which apply traditional retroactivity tests. Unlike the retroactivity cases, both vested rights and equitable estoppel cases emphasize an "intricate
analysis of the right sought to be destroyed ....

In many cases the . . . approach

is stultifying, for judicial analysis seems to end with scrutiny of the right. The other
[retroactivity] elements of both statutory interpretation and due process analysis determination of the legislative objectives and balancing of the asserted right against
such objectives - are not discussed."
165. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 593, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128
Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976). See also note 161 supra.
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Does retroactive application help the new law?

Each case should be examined to determine whether application
of the statute in a particular fact situation would actually further the
purposes of the legislation; when retroactive application would harm
a private claim or interest but do little to further the general goals
of the statute, retroactive effect should be denied. 16 6 In contrast,
when the retroactive application of the statute would accomplish the
very effect intended by the legislature and in so doing further an important public policy, 16 7 there should be a much greater chance of
the statute's being upheld, notwithstanding its impact on private
claims. As noted by New Jersey's Supreme Court:
In each instance the statutes under review in the foregoing cases
had an immediate and considerable impact upon private rights,
while serving no discernible public purpose of real import. Thus,
by affording the acts only prospective application, the interest
of the public was not materially diminished, while private rights
were protected. In the instant case, however, as we have indicated, there is a highly significant and important social interest
which will be seriously impaired by interpreting the statute as
having no more than prospective application.16 8
Factor Two: Significance of the private interest asserted
Once the determination is made that the public interest is indeed
worthy of judicial note and evaluation and would be actively promoted
by the new law, the question becomes whether the private interests
affected by the statute are outweighed by the desirability of attainment
of the legislative objectives. Neither the private nor the public interest can be quantified, but their relative value must nevertheless be
compared. Although such a balanced judgment is difficult and subjective, a few factors exist to guide the weighing process. Some cases
have upheld retrospective effect of important statutes against private
166. See Greenblatt, supra note 58, at 550-53, 562; Hochman, supra note 55, at
697-703.
167. This discussion assumes, of course, that the subject matter of the legislation
is properly authorized and constitutional. Many courts, for example, continue to view
some types of aesthetic regulations as beyond the proper scope of the police power.
168. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229-31, 320 A.2d 496, 502 (1974). The
significance of the state interest is often apparent on the face of the statute. There
are categories of legislation directed to problems of unusual and pressing public concern of which the particular application of the law is a prime example. It has been
asserted, for example, that the success of the 1972 Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (Supp. V 1975), is dependent on a retroactive application of its
provisions to protect the consumer from defective products presently held by the consumer but manufactured before passage of the act. Comment, Federal Regulation of
"Substantial Product Hazards," 25 Am. U.L. REv. 717, 726-30 (1976).
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claims or interests that were apparently considered to be speculative
or inconsequential in nature. For example, courts, having established
that particular statutes represented important public policies, have
upheld application of the statutes to reallocate the equitable distribution of marital assets"' and to extinguish reversionary claims to land
titles.17o Although these private interests were of considerable import to the litigants, they were nevertheless found less important than
the public interests served by the new statute. This process weighs
the private litigant's right or interest underlying reliance on the old
laws rather than the reliance per se. Thus, in the context of land
development problems, a similar judicial evaluation of the magnitude or weight of a claimed land development right would doubtless
draw heavily on the several theories of land development interests
discussed above.17 1 The assertion of a right to develop land may range
from the well-recognized claim based on a validly granted, nondiscretionary permit to the highly speculative one encompassing only
an incipient proposal requiring extensive rezoning and environmental analysis. Finally, although land has often been accorded some
higher, perhaps mystical, quality as a species of property right, claims
to develop land arguably should not be accorded a higher status or
subjected to different treatment from other valued interests, such
172
as the marital or reversionary interests.
Retroactivity Applied to Land Development
The preceding discussion indicates that a private claim to develop land should be first evaluated and then weighed against the
public interest represented by the statute to determine whether a
land use regulation should be applied retrospectively. For instance,
if a significant private land development claim has been established
169. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427
(1976); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
170. Presbytery of S. E. Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1975), Hiddleston v.
Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 186 Neb. 786, 186 N.W.2d 904 (1971).
171. See notes 14-29 & accompanying text supra.
172. In San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529
P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976), the unsuccessful plaintiffs tried to establish a special due process protection for real property.
The Court's reply was succinct: "[P]laintiffs fail to explain why legislation which
has a significant impact on real property rights and real property values should be
differentiated from legislation which significantly affects other rights or other values.
The due process clause of our federal Constitution applies uniformly to deprivations of
'life, liberty or property,' and the time has long past [sic] when property rights were
exalted over our citizens' rights in life or liberty." Id. at 213, 529 P.2d at 575, 118

Cal. Rptr. at 151.
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and the new law merely changes the text of a conventional city zoning
ordinance, the new law seldom could be considered of immediate
and pressing importance; to interpret the ordinance as prospective
only and thereby to allow a developer to establish one more structure

or land use similar to many already in place would not seriously impede the public interest represented by the statute. Thus, retroactive
application would not further the purposes of the legislation. In
contrast, a massive planned unit development, expected to occupy

hundreds of acres and house thousands of people, would represent
a significant threat to the policies and purposes of a newly-created
regional land regulatory agency. 17 In such an instance, a court
could well decide to apply a statute retroactively to prevent the com-

pletion of a project whose very existence would significantly counteract an important state policy declared by the new statute.

The dis-

tinction is less a matter of scale than effect. Thus, the suggestion has
been made that the ordinance in the first example be denied retroactive effect, because a single building would have little impact on
the textual content of the ordinance. The same small building in
the same city might represent a considerable affront to an ordinance
which, rather than making general textual amendments, imposed new

restrictions on a defined district or revised the boundaries of that
district to affect specific land areas. That situation, known generally
as a map amendment, would probably call for a retrospective application of the new legislation.
A frequent result of vested rights litigation is the application of

the new law against a proposed or partially completed project of the
precise type that the new legislation intended to prohibit. 174

The

173. The Sea Ranch is an example of such a development, planned to occupy 5200
acres and exercise exclusive control over ten miles of the Pacific coast. See Oceanic
California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 51, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 664 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). But see San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal. 3d 888, 513 P.2d 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377

(1973).
174. "The need for retroactivity is particularly compelling in those cases in which
the very transaction from which it is claimed a vested right has arisen is one of those
which motivated the legislature to act ....
In cases of this type, when [the legislature] has the substantive power to act prospectively, the public interest in the effectiveness of the legislative scheme seems clearly to permit the elimination of preexisting
evils which may have pointed up the very need for the legislation and whose continued
existence would impair the effectiveness of the statutory scheme. However, it is by
no means clear that the same result would be reached in a case in which the preenactment transaction was within the statutory language, but not one at which the
statute was directly aimed nor which was likely to affect the implementation of the
program to any significant degree." Hochman, supra note 55, at 701-02. The Sea
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project may have been one of many of the same type, or it may have
been the vanguard of several such proposals whose proposed construction was the impetus spurring the legislative reaction. Proposed
or partially completed projects that threaten to produce the very
effect which a general statute was intended to prohibit might quite
properly be prohibited by retrospective legislation. These projects
should be distinguished from projects that were singled out by the
legislature to be affected primarily by the specific statute under consideration. As to the latter, the possibility exists that a legislative
body might unfairly single out a particular developer or project as
the object of its displeasure and, in the guise of general land use
controls, impose restrictions designed to thwart that project. That
situation bears all the potentially discriminatory evils of special legislation, 175 bills of attainder,1 7 6 or quasi-judicial action of a type that,
if not invalid on its face, should be highly suspect. This type of legislation vividly illustrates many of the arguments against retroactive
application of a statute. Separating these two very different motives
in superficially similar fact situations requires exacting judicial review.
To ignore that the public and their legislative representatives
often become aware of a land use problem only when a particular
proposal suddenly brings into focus the shortcomings of the existing
Ranch, see note 173, supra, was one of the projects which spurred passage of the California coastal initiative in 1972.
175. "Special legislation" refers to arbitrary legislative action against a particular
person or group, classified without reasonable basis, which violates principles of equal
protection. It is improperly discriminatory when it imposes a burden on particular
individuals not placed by general legislation on others similarly situated. In Shapiro
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954), a use permit revocation based on an amended ordinance was overturned because the court determined
the contents of the ordinance and the history of its adoption clearly demonstrated that
the ordinance "'was special legislation, unjustly discriminatory, arbitrary, unreasonable,
and confiscatory in its application, in that it was aimed directly at this particularpiece
of property."' Id. at 628, 105 A.2d at 30Z-03 (quoting lower court opinion). The
rule has received consistent recognition by Pennsylvania courts. See Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 310-11, 211 A.2d 514, 518-19 (1965); cases cited
in Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. 499,
507-09, 275 A.2d 896, 901-02 (1971); Linda Dev. Corp. v. Plymouth Twp., 3 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 334, 338-40, 281 A.2d 784, 787 (1971); Colonial Park for Mobile Homes,
Inc. v. New Britain Bor. Zoning Hearing Bd., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 594, 601-02, 290
A.2d 719, 723 (1972).
In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 40 Cal.
App. 3d 1059, 1063-64, 115 Cal. Rptr. 731, 734 (1974), a similar rule was derived
from a line of California cases which would invalidate a change in the law which is
discriminatory or is enacted solely to frustrate a specific developer's plans. The rule
is not yet clearly developed, although the policy reasons for its adoption are evident.
See, e.g., D. HAGMAN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRAcTircE § 5.55 (Supp. 1975).
176. See note 154 supra.
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regulatory scheme would deny human experience. Not unexpectedly, therefore, a legislator will have in mind specific examples of the
harm to be prevented by new legislation, which will reflect proposals
recently presented or projects recently initiated. Thus, a particular
project could appear to be the focus of a new law, which would
render that law suspect as special legislation. However, merely because the project spurred legislative awareness which resulted in the
change of policy should not render the law unenforceable as applied
to the project. Newly awakened public concerns are no less legitimate than others and, in the absence of a showing of intentional discrimination, should be equally deserving of retroactive application
when they represent important public policies.
Nonconforming Use Theories
The law of nonconforming uses, as developed in traditional zoning cases, offers a separate body of case law by which to evaluate
the general problem of vested rights in land use regulation. A nonconforming use is a lawfully existing and often well established use
of land that predated the regulations or prohibitions presently in force
in an area. Although the use does not conform to the new law, it
is nevertheless allowed to remain because its preexisting status is protected by operation of the nonconforming use doctrine. 17 7 That doctrine is universally recognized and grants a large degree of protection
to established uses of land. The discussion below analyzes the present
state of the doctrine and a major theoretical offshoot that makes possible some refinement of development rights theory.
Land Development as a Nonconforming Use
The nonconforming use doctrine offers a ready analogy to vested
rights problems. When a developer is able to assert that the proposed
use is in fact well established enough to qualify for nonconforming use
status, the project will receive substantial protection against the operation of the new law without the necessity of satisfying any of the
vested rights tests described above. In its traditional application,
however, the nonconforming use rule rarely protects proposed or
partially constructed projects.
The origin of the nonconforming use rule is buried in the his177. The doctrine of nonconforming uses is generally applicable not only to nonconforming uses of land but also to nonconforming structures (those which do not conform to appropriate bulk or siting requirements). Any combination of conforming
or nonconforming uses and structures ig possible. See Annot. 57 A.L.R.3d 419, 422

(1974).
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torical development of Euclidean zoning theory in the 1920's and
1930's. When first initiated, zoning had to be superimposed on the
uses of land already established. If established uses were different
from the use categories prescribed in the new zoning ordinances, a
method had to be found to allow their continued operation, because
no jurisdiction could be expected to wipe the municipal slate clean
prior to enacting new land use controls. Understandably, a primary
reason to protect established or preexisting uses was the simple practical expedient of offering a politically acceptable scheme of land use
controls. 1 78 Other reasons, if less pressing, were certainly as compelling. Early cases assumed that zoning legislation would have to
be applied prospectively to avoid the general proscriptions against
retroactive legislation'" or against uncompensated taking of property
rights. 810 In later years, the general principle of protection of preexisting uses has received virtually universal adoption.
The primary distinction in the traditional application of the nonconforming use doctrine and the vested rights doctrine rests on the
simple premise that for a use to be granted the protection of nonconforming status, it must have been in lawful physical existence at
the operative date of the ordinance.' 8 ' In contrast, most of the cases
adjudicated under any of the vested rights theories discussed in the
preceding sections of this Article instead involved uses of land that
were not yet in existence, but for which various commitments had
been made. With a few notable exceptions, therefore, it would not
occur to most practitioners to apply the nonconforming use doctrine
to proposed, pending, or otherwise inchoate uses.' 8 2 Although the
178. E. BASSETT, ZONING 112-16 (1936). See generally 1 ANDERSON, supra note
17, at § 6.02; 4 WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 109 (1975). Some jurists have interpreted the early protection of nonconforming uses as a temporary "strategem of city
planners," to eventually be replaced by a policy of eliminating pre-existing uses. See
Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 570-71, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 612, 152 N.E.2d
42, 51-52 (1958) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930);
Comment, The Elimination of Nonconforming Uses, 1951 Wis. L. REv. 685, 687-89.
180. E.g., People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 107-08, 106 N.E.2d 34, 35 (1952).
181. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 17, at § 6.10; 4 WLLIAms, supra note 18, at §
110.01. The distinction has substantial appeal and has long been a central factor
in zoning theory. Howard McBain, presenting the Hewitt Lectures at Columbia in
1917, noted that "no city has as yet attempted to impose, under the police power, a
limit that would affect buildings already constructed. It is impossible to say what the
attitude of the courts would be toward such an interference with actual rather than
potential property values." H. McBAiN, AM.EIcAN CITY PROG ESS A" Tm LAW 96
(1918) (emphasis added).
182. Although general practice is to separate the two doctrines, several cases have
dealt with the close similarity of the questions involved. See, e.g., Spindler Realty
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two doctrines thus appear to apply to quite distinct situations, the

central question in each is the same: have the landowner's activities acquired sufficient stature to be accorded legal protection against
new laws? In nonconforming use cases that question is resolved
by considering whether a use was in existence when the new law
became operative. In vested rights cases, the question can be simi-

larly phrased to ask whether the proposed use had acquired so many
of the characteristics of a property right that it should receive pro-

tection as if it were an existing use of property. 183

Although the essential question is the same, in their usual application the two rules maintain a fierce distinction between existing

and planned uses. Traditionally, the operative issue is whether the
alleged use was in operation on the effective date of the new law.18 4
An existing enterprise or other use of land in daily operation clearly
represents a substantial property interest, and a court may easily con-

trast that interest to the claims of a landowner or option holder who
merely enjoys a desired zoning classification or is entertaining thoughts
Co. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 264, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7, 15, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
975 (1966); Donadio v. Cunningham, 58 NJ. 309, 322, 277 A.2d 375, 382 (1971).
An opinion by the Attorney General of Vermont (No. 971, Nov. 8, 1972) took this
approach, adopting as its issue "whether the preliminary preparationg by a developer,
short of actual use of his land, create a vested right in the land that would compel the
same protection of the law as a lawfully established nonconforming use." In each instance, however, the distinction between existing and proposed uses served to deny the
comparison. The doctrinal similarity was also discussed in perceptive dictum in County
of San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 234 P.2d 972 (1951): "[plrotection of an undertaking involving the investment of capital, the purchase of equipment,
and the employment of workers, is akin to protection of a nonconforming use existing
at the time that zoning restrictions become effective. The same principle underlies
the rule that a permittee who has expended substantial sums under a permit cannot
be deprived by a subsequent zoning ordinance of the right to complete construction
and to use the premises as authorized by the permit." The developer was denied relief in that case, the court holding that the nature of the use had changed too radically
to be construed as a continuation of the former use.
183. Professor Norman Williams has aptly termed this process the "creation of a
new nonconformity." 4 WIUjAms, supra note 18, at ch. 111. The question is stated
in this manner to demonstrate the similarity of the fact situations. In practice, a
vested rights problem is usually phrased in terms of equitable estoppel or retroactivity.
184. The question of actual operation and existence can include both the initiation
of a new use and also the abandonment, discontinuance, or reinstatement of old uses.
Where abandonment is at issue, courts are much more willing to make a finding of
nonconforming status based on something less than substantial, ongoing activities. See
4 WmLms, supra note 18, at § 115; Annot. 57 A.L.R.3d 279 (1974). That attitude
is consistent with the concept that the important consideration is not the nature of the
activity but the recovery of the owner's investment, since many abandonment cases
involve situations in which the owner's investment recovery was cut short by extraneous
events. See id.; see notes 199-204 & accompanying text infra.
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of eventual development of the land. 185 Thus, the property owner in
one of California's major vested rights cases, Spindler Realty Corp.
v. Monning,186 attempted to bring his project within the nonconforming use protection provided by a municipal code. The court refused
to accept the premise that the code provided for the protection of
"intended" uses as nonconforming, holding instead that there had been
no "actual existing use of the subject property" and restating the
familiar observation that it is the owner's activity, and not his plans,
which determines the scope of the nonconforming use. 18 7 When the
planned use is at a stage close to completion or when land is acquired
and structures erected but not yet occupied, however, the easy distinction between existing and proposed uses becomes one which might
yield highly formalistic and apparently unfair results. In such a case
the physical commitments are essentially identical, and the only distinction between existing and planned uses is the accident of a few
days' timing. 188 This area, in which the factual requirements of the
two doctrines become somewhat blurred, is where most courts and
commentators stop referring to nonconforming uses and revert to
standard vested rights terminology.189 Generally, however, the distinction between planned and existing uses continues to be recognized
to an extent that developments that might easily achieve protection
under some theories of equitable estoppel are nevertheless regularly
denied nonconforming use status. The circumstances could exist
whereby a fact situation sufficient to establish both detrimental reliance and equitable estoppel in favor of a landowner would nevertheless not be sufficient to establish a nonconforming use but, in contrast, a preexisting nonconforming use would quite certainly satisfy
any estoppel test.
Amortization Theory
The law of nonconforming uses has evolved another concept
which adds an important dimension to the several theories of vested
185. Professor Williams asserts that although the potential exists, cases very rarely
recognize as nonconforming any use which demonstrate anything less than a substantial degree of actual use. 4 WILLUMS, supra note 18, at § 110.03.
186. 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966).
187. Id. at 270, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 15. Accord, Town of Mendon v. Ezzo, 129 Vt.
351, 360-61, 278 A.2d 726, 732 (1971). See also case citations in 4 WML4As, supra
note 18, at § 110.3 n.30; 8A McQuILLAN, supra note 30, at § 25.188.

188. E.g., Meserole v. Board of Adjustment, 172 S.W.2d 528, 530-31 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1943).
189. Anderson's treatise makes the transition almost imperceptibly. See 1 ANmsRiSON, supra note 17, at § 6.19-625. In contrast, see 4 WiLLAMS, supra note 18, at 414.
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rights discussed earlier. A growing number of courts has been willing
to allow the forced termination of preexisting nonconforming uses,
despite the policies and concerns discussed above, when those uses
have been terminated by "amortization." Amortization is simply a
process by which a landowner is legally forced to terminate his nonconforming development or use after a specific and appropriate time
period. 190 The theory holds that forced termination is fair and constitutional when it allows the property owner to maintain the project
for just enough time to recover the investment represented by that
project. There is no further need to provide for compensation when
that period of time has ended.
The implications of the amortization doctrine are several. The
doctrine suggests first that the judicial philosophy of property rights
is sufficiently flexible to allow premature termination of even the most
thoroughly secured and vested property rights. Second, it offers the
germ of a method by which the most common form of developers'
vested rights claims might be quantified and fairly considered.
Amortization provisions began to attract favorable judicial notice
in the mid-1950's' 9' and since then have received general, if occasionally begrudging, 92 approval from a majority of the jurisdictions in
which their validity has been questioned. 93 That general approval,
190. The term "amortization" reflects the doctrine's similarity to the accounting
process by which funds are incrementally set aside or liabilities gradually extinguished.
The etymology of the word is particularly instructive. It is derived from French and
Latin and means variously "to [put to] death," or "to deaden," and was used in early
mortmain practices. 1 OxFoRD ENGLiSH DICTIoNARY 288 (1933); WEBSTm 'S NEw
INTERNATiONAL DCTIONAny 88 (2d ed. 1954). Judge Van Voorhis' dissent in Harbison
v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 570, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 612, 152 N.E.2d 42, 51-52
(1958), see note 179 supra, relied on the failure of the facts to demonstrate an attempt by the city to apply recognized accounting principles expected of true amortization. That significant discrepancy has disappeared in recent cases. See notes 199202 & accompanying text infra.
191. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954);
Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957); Grant v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
192. See Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 152 N.E.2d
42 (1958). Many commentators are quick to point out that judicial approval of the
technique is generally limited to the amortization of relatively insubstantial uses or
structures, such as animal kennels, Wolf v. City of Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W.2d
501 (1964), highway signboard, or automobile junkyards, and has only rarely been
extended to substantial or economically important structures or uses. See ALI MoDnr
LAND DEv. CODE, Art. 4, comment at 149-150 (1976). If valid, that observation indicates judicial acceptance still lacks commitment to some of the theories here.
193. Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1134 (1968 & Supp. 1977). Cf. Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d
1146 (1955) (earlier view). Several jurisdictions have not decided the question. See,
e.g., Comment, Amortization of Nonconforming Uses in Pennsylvania: A Possible Rem-
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however, has been attained without a clear consensus on the rationale
for the apparent constitutionality of the technique. Many courts, in
reliance on City of Los Angeles v. Gage,1 94 the leading case, merely
opined that such a restriction was essentially not different from the
many other recognized and valid forms of limitation on nonconforming uses, such as prohibitions on expansion of a nonconforming use or
structure or prohibitions on resumption of a nonconforming use once
it is adjudged to have been abandoned.' 9 5 Other cases relied on the
platitude that reasonable circumstances would ensure the validity of
an amortization program that had finite terms and provisions 19 6 and
often relied on a principle of balancing the private loss against the
public gain. 197 Most courts have discounted a need to exercise eminent domain and have held the amortization technique to be justified
under modem theories of the police power.' 98 When analyzed with
edy for a Zoning Headache, 79 DicK L. Bxv. 235 (1975. A Michigan statute has been
construed as prohibiting amortization in that state. MicH. CoMP. LAWS 1948 §
125.583a, construed in DeMull v. City of Lowell, 368 Mich. 242, 118 N.W.2d 232
(1962); Central Advertising Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 42 Mich. App. 59, 201 N.W.2d
365 (1972).
194. 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
195. Id. at 459-60, 274 P.2d at 44. The court went on to say: "The distinction
between an ordinance restricting future uses and one requiring the termination of
present uses within a reasonable period of time is merely one of degree ....
..
Id.
Accord, Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 315-16, 129 A.2d
363, 370 (1957); City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. 1972),
appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 901 (1973).
The comparison is a rather curious one, however. "Obviously, there is a real distinction between legislation which merely prohibits future uses and that which compels discontinuance of existing uses . . . . In
more recent years, it has been recognized that this rule bars only discontinuance which
is immediate, and not that which allows a reasonable amortization period ....
..
National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 380-81, 27
Cal. Rptr. 136, 139 (1962).
Contra, Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Mo.
1965).
196. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492,
501, 162 N.W.2d 206, 213 (1968); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 176
N.Y.S.2d 598, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958).
197. Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 319, 129 A.2d
363, 372 (1957); Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 32 N.J. 448, 457, 161 A.2d 241, 245
(1960); City of Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 544, 342 P.2d 602, 604 (1959);
Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1134, 1142-44 (1968).
There is some indication the balancing
is merely an initial, rather than singular, test of validity, and having once been satisfied,
opens the analysis to the sufficiency of the amortization period. See Comment, Constitutionality of Sign Amortization Ordinances, 9 UaB. L. ANN. 303, 313 (1975); Note,
A Suggested Means of Determining the Proper Amortization Period for Nonconforming
Structures, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1325, 1328-30 (1975).
198. The relationship to eminent domain or a need to pay compensation is usually
simply stated. "The reasoning is clear: after the economic life has passed, any property which may remain cannot be attributed to the period antedating the zoning ordi-
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reference to the discussions above, however, another, perhaps more
salient rationale becomes evident. Recent amortization cases have
not been concerned with the initial legality of amortization as a technique but instead have addressed the peculiarities of the particular
provisions employed, especially the time frames imposed on the hapless owners of the property interests involved. 19 These cases appear
to reflect an underlying desire to assure the landowner's recovery of
some reasonable approximation of the investment actually made in
the property. 200 That investment is represented by the sum of the
monies in fact expended or obligated on the project and not the alleged market value or replacement value 20 1 of the property at the
time it became nonconforming.2 02 Recovery might also include a
sum representing a reasonable profit for the period of the investment.
Such an investment, to use the terminology of estoppel, is merely a
nance, but must be attributed to the period of time during which amortization was in
progress. Consequently, as to the property which remains, there is no retroactivity. . . . Furthermore, when amortization is complete, the original zoning ordinance
cannot be said to confiscate any property because that property which existed at the
time of the original ordinance no longer exists." Comment, Zoning - Principle of
Retroactivity and Amortization of the Nonconforming Use - A Paradox in Property
Law, 4 VrmL. L. REv. 416, 417 (1959). In Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 320, 129 A.2d 363, 372 (1957), the court discounted a claim
that billboards had been taken once the owners had fully depreciated their value. A
common alternate theory was set out in Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village
of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 501, 162 N.W.2d 206, 213 (1968): "If the value of
plaintiff's property interest was extinguished before the running of the 3-year period,
there would be no taking, or if the value of freedom from new competition for the
statutory period equalled the value of the property interest remaining at the end of
the period, there would be just compensation for the taking."
199. Art Neon Co. v. City of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974); Board of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Iowa
1969); Klicker v. Minnesota, 293 Minn. 149, 197 N.W.2d 434 (1972); City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 901
(1973).
200. For a detailed account of the process see Note, A Suggested Means of Determining the Proper Amortization Period for Nonconforming Structures, 27 STANs. L.
RBv. 1325 (1975). See also notes 183 & 198, supra.
201. Art Neon Co. v. City of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal.
3d 875, 879-80, 464 P.2d 33, 35, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579-80 (1970); Comment, Constitutionality of Sign Amortization Ordinances, 9 UnB. L. Am. 303 (1975); Note,
Removal of Nonconforming Uses: Amortization, 59 CAL. L. RBv. 242 (1971).
202. "The reasonableness of the opportunity for recoupment thus afforded is to be
measured by conditions at the time the existing use is declared nonconforming and
not, as viewed by the intermediate court, by conditions upon expiration of the tolerance period." City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S.W.2d 773, 779 (Tex. 1972),
appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 901 (1973).
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quantified measurement of the reasonable reliance of the property
owner on the continued legality of the use; 20 3 in property rights
phraseology, the investment is a fair approximation of the expectation
held by the property owner that the use would continue to receive
the protection of the property laws.
If the property right in a nonconforming use can be equated
with the investment actually made, two conclusions follow. First, a
use of land may be forcefully terminated, no matter what its stage
of completion, once reasonable techniques have been provided for
the recovery of the investment actually made to date. 20 4 Second,
continued operation or expansion beyond the point represented by
the investment is neither necessarily nor constitutionally required assuming that adequate means exist for reasonable recovery of the
investment. It would follow that a partially completed project could
be stopped midway through construction if it were possible to provide
for the recovery of a reasonable return on the developer's investment.
That possibility forms part of the rationale for the reformulated rule
suggested in Chapter IV below.

III.

California's Vested Rights Doctrine

The theories discussed in the preceding chapter represent a distillation of current legal thought and the realities of modern land use
regulation and development practices. To appreciate fully the manner in which modern legal theory is, or could be, applied to the vested
rights doctrine, however, requires consideration of that doctrine within its historical context.
The case law of California offers the opportunity to step back
from current sophistication to examine closely the origin and gradual
evolution of the vested rights doctrine. California courts have employed this doctrine since the first zoning laws were passed. The
earliest cases, which seem elementary today, contain the basic rules
by which the doctrine has been effected. As will be seen, however,
the rules, oft repeated and seemingly simple, frequently mask the
variety of underlying theories discussed above.
In considering the development of California's law of vested
rights, cases that arose upon the advent and judicial sanction of comprehensive zoning ordinances are basic. The law was applied to
cases concerning implementation and amendment of zoning ordinances
203. See notes 104-06 & accompanying text supra.
204. This assumes the investment was not merely speculative, but was of such a
nature that an entrepreneur might reasonably expect some return on the investment.
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and more recently to cases arising under modem legislation providing
for environmental protection and regional land use regulation. Early
cases from other jurisdictions were heavily relied on by California
courts when vested rights claims first arose in the state; since the
passage of comprehensive zoning laws, California courts have shown
little concern for cases from other states. Consequently, little attempt
will be made to compare later cases from other jurisdictions with
current California law despite the diversity of approaches
by courts
20 5
throughout the country to the vested rights question.

Common Law of Vested Rights
Roots of the Vested Rights Doctrine
Two early non-California cases considered the effect of an amendment of a zoning ordinance on a landowner who was proceeding with
development in accordance with the original zoning of the property.
The first case, Brett v. Building Commissioner,20 6 arose in Massachus20 7
setts in 1924; the second, Pelham View Apartments, Inc. v. Switzer,
was decided three years later in New York. The cases reflect the
divergence of courts' attitudes and discussions regarding vested rights
and the scope of the police power with regard to zoning. In large
part, the difference in the disposition of these cases marks the pattern
for much of the later California case law.
205. See City of Hollywood v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co., 283 So.2d 867 (Fla.
App. 1973), modified, Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So.2d
10 (Fla. 1976); American Natl Bank v. City of Chicago, 19 Ill. App. 3d 30, 311
N.E.2d 325 (1974); Montgomery County v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337
A.2d 712 (1975); Hawkinson v. County of Itasca, 304 Minn. 367, 231 N.W.2d 279
(1975); Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 32 N.J. 448, 161 A.2d 241 (1960); Putnam Armonk,
Inc. v. Town of Southeast, 52 App. Div. 2d 10, 382 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1976); Town of
Hillsborough v. Smith, 276 N.C. 48, 170 S.E.2d 904 (1969); Clackamas County v.
Holmes, 265 Or. 193, 508 P.2d 190 (1973); Gable v. Springfield Twp. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 381, 335 A.2d 886 (1975); Pure Oil Division v. City of
Columbia, 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970); Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331
P.2d 856 (1958); Preseault v. Wheel, 132 Vt. 247, 315 A.2d 244 (1974); Cable &
Hauck, The Property Owner's Shield - Nonconforming Uses and Vested Rights, 10
Wnri.sEr L.J. 404 (1974); Heeter, supra note 93; Rhodes, These Rights are Mine:
Downzoning, Vested Rights, Equitable Estoppel, 50 FLA. B.J. 586 (1976); Note, Survey of Nonconforming Uses in Georgia, 10 GA. S.B.J. 302 (1973); Note, Good Faith
Expenditures in Reliance on Building Permits as a Vested Right in North Carolina, 49
N.C.L. RBv. 197 (1970); Note, Vested Rights and Land Use Development, 54 OnE. L.
REv. 103 (1975); Building Permits - Vested Rights Thereunder in Pennsylvania, 73
Dic. L. REv. 578 (1968); Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 596 (1973); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1150
(1973); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13 (1973); 82 AM. Jun. 2d Zoning and Planning § 186
(1976). See also ALI MoDEL LAND DEv. CoDE, § 2-309 (1976).
206. 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269 (1924).
207. 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y.S. 56 (1927).
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In Brett, the plaintiff owned a lot that was initially zoned for
unrestricted residential use. He received a building permit for the
construction of a two-family dwelling and entered into contracts for
its construction. One month later the town passed an ordinance that
amended its original zoning plan by creating a residential district
restricted exclusively to single family dwellings, within which plaintiff's lot was located. At the time the permit was revoked under the
new law, excavation for the foundation was complete, as was the
necessary initial engineering work for the house, but concrete had
not yet been poured for the foundation. The Massachussetts court
upheld the revocation of the permit.
In Pelham, the plaintiff secured a building permit for construction of an apartment house in an area zoned for multiple unit dwellings.
He purchased property in the zone, apparently at a price that reflected the possibility of such a land use. During the six months
subsequent to the permit's issuance the plaintiff commissioned plans
for the building, and began excavation. At that point the zoning
ordinance for the area was amended to preclude construction of
apartments and the plaintiff's permit was revoked. Unlike the Brett
decision, the court in Pelham held the revocation invalid.
The difference in the conclusions that the two courts reached is
a function of their different approaches. The court in the Brett case
validated the revocation by first determining that the amendment to
the zoning ordinance was a legitimate exercise of the town's police
power. The court then focused on the issuance of the permit to the
plaintiff and the work that had been done prior to the passage of the
amendment. The court stated that the plaintiff had "no special and
peculiar immunity arising from the fact that permits had been issued .... Since the petitioners had only barely begun work pursuant
to their permits, they had acquired no vested rights against a change
in the by-law by the exercise of the lawmaking power." 208 The court
assumed that the amendment would not apply to already existing
buildings within the new district but found the plaintiff's case not
to fall within such an exception to the law. The court stated that
the private use of property was always subject to the proper exercise
of the police power2 0° " and that in the circumstances of this case the
restrictions upon the plaintiff were reasonable considering the pur208.

250 Mass. at 79-80, 145 N.E. at 271-72.

209. Id. at 77, 145 N.E. at 270 (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1910); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)).
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poses - fire safety and the general welfare of the townspeople - for
which the law was passed.
In contrast, the court in Pelham did not consider the purpose
behind the exercise of the police power. It focused solely upon the
facts regarding the issuance of the permit to the plaintiff and his
conduct after receiving it. The court stated, "Where a permit to
build a building has been acted upon, and where the owner has . . .
proceeded to incur obligations and in good faith to proceed to erect
the building, such rights are then vested property rights, protected
by the Federal and State Constitutions." 210 Because the plaintiff had
acted in reliance upon his permit, he was deemed to have acquired
a vested right so that his permit could not be revoked on the basis
of the later zoning which prohibited his planned use for the land.
Implicit in this holding is the court's assumption that a vested right
could be asserted against the exercise of the police power, at least
21
in matters related to zoning. '
The factual differences cannot be regarded as determinative of
the contrary outcomes of these cases. Instead, the important difference is the underlying theory employed by the court in each case.
In Brett, the court adhered to a strict analysis of the purposes to be
accomplished by the exercise of the police power as compared with
the extent of infringement of the perfected real property interests of
the landowner. The town's action was reasonable; the interference
with the plaintiff's private property was not severe. Consequently, the
act was valid, and the plaintiff had not achieved a position that placed
him beyond its operation-the development right had not vested. On
the other hand, in Pelham, the court did not base its decision on an
analysis of the validity of the exercise of the police power. Instead,
in looking only at the plaintiff's conduct once the permit was granted,
it noted the extent of action taken in reliance on that permission and
the landowner's good faith. In the court's consideration, because it
found that the plaintiff had acted in good faith in reliance upon his
permit, he was immune from the effect of the later amendment; in
effect, he had a vested right that could not be impaired. Whether
the court was aware of the fact, its analysis employed the concepts
of an estoppel applied on behalf of the property owner against the governing body. The landowner's good faith reliance on the expression
210. 130 Misc. at 546, 224 N.Y.S. at 58.
211. Compare Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904) with Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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of the government's development permission 21 2 gave rise to an estoppel against the municipality. The estoppel coincided with acquisition of a vested right. The key to the estoppel analysis is the extent
of the landowner's reasonable reliance, and, while the court in Pelham
did not discuss this point in detail, it did state that "under the conditions as presented in this case"1s a vested right, thus, an estoppel, had
arisen.
Thus, under the police power and real property analysis, consideration of the purposes to be achieved by legislation that interferes
at some point in the development process indicates the extent to which
private property interests can be impaired; the more important the
public purpose, the greater the infringement that is constitutionally
permissible. The estoppel analysis considers a landowner's conduct
once some form of governmental permission has been received; at
some inexact point, good faith reliance alone will vest the right to
complete development despite intervening contrary legislation. An
understanding of the difference in approach exemplified by these two
cases is helpful in examining vested rights cases that have arisen in
California since the implementation of comprehensive zoning laws. 214
Development of the California Vested Rights Rule
Early CaliforniaCases
Shortly after Brett and Pelham were decided, several cases considered the validity of acts of public officials under comprehensive
zoning laws in California, and each relied in part upon one of these
two cases. Although only one of the early California cases was narrowly focused on the question of the validity of the revocation of a
building permit as were Brett and Pelham, each dealt with some aspect of the question of vested rights and the implementation of zoning
laws. Brougher v. Board of Public Works 2 15 arose in 1928 and was
an action for a writ of mandamus sought by the plaintiff to require the
defendant to grant him a building permit pursuant to a proper application. After the plaintiff had applied for the permit but before his
application had been acted upon, the height limitation on buildings
within the zone where the plaintiff proposed to build was changed so
212.
213.

See notes 95-109 & accompanying text supra.
130 Misc. at 547, 224 N.Y.S. at 59.

214. A comprehensive zoning ordinance received judicial sanction in California
in 1925. See Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1926); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497,
234 P. 388 (1925), aff'd, 274 U.S. 325 (1926).
215. 205 Cal. 426, 271 P. 487 (1928).
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that his plans no longer conformed to the new zoning. For this reason he was denied the building permit. The plaintiff claimed that he
was entitled to his permit as a matter of right at the time he had
applied for it and that the permit
could not be denied on the basis of
6
a later change in the law.21

The court easily disposed of these contentions, employing the
reasoning of the Brett case. By extension, if a later change in the
law was a sufficient basis to revoke a permit after issuance and after
work had begun, it was certainly a proper basis to deny a mere application for a permit.2 17 In discussing permit law, the court stated:
"'As a general rule a permit or license is revocable, except where the
licensee had done something under the license from which the mere
privilege would ripen into a vested right' . . . [but this] exception
. . . does not exist in those cases . . . where no permit has ever
been issued." 218 The court's conclusion was, therefore, that a per-

mitting body could deny a permit on the basis of a change in the
law because a right that would prevent application of the new law
could not be perfected under a permit that had never been issued.
Although this explanation for the basis of such a body's power to act
may have been inarticulate, 2' 9 the court's statement became a fixture

in the law of California, having the effect of closely tying the question
of vested rights to the grant of a building permit. Later cases adopted
the building permit requirement as the exclusive threshold of a
220
vested right.

216. See notes 38-45 & accompanying text supra.
217. 205 Cal. at 433-34, 271 P. at 490-91; accord, Miller v. Board of Public Works,
195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1926).
218. 205 Cal. at 434, 271 P. at 490-91 (quoting Southern Leasing Co. v. Ludwig,
168 App. Div. 233, 153 N.Y.S. 545 (1915).
219. A permitting body must perforce have the power to grant or deny a permit.
Obviously, if an applicant meets all of the stated requirements, the permit must be
issued. The permitting body, however, has the power to deny the permit for good
cause. A legitimate exercise of the police power which prohibits the development
specified in a permit application constitutes good cause for denial of the permit. The
question of vested rights is inapposite under this set of circumstances. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 115 Cal. Rptr.
731 (1974); West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 256 Cal.
App. 357, 64 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1967); cf. McCombs v. Larson, 176 Cal. App. 2d 105,
1 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1959) (denial of a permit absent express authority to do so improper); Munns v. Stenman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 543, 314 P.2d 67 (1957) (no authority
to deny permit when exercise of police power arbitrary and discriminatory).
220. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17
Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966); Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79,
40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

A second California case, which relied on Brougher and in turn
upon Brett, concerned the extent to which it was necessary for a
landowner to proceed with development before rights would vest
against a change in the zoning law. The 1930 case of Wheat v.
Barrett221 involved an unusual set of facts but presented essentially
the same question as did Pelham and Brett. The plaintiff sought to
compel the issuance of a building permit by challenging the validity
of the local zoning regulations. After a favorable judgment in the
trial court, the plaintiff served the lower court's writ on the local
officials. Before the writ was stayed on appeal, he entered into a
contract for the erection of a building, excavated the land, and built
forms for the foundation. At the time the appeal was heard, a new
ordinance had been passed which, if applicable to the plaintiff, would
have prevented further construction on the project. The court considered the question of whether he had "secured a vested right in
the permit required to be granted under the terms of the original
222
judgment."
The court's opinion consisted almost entirely of quotations from
Brougher and Brett; it did not explicitly analyze the facts presented
from any particular theoretical basis. After quoting from the Brett
case and noting the extent of the landowner's work therein, the court
merely stated, "As much, if not more so in the present case, is the
work done inconsequential in proportion to the total cost of construction, than in the cases cited, and therefore less reason upon which to
base the claim of a vested right.."223 Unlike the Brett court, the court
in Wheat made no attempt to weigh the purposes to be achieved by
the city's exercise of its police power against the significance of the
interference with the plaintiff's property interest. Instead, the basis
of the court's holding was a comparison of one portion of the facts
in Brett with the analogous facts of the case at hand: the amount of
work done by the plaintiff. This analysis was incomplete under the
theory of Brett, which investigated first the exercise of the police
power and then the extent of the private interests affected.
The Wheat court cited the Pelham case but chose to distinguish
it on its facts, 224 probably because the plaintiff there had secured a
vested right. Had the Wheat court pursued an estoppel analysis, it
might have reached another result, because whether the plaintiff in
221.
222.
223.

210 Cal. 193, 290 P. 1033 (1930).
Id. at 195, 290 P. at 1033.
Id. at 199, 290 P. at 1035.

224.

Id.
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Wheat acted with the requisite reliance and good faith to secure an
estoppel against the city was doubtful. At best, the case illustrates
the recurring problem of many vested rights cases: an incomplete
analysis of the problem caused by a failure to adopt a particular
theoretical basis for the vested rights doctrine.
The last of the early California cases that touched upon concerns
relevant to the vested rights problem in zoning was a 1930 case, Jones
v. City of Los Angeles. 225

This case considered the necesssity of

preserving existing uses of land that became nonconforming after
passage of a zoning ordinance. The city passed a zoning ordinance
that prohibited the operation of sanitariums in designated residential
zones and then attempted to enjoin the operation of several such institutions which had been in existence before passage of the new law.
The court found scant precedence because the issue of protecting nonconforming uses had rarely arisen and therefore looked to cases that
discussed the related question of vested rights. 226 The court relied
on the Pelham case's 227 rationale that the exercise of the police power
in zoning matters was not absolute. 228 The court undertook to bal-

ance the impact on existing private interests against the benefit to
the public to be gained by a retroactive application of the zoning
ordinance. The private interest was represented by an existing, nonnuisance use of property that would have been immediately destroyed.
The public benefit sought was only an intent to further the general
welfare, as opposed to more serious and specific concerns of health
or safety. 220 The court's conclusion was that, "where . . . a retroactive ordinance causes substantial injury and the prohibited business
is not a nuisance, the ordinance is to that extent an unreasonable . . .
225. 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
226. See County of San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 234 P.2d 972,
977 (1951): "Protection of an undertaking involving the investment of capital, the
purchase of equipment, and the employment of workers is akin to protection of a nonconforming use existing at the time that zoning restrictions become effective." Id.
See also 1 ANDERSON, supra note 17, at §§ 6.01-.31; 4 WiLLiAMS, supra note 18, at
§§ 111.01-.03. See notes 177-89 & accompanying text supra.
227. The court cited additional cases, including: Frank J. Durkin Lumber Co. v.
Fitzsimmons, 106 N.J.L. 183, 147 A. 555 (1929) (use actually instituted); Rosenberg
v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N.W. 838 (1929) (plans for construction prepared); Atkinson v. Piper, 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1923) (buildings
under construction).
228. But cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (police power can be exercised absolutely to abate
nuisances).
229. See generally 1 ANDnEsoN, supra note 17, at § 6.08.
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For this reason the ordinance, valid

as to future uses of land in the zone, could not be applied so as to
require the elimination of present uses.
The court's analysis was sound. Although addressed to a factual
situation not identical to the cases already discussed, it closely resembled the method of analysis used by the court in the Brett case;
the purpose for exercise of the police power was considered in relation to the extent of the private interests affected. That the courts
in Jones and Brett reached different conclusions is immaterial; the
conclusions were the result of similar analytical processes.
The court's analysis in Jones must be starkly contrasted with
that of Pelham, notwithstanding the Jones court's reliance upon it
and similarity of the outcome reached. The phenomenon of a court
reaching for a result and relying upon a case that achieved a similar
result, albeit on the basis of a different analysis, is not uncommon.
It tends, unfortunately, to blur the analysis of courts that are inclined
to decide later cases solely by factual comparisons with earlier ones
rather than by concentrating upon an application of the theory of
23 1
earlier cases to the facts of the case presently before it.
The Permit Requirement
A more recent California case provides illustration of the confusion and strained reasoning that is apt to occur when courts fail
to understand adequately the theories of the cases on which they
base their opinions and strive instead to achieve a desirable result.
In Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara,232 the plaintiff
had received a special use permit 233 in 1941 to drill for oil in an
undeveloped area of the city. He had made preparations for drilling and expended considerable sums but had not actually begun
drilling operations when he was forced to cease activity because of
the outbreak of war and the army's occupation of the property. By
the time he regained his property and was prepared to continue the
230.
231.

211 Cal. at 321, 295 P. at 22.
E.g., Wheat v. Barrett, 210 Cal. 193, 290 P. 1033 (1930).

232.
233.

85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 194 P.2d 148 (1948).
A drilling permit would be issued, "'[ilf the City Council shall find that the

granting of such permit will not materially affect the health or safety of persons residing or working in the neighborhood thereof or elsewhere in the City and will not
be materially detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to property or improvements in the neighborhood thereof or elsewhere in the City in which the property
of the applicant is situated, it shall grant such permit ....
...
Id. at 779, 194 P.2d
at 150 (quoting Santa Barbara Ordinance 1613). See 56 CAL. Jun. 2d Zoning § 160
(1960).
See note 46 supra.
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drilling operations, the zoning in the area had been changed to allow only residential uses so that his drilling permit was revoked.
He sought to compel the city to annul its act of revocation and to
reinstate his permit. The court granted the relief sought by the
plaintiff, finding that he had been deprived of property without due
234
process of law.
On the facts of the case, the court was correct in its decision.
Its discussion and analysis of the vested rights question, however,
was unintelligible. At the outset of the opinion, the court stated the
proposition, "If a permittee has acquired a vested property right
under a permit, the permit cannot be revoked." 23 r As illustrative
of this proposition, the court quoted from the Pelham case, among
others. It then concluded that, because the plaintiff relied upon his
permit in good faith by beginning preparatory work for drilling at
a cost of $4,500, he had "acquired a vested property right to proceed
under the permit to drill well No. 8 .... "236 This language is clearly
that of estoppel as used in Pelham, and if that was the court's theory
in the case at hand, no additional discussion would have been necessary; the estoppel had arisen, and the landowner was shielded from
the later change in law.
The analysis, however, was not so abbreviated. Before stating
the conclusion that the plaintiff had a vested right, the court discussed the nature of the city's original grant of the permit 3 7 and
the unique nature and value of a property interest in a nontransferable natural resource. It was concerned with the severity of the
impact of any law that proscribed the activity by which such a reSource is extracted.2 38 The court stated that any proscription on
extraction of natural resources under the exercise of the police power
could be justified only if that activity constituted a nuisance. No
allegation of nuisance had been made in the case. The analysis accords with that of the Brett case and could have warranted the court's
finding that the amended ordinance was unreasonable as applied to
234. 85 Cal. App. 2d at 797-98, 194 P.2d at 161.
235. Id. at 784, 194 P.2d at 152. See notes 55-57 & accompanying text supra.
236. Id. at 798, 194 P.2d at 156.
237. "In issuing the permit, respondents determined that the drilling of well No.
8 would not be materially detrimental to the health or safety of persons residing or
working in the immediate vicinity of the well, or injurious to property or improvements in the neighborhood thereof, or elsewhere in the city." Id. See note 233
supra.
238. See generally 4 WmLmiMs, supra note 18, at §§ 91.01-.13. See also 3 ANDERsoN, supra note 17, at § 18.31; D. HAGmAN, URBAw PLANNmNG AN LAND DEvErPmzr
CorROL LAw § 75 (1971).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

the plaintiff and therefore invalid. Thus, under either the Brett or
Pelham approach the plaintiff apparently would have been immu2 9
nized from the change in the law. 3
The court, however, inexplicably continued its opinion in an
effort to determine "the effect of the amendments to the zoning ordinance .. .on the right which had vested in [the] appellant prior
to their enactment.."240 It concluded the "amendments did not revoke appellant's permit or effect its rights thereunder." 241 The very
fact that the court felt the need to consider the effect of the rezoning
after finding that plaintiff's right was vested evidenced its failure
to appreciate that the vested rights doctrine itself prevented revocation of the permit. The only conceivable explanation of the court's
action is that it somehow had come to view a vested right as an
adjunct of the permit, attaching after the permit had been issued
and the permittee had properly and sufficiently relied thereon. The
cases heretofore had properly been concerned with the effect of a
change in the law upon a particular landowner. Whatever the
method of analysis, if the proper circumstances were found to exist,
the law was not applicable to that landowner because rights had
been acquired that could not be impaired. The Trans-Oceanic court
viewed the problem conversely. That court looked first at the permit and decided whether a vested right had attached to it and then
considered the effect of a change in the law upon the permit and
vested right. This approach emasculates the analysis because, if the
right is truly vested, the only conclusion that can be reached is that
it cannot be impaired by the new law. If the court were to have
concluded in the first part of its opinion that the plaintiff had a vested
239. A secondary issue presented in this case concerned the plaintiff's possible
abandonment of its right to drill for oil. Although the permit had been issued in
1941, six years had passed before the plaintiff was able to proceed with its actual drilling operations. Owing to the unusual circumstances of the war and the post-war
shortage of materials, the court found that the plaintiff had manifested no intent to
abandon its rights and that it had proceeded in a reasonable time with its drilling
activities. 85 Cal. App. 2d at 790, 194 P.2d at 156. The possible lapse of a vested
right is raised in a later case, Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. de-

nied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).

See also Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast

Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 74-75, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 674-75 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
240. 85 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 194 P.2d at 157.
241. Id. at 792, 194 P.2d at 158. In addition, and as if to place a final nail in
the city's coffin, the court held that, as a matter of procedural due process, the city's
act of revoking the permit was invalid because the plaintiff had not been given notice
or an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 795-97, 194 P.2d at 159-60. See note 158 supra.
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right, but then determined that the new law was nonetheless applicable, the only conclusion that could have been drawn is that the
plaintiff's so-called right had never really vested in the first place.
The analysis is thus reduced to the proposition that a person has a
2 42
vested right if a vested right exists.
More than semantics is involved; the entire analytical process
is impaired by the Trans-Oceanic concept of vested rights. The result is that the term "vested rights" has no meaning and its use precludes analysis of the real question posed by a change in zoning
law.243 The form of a landowner's position, possession of a particular permit and subsequent activity, becomes more important than
the substance of the position, either good faith reliance or a balance
of the public and private interests involved.
The result of the choice of form is graphically illustrated by the
1958 case of Griffin v. County of Matin,244 which held that an ordinance downzoning the plaintiffs' property was invalid. The evidence in the case indicated the county had rezoned the property
just prior to its condemnation by the state for the sole purpose of
lowering the value of the land for compensation purposes. 245 One
month before the property was rezoned the plaintiffs had been issued a building permit for construction of a service station. Before
receiving the permit they had prepared plans for the station, and
afterwards they had done some very minor grading on the property.
The court held the rezoning invalid, stating that the plaintiffs "had
a vested right in the permit, and the county had no legal right to
revoke it." 246 It conceded that, in comparison with other cases, the
plaintiffs had not done very much work but stated that they had
"changed their position to reliance on the then zoning ordinance and
upon the issuance of the permit, performing a material amount of
work thereunder .... "247 Consequently, an estoppel against the
242. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592 n.9, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376,
128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1976); see also Variable Quality of a Vested Right, supra
note 7. See notes 51-57 & accompanying text supra.
243. In analyzing this problem, Justice Traynor did not use the term "vested
rights." Instead, be spoke of the protection of a landowner who has 'legally undertaken the construction of a building" or a permittee who has "expended substantial
sums under a permit ....
.. County of San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683,
691, 234 P.2d 972, 977 (1951). See notes 55-57 & accompanying text, supra.
244. 157 Cal. App. 2d 507, 321 P.2d 148 (1958).
245. See Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1972); Note, Valuation in Inverse Condemnation, 25 HAsTwNs L.J. 768 (1974);
see also Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
246. 157 Cal. App. 2d at 511, 321 P.2d at 151.
247. Id.
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county had arisen, prohibiting the county from revoking the plaintiffs' permit.
In this case, the court was faced with a clearly improper zoning
ordinance.2 48 It could have held the ordinance invalid as an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the police power. Instead it
chose to invalidate the ordinance because the plaintiffs had purportedly acquired vested rights. The court considered the reliance
of the plaintiffs both before 249 and after issuance of the building permit. It did not analyze the nature and substantiality of the reliance but merely labeled the grading activities "material" and deemed
it a question for the trial court "[w]hether the work had progressed
to a point sufficient to warrant the estoppel .... "250
Under such reasoning almost any landowner could be considered
to have a vested right under the rule in Trans-Oceanic, if the landowner has a permit and has done something, almost anything, subsequently. Although the Griffin court should not be faulted for the
outcome of the case, its choice of a vested rights analysis hastened
the process of ossification which had begun in Trans-Oceanic.
Vested rights was something that a property owner had after a permit was issued, and no longer was the label for an analytical process that determined the effect upon a particular landowner of an
exercise of the police power that caused a change in the zoning of
his property. The Griffin court employed the language of estoppel
although the facts of the case strained that concept, perhaps beyond
its legitimate limits.251
Estoppel Theory
After Griffiin, questions remained concerning the requisite basis
and extent of a landowner's reliance. Was reliance upon existing
zoning to be considered or only reliance upon some permit or act
of permission given by the government? Was the standard of reliance material reliance or substantial reliance; what was the measure
of reliance, absolute expenditures or a comparison of expenditures
with total projected costs? What was good faith? Because the
248.

See note 245 & accompanying text supra.

249.

Later California cases have held that reliance upon the existing zoning of

property at the time of purchase can in no way inhibit the later exercise of the police
power. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr.
365 (1975); Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964).
250. 157 Cal. App. 2d at 514, 321 P.2d at 153.

251. Underscoring the notion of estoppel, the court alluded to but dismissed the
county's contention that the plaintiffs had come to the court with unclean hands. 157
Cal. App. 2d at 514, 321 P.2d at 153.
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term vested rights had become a shibboleth, empty of meaning and
useless as an analytical concept, later cases needed only to answer
these questions so that the formula could be mechanically applied.
In 1964, the case of Anderson v. City Council 25 2 firmly estab-

lished the estoppel theory as the basis for California's common law
vested rights doctrine and began the process of answering the questions raised by Griffin regarding the parameters of this theory of
vested rights. The plaintiffs owned a parcel of land zoned for business use. They prepared plans for building a service station on the
parcel and applied for a building permit, but before they completed
their plans and received the building permit, an ordinance was passed
that required a use permit to be issued before a new use could be
initiated in a business zone. 253 Their application for a use permit
was denied and the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate to compel
issuance of the permit along with a building permit for the service
station.2 54 Among other contentions, they claimed to have secured
a vested right to construct the service station on the basis of the
time and money that they had invested in attempting to develop
their property.
The court addressed this contention by focusing upon the fact
that the plaintiffs had not received a building permit before the pas252. 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964). An interesting examination
of this case appears in D. MANxtxan, MAAGING OuR URBAN ENv RoNmENT 53-106
(Supp. 1968) [hereinafter cited as MANDELErg]. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Board
of Supervisors, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 115 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1974).
253. The plaintiffs had applied for a building permit prior to the time that the use
permit ordinance was passed, but their application was denied because their plans
required a variance from city setback requirements. The court held that the denial
of the building permit for that reason was proper. 229 Cal. App. 2d at 87, 40 Cal.
Rptr. at 46; see MANDxy.R, supra note 252, at 72-74. The ordinance requiring use
permits for new development in commercial areas of the city arguably was invalid
because it contained no standards for the exercise of the council's discretion in acting
on a permit request. This issue apparently was not raised by the plaintiffs. See id.
at 89-90.
254. Under later California law, the city's action in denying the use permit and
the manner of review by the trial court would have been different. Adjudicative actions of local agencies or bodies must now be based upon findings drawn from evidence
presented to that agency or body. See Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v.
County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974).
It is doubtful the city council's procedure met the requirements outlined in Topanga.
See MANDELKm, supra note 252, at 80-83. Depending upon the nature of the permit
applicant's claim, the trial court's review of the adjudicative body's decision is based
upon a standard of either substantial evidence contained in the record of the proceedings or the court's independent review of that evidence. See Strunsky v. San Diego
County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805
(1974).
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sage of the ordinance that required a use permit for their proposed
activity. It stated that, on the one hand, the mere purchase of real
property could not be the basis of a right that inhibited the exercise
of the police power to effect a change in the zoning of the property, 25 5 but that, on the other hand, the actual use of the property
could not be impaired by a change in the zoning law. 256 It was
""[t]he activity of the owner in the use of his property at the time
it becomes subject to a zoning ordinance and not his plans regarding
the future use of that property '"' 25 7 that formed the basis of any
rights against a change in zoning. To the plaintiff's contention they
had secured a vested right the court responded as follows:
[R]espondents have been unable to cite a single California decision in which a property owner has been held to have acquired
a vested right against future zoning without having first acquired
a building permit to construct a specific type of building and having thereafter expended a considerable sum in reliance upon said
permit. Such authority would appear nonexistent for the reason
that the vested rights theory is predicated upon estoppel of the
governing body. Where a building permit to erect a specific type
of building is issued by a county or city and the permittee acts
upon it and incurs obligations, or in good faith commences construction, his rights become vested and the governmental body is
thereafter estopped to set up a zoning ordinance subsequently
enacted. . . . Where no such permit has been issued it is difficult
to conceive of any basis for such estoppel."218
Thus, the court held that the issuance of a building permit was the
requisite act of government upon which a landowner could subsequently rely thereby vesting a right and securing immunity from a
change in the law. No reasonable expectation of development resulted from reliance upon other acts despite the fact that such reliance might be necessary to a particular development project.
The court's language has been quoted repeatedly in later cases
and bears close examination. First, the court is technically incor255. See HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1975) (change in zoning of property); Price v. Schwafel, 92 Cal. App.
2d 77, 206 P.2d 683 (1949) (interim zoning ordinance); O'Rourke v. Teeters, 63 Cal.
App. 2d 349, 146 P.2d 983 (1944) (initial zoning of property).
256. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930). But cf.
County of San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 234 P.2d 972 (1951) (no extension or enlargement of a nonconforming use); City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal.
App. 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954) (amortization of a nonconforming use).
257. 229 Cal. App. 2d at 88, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (quoting Paramount Rock Co.
v. County of San Diego, 180 Cal. App. 2d 217, 232, 4 Cal. Rptr. 317, 326 (1960)).
258. 229 Cal. App. 2d at 89, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (emphasis in original, citations
omitted).
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rect in its assertion that in no California case had a vested right been
acquired without the prior grant of a building permit. In the TransOceanic case, the plaintiff had perfected a vested right on the basis
of a special use permit, not a building permit. 259

Second, nothing

in the earlier California case law had necessarily limited the vested
rights theory to the grant of a building permit.260

A more accurate

statement of the previous law would have been that no landowner
had ever acquired a vested right without lawfully performing some
physical act of development on property prior to the effective date
of a new law that potentially interfered with the development. This
statement comports with the holdings of vested rights cases employing the estoppel theory as well as those balancing the purpose sought
259. See note 233 & accompanying text supra. Accord, Dobbins v. Los Angeles,
195 U.S. 223 (1904) (fire commissioner's permit). See also Jones v. City of Los
Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930) (lawful pre-existing use).
260. The origin of the permit rule was apparently Brougher v. Board of Public
Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 P. 487 (1928). See notes 34 & 215-20 & accompanying
text supra. Because that case dealt with the power of a permitting body to deny
a permit on the basis of a change in the law, the court's discussion of vested rights
and the restraints on the police power in zoning was narrowed to permits and to the
perfection of rights under a permit once it had been granted. The case does not
state, however, that rights can only vest under a permit, or that no other form of
private property restraint upon the police power exists. Indeed, the earlier case of
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904), did not indicate that the grant of the
permit in that case was the basis of the plaintif's vested rights, nor was there any
any purported revocation of the permit itself on the basis of the later exercise of the
police power, the validity of which was itself the issue in the case. Also, in Jones
v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930), discussed at notes 225-31 &
accompanying text supra, the court essentially recognized a vested right in the maintenance of a presently existing, lawful use of property. While citing cases that spoke
of vested rights under a permit, the court relied upon a case in which no permit had
been issued and in which "construction was not yet under way but the owner of the
land had incurred expenses in the preparation of plans for the structure." Id. at 312,
295 P. at 18 (citing Rosenberg v. Village of Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N.W.
838 (1929)).
This area of the law was summarized in a portion of an opinion by Justice Traynor
in 1951, which clearly indicates that the doctrine of vested rights includes, but is not
exclusively limited to, the grant of a permit or any particular permit. Speaking for
the court, Justice Traynor said: "If an owner has legally undertaken the construction
of a building before the effective date of a zoning ordinance, he may complete the
building and use it for the purpose designed after the effective date of the ordinance. . . . Protection of an undertaking involving the investment of capital, the
purchase of equipment, and the employment of workers, is akin to protection of a
nonconforming use existing at the time that zoning restrictions become effective.
The same principle underlies the rule that a permittee who has expended substantial
sums under a permit cannot be deprived by a subsequent zoning ordinance of the
right to complete construction and to use the premises as authorized by the permit."
County of San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 691, 234 P.2d 972, 977 (1951)
(emphasis added, citations omitted).
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to be achieved by the exercise of the police power and the impairment of private property interests.
In 1966, two years after the Anderson case was decided, its
language and rationale were utilized in Spindler Realty Corp. v.
Monning.' 1 This case occupies a pivotal position in the California
case law of vested rights; it represents the first application of the
vested rights rules to a decidedly modern development project. The
earlier cases generally involved small projects, usually a single structure to be built upon a single lot. Spindler and later cases involved
much larger and more expensive projects covering numerous acres
and requiring extensive preconstruction engineering and architectural
planning. Spindler differed also in that it involved multiple development permits from the local government, which complicated the
vested rights question.
Spindler owned a 21-acre tract of hillside property which had
been zoned for multiple dwelling development. 262 In June 1960,
the city council developed a master plan that rezoned all property
in the area except the plaintiff's for large lot single family development. More than a year later, Spindler received a grading permit
for the preparation of a building site on its property. Although the
permit made no reference to any particular use of the property, the
permit could only be issued for the purpose of building. 2 3 Two
weeks after grading operations began on October 9, 1961, the city
planning commission, without notice to Spindler, undertook to consider rezoning the property to conform with the single family zoning
of the rest of the area. The downzoning was ultimately approved
by the city council and became effective in April 1962. In the sixmonth interim, Spindler had begun grading operations in conformity
with its grading permit and in March 1962 had applied for a building permit for an apartment complex. Its application was not in
order until June 1, 1962, and at that time was denied on the basis
of the rezoning. By then, Spindler had spent several hundred thousand dollars for plans and grading operations.
Spindler sought a writ of mandate to compel issuance of a building permit in accordance with the original multiple dwelling zoning
of the property. It contended that it had acquired a vested right
261.
262.
at 259,
263.

243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966).
Multiple dwelling development included hotels and apartment houses. Id.
53 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
Id. at 263, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
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to such development because it had "relied in good faith on the
[city's] permissive acts and authorizations .. .pursuant to existing
zoning" 26 4 and had performed substantial work in reliance on its

grading permit. Spindler argued that, because a permit was required for grading and grading was approved only for purposes of
building, its grading permit was analogous to a building permit and
it had therefore satisfied the vested rights rule.
The court rejected Spindler's claim. It recited the familiar
general rule that "if a property owner has acquired a vested right
under a permit, the permit cannot be revoked" 265 and then quoted
the rule from the Anderson case that a vested right against a change
in zoning can arise only if a landowner has relied in good faith upon
a building permit. The court conceded that Spindler had acquired
a vested right to complete the grading under its grading permit but
saw the issue as "whether that vested right gives Spindler a vested
right, without issuance of a building permit, not only to complete
the grading but also to build as permitted by [multiple dwelling]
zoning, so as to render the later rezoning inoperative." 266 It found
Spindler's reliance upon the grading permit of no consequence with
regard to the rezoning. Once Spindler learned of the possibility of
rezoning the court deemed it to have taken "a calculated risk,"267
notwithstanding the reasonableness of its actions in the face of the
uncertainty of its position. 268 Even though Spindler had no way
of knowing the extent of its risk at that time and even though its
reliance on the existing zoning and grading permit had been in good
faith, the court nevertheless strictly applied the building permit requirement to the facts of the case. Harking back to Anderson, the
court stated, "Since no building permit was issued to Spindler, the
City was not estopped to adopt the ordinance rezoning Spindlers
264. Id. at 264, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
265. Id. at 263, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
266. Id. at 264, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
267. The court noted: "'[T]he legal status of the date of October 26, 1961, as
a date after which petitioner might eventually be found to have expended money at
petitioner's risk was, and still is, uncertain. It was further uncertain at the time
whether it would eventually be found, as a matter of law, that petitioner could acquire vested rights to build under a grading permit as distinguished from a building
permit, and what the crucial date of the acquisition of such vested rights might be'
and that under these circumstances and others relating to the conditions of the property, Spindler's decision 'immediately after October 27, 1961, to proceed with the
grading was an entirely reasonable one to make, and that there was nothing whatsoever morally reprehensible in proceeding."' Id. at 265-66, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 12-13
(quoting trial court's opinion).
268. 243 Cal. App. 2d at 265, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
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property ....
"269
Spindler's property was subject to the new residential zoning, and any development had to conform to that zoning.
The court relied on Anderson, but the landowners there had
not received any development permission from the government and
had not performed any work on the property prior to the new law.
In Spindler, the landowner had received a limited form of development permission and had acted in reliance upon it, performing substantial work before receiving notice of the possible rezoning27 ° and
reasonably proceeding with work thereafter. To adopt successfully
the estoppel rules laid down in the Anderson case, the Spindler court
accurately perceived the need to account for the landowner's activity, particularly the work done on its property, prior to the time
the new zoning was enacted and the building permit denied. It
responded by characterizing the time after receipt of notice that new
zoning was being considered as a period of calculated risk-taking
on the part of the landowner.2 7 1 If the landowner chose to proceed,
the gamble was that the new law would not pass or that a building
permit and vested rights would be secured before it did. The uncertainty and potential waste inherent in such a situation is obvious.

27 2

The consequence of the estoppel theory as expounded in
Anderson and applied in Spindler is that the form of the landowner's
position at the time a new land use regulation determines the outcome. In Griffin, minimal grading activities undertaken after a
building permit was issued were sufficient to establish a vested right,
while in Spindler, much more substantial work performed pursuant
to a different permit did not vest rights against a change in the
zoning laws.
269. Id. at 269, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
270. See id. at 261, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
271. As authority, the court cited an early Arizona case, City of Tucson v. Arizona
Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 272 P. 923 (1928), in which an ordinance prohibiting mortuaries in a given area was held valid against a landowner who had proceeded with
such construction after learning that the ordinance was pending. That case, however,
was wholly inapposite; it was concerned with a use of land that was legitimately within
the realm of nuisance concerns. As seen earlier, the statement had often been made
that no vested right could be asserted to inhibit the exercise of the police power with
regard to the control of nuisances. See notes 237-39 & accompanying text supra. See
also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock,
237 U.S. 171 (1915); Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904); Jones v. City
of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930); Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of
Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 194 P.2d 148 (1948).
272. See Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d
34, 39, 423 P.2d 824, 829, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672, 677 (1967).
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The result in Spindler can be explained with more satisfaction
by analyzing the extent to which the plaintiff's property interests
had been perfected pursuant to government authorizations prior to
the rezoning. Once Spindler had received its grading permit, it had
a legitimate expectation of developing its property, which it began
perfecting when the work began on its land.27 3 At the time of the
effective date for the rezoning, further grading was needed before
construction could begin, and no identifiable use had yet been perfected. Thus, Spindler's property interest was still undefined at
that time; the only irrevocable losses as a consequence of the rezoning were planning expenses, which are generally not considered
by courts when evaluating vested rights claims.2 7 4 If a property
owner's actual use cannot be impaired by a change in zoning 27 5 and
if this tenet is the underlying premise of the vested rights doctrine, 276
Spindler had no vested right, not because it had not secured a building permit but because it had not sufficiently perfected a use of its
property prior to the rezoning.
The Spindler decision, resting as it did upon rules developed to
accommodate the problems that arose when comprehensive zoning
ordinances were established or adjusted, closed the period during
which the vested rights question involved rather modest development attempts and well established zoning practices of local communities. Its theory of vested rights was grounded in the doctrine
of estoppel. The particular rules required that a landowner rely to
some inexact but nonetheless substantial degree upon a building
permit in order to secure immunity from a change in the zoning.
The element of good faith seemed to be necessary but had not
been in issue in the decided cases. These vested rights rules focused
heavily on the form of the landowner's position; the public purposes
sought to be achieved by a new law were not considered either for
or against a landowner in determining a particular vested rights
claim. 277 Possibly, the rules developed by the courts were all that
was required to mete out substantial justice and accommodate fairly
273. See Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964).
274. See id.
275. See County of San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal. 2d 683, 234 P.2d 972 (1951);
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930).
276. See Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776,
194 P.2d 148 (1948).
277. Cf. Cabric v. Ranchos Palos Verdes, 73 Cal. App. 3d 183, 140 Cal. Rptr. 619
(1977); McCombs v. Larson, 176 Cal. App. 2d 105, 1 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1959); Munns
v. Stenman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 543, 314 P.2d 67 (1957); (permits improperly denied on
the basis of a later law).
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the interests of the public and property owners during the period in
278
which they were developed.
Spindler, however, had not looked like many of its predecessors:
more land, more planning, more permits, and more money were involved than in the earlier cases. When the vested rights question
next arose in California, the circumstances were markedly different
from those in cases concerned with comprehensive zoning. The
question arose under state-mandated environmental 27 9 and regional
land use controls28s characterized by administrative decisionmaking
and highly discretionary approval of development proposals. The
developments in issue often covered many acres and in some cases
had been subjected to extensive local planning and zoning control
before the new state laws became effective. Arguably, both the
public and private ante had now been upped. What theories and
rules were to be applied under these circumstances?
Regional Land Use Control and Modem Development Practice
The public's environmental conscience was aroused during the
late 1960's and early 1970's. In its wake, new laws were passed to
meet an array of concerns, many of which related to the use of land
in areas considered to be environmentally sensitive. 2 81 In contrast
to most older land use regulations, these new laws were passed by
the state legislature rather than local governments. 282 The cases
that follow discuss the vested rights doctrine as it developed under
the exemption provision of the California Coastal Zone Conservation
Act of 1972.283
The Coastal Zone Act
The Coastal Zone Conservation Act was typical of the modern
278. But see Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal.
2d 34, 423 P.2d 824, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1967).
279. California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21176
(West 1977).
280. See, e.g., California Coastal Act, CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West
1977) (supersedes California Coastal Zone Conservation Act, former CAL. Pun. REs.
CODE §§ 27000-27650, added by initiative measure, Nov. 7, 1972, 1972 Cal. Stats. at
A-181-88, repealed by § 27650 on Jan. 1, 1977); California Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 67000-67130 (West Supp. 1977).
281. See note 21 supra.
282. Statewide land use regulations suggest much stronger statements of public
policy than do municipal zoning laws, which might be perceived as expressions
of various competing private interests. See Babcock & Feurer, supra note 25, at 300.
283. Former CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West 1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Coastal Act]; see note 280 supra.
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land use regulations prompted by the environmental concerns of
legislators and citizens. Approved as an initiative measure in November 1972, the Act was designed to preserve the coastline of the
state as a valuable natural resource. 28 4 It required the preparation
of a comprehensive plan for the management of the land within a
designated coastal zone. 28 5 Unlike local zoning ordinances intended
to harmonize the allocation of possible uses of land within a single
municipality or county, the Act sought to control all forms of development within its designated regional area in order to achieve
compatibility of any development with the intrinsic qualities of the
area. The orientation of this legislation was the preservation of the
particular physical and aesthetic characteristics of the land rather
than the control or apportionment of the use of that land.
The Act provided that beginning February 1, 1973, anyone
"wishing to perform any development"28 6 within a specified permit
area along the coast287 obtain a permit authorizing that development from the commission established to carry out the provisions of
the Act.288 Development would be allowed if the commission determined that it would be consistent with the objectives of the Act 289
284. The Coastal Act's findings and declarations stated: "[T]he California coastal
zone is a distinct and valuable natural resource belonging to all the people and existing as a delicately balanced ecosystem; . . . the permanent protection of the remaining natural and scenic resources of the coastal zone is a paramount concern to present
and future residents of the state and nation; . . . it is the policy of the state to preserve, .protect, and, where possible, to restore the resources of the coastal zone for
the enjoyment of the current and succeeding generations; and . . . to protect the
coastal zone it is necessary:
(a) To study the coastal zone . . . to ensure conservation of coastal zone resources.
(b) To prepare . . . a comprehensive, coordinated, enforceable plan for the orderly,
long-range conservation and management of the natural resources of the coastal
zone ....
(c) To ensure that any development which occurs in the permit area during the
study and planning period will be consistent with the objectives of this division."
Former CAL. PUn. REs. CODE- § 27001 (West 1976).

285. Id. §§ 27300-27320.
286. Id. § 27400. Development included, among other activities, the "placement
or erection of any solid material or structure . . . grading, removing, dredging, mining,
or extraction of any materials; change in the density or intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to, subdivision of land pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act
and any other division of land, including lot splits . . . Construction, reconstruction,
demolition, or alteration of the size of any structure, including any facility of any
private, public, or municipal utility ......
Id. § 27103.
287. Id. § 27104. Subject to certain provisions, the permit area was "that portion
of the coastal zone lying between the seaward limit of the jurisdiction of the state
and 1,000 yards landward from the mean high tide line of the sea ......
Id.
288. Id. §§ 27200-27243, 27400-27428.

289. Id. §§ 27400, 27402.
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and would not have any "substantial adverse environmental or eco29
logical effect.." 0
Section 27404 of the Act specifically provided that any person
who had obtained a building permit before the effective date of the
Act and had a "vested right thereunder" was not required to get a
permit from the coastal commission. A person was deemed to have
a vested right if they had "in good faith and in reliance upon the
building permit diligently commenced construction and performed
substantial work on the development and incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials.
...291 A landowner claiming an exemption under this section had to present a claim to the commission
for approval. 29 2 If the claim were denied, the landowner could seek
29
judicial review of the commission's action. 3
290. Id. § 27402.
291. Id. § 27404.
292. The claim was required to be filed with the appropriate regional commission.
An appeal from the decision of the regional commission to the state commission could be
taken by any aggrieved person. See Marina Plaza v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 3d 311, 321, 140 Cal. Rptr. 725, 730-31 (1977); Klitgaard
& Jones, Inc. v. San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 99, 121 Cal. Rptr.
650 (1975); CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App.

3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974).

See also Sierra Club v. California Coastal Zone

Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 149, 129 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1976).
293. Former CAL. Pun3. REs. CODE § 27424 (West 1976). See South Coast Regional Comm'n v. Gordon, 18 Cal. 3d 832, 558 P.2d 867, 135 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1977);

State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974);
Marina Plaza v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 3d 311,

326, 140 Cal. Rptr. 725, 733-34 (1977).
A recurring question in the Coastal Act cases concerned the scope of judicial review of coastal commission decisions. See generally Strumsky v. San Diego Co. Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974).
Courts agreed that commission determination of an exemption claim was an adjudicatory matter. See State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 245, 524 P.2d 1281, 1286.
115 Cal. Rptr. 497, 502 (1974); Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 58
Cal. App. 3d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1976); Davis v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 700, 129 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 57 Cal. App.
3d 76, 83, 129 Cal. Rptr. 57, 62 (1976); Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State, 41
Cal. App. 3d 835, 116 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1974); see also Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic
Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr.
836 (1974); CAL. CIv. Paoc. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1976) (judicial review of adjudicatory decisions of an administrative agency). Courts differed as to whether they
were confined to upholding the commission's decision if there was substantial evidence
in the administrative record to support it, see Patterson v. Central Coast Regional
Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1976); Sierra Club
v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 534, 149 Cal. Rptr.
743 (1976), or whether they could exercise their independent judgment based upon
the evidence contained in that record. See Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State, 41
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The Act's statutory exemption represented an attempt to codify

294
the rules of the California common law doctrine of vested rights.

Unfortunately, the particular wording of section 27404 was flawed
when read in conjunction with section 27400, the permit requirement
of the Act. Section 27404 exempted persons who had vested rights
under a building permit as of November 8, 1972, the effective date
of the act, but section 27400 required persons "wishing to perform
any development" on the coast after February 1, 1973, to get a permit. No mention was made in the Act of the consequence of any

development activity occurring between these two dates. The first
case to be litigated under the Act, San Diego Coast Regional Com-

mission v. See the Sea, Ltd.,295 harmonized these sections by creating

a second exemption from the permit requirements of the Act. The

court held that, because the voters did not intend to impose a moratorium on coastal construction by passage of the Act, a builder who
had secured a building permit and performed substantial actual construction on a project prior to February 1 could proceed without
a coastal permit. Thus, two exemptions existed: section 27404's

tradtitional common law vested right and the so-called See the Sea
exemption based upon substantial construction of a project before
the time after which a coastal commission permit was required for
296
coastal development.

Cal. App. 3d 835, 116 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1974). See also Avco Community Developers,
Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 796-97, n.7, 553 P.2d 546, 553,
132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 393 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 62, 133
Cal. Rptr. 664, 667 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Davis v. California
Coastal Conservation Comm'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 700, 708-09, 129 Cal. Rptr. 417, 42122 (1976); Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal.
App. 3d 534, 545, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315, 323 (1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
294. Aries Dcv. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal.
App. 3d 534, 543, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 (1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
See San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal. 3d 888, 894-903,
513 P.2d 129, 132-39, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380-87 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
Courts often discussed whether the exemption provided by former § 27404 was
coextensive with the common law of vested rights and considered the possibility that
a common law vested right might exist that did not satisfy the express language of
§ 27404. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n,
17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977); Urban Renewal Agency v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 15
Cal. 3d 577, 542 P.2d 645, 125 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1975); Oceanic California, Inc. v.
North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
295. 9 Cal. 3d 890, 513 P.2d 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
296. Courts differed as to the actual holding in See the Sea. All agreed that substantial lawful construction prior to February 1, 1973, was necessary to obtain the

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

For several reasons, the vested rights questions that arose after
passage of the Act differed from any that had occurred previously in
California zoning law.297 First, the process of development was
different. The scale of many of the projects along the coast that
were under consideration or in progress when the Act passed was
unprecedented. Some projects involved thousands of acres of land
and hundreds of dwelling units as well as commercial and recreational facilties.298 Many projects had been subjected to extensive
local planning and zoning control before passage of the Act. 290
exemption, but some courts required the construction to have been pursuant to a
building permit, while others did not find that See the Sea mandated such a requirement. Compare Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n,
17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977) with Environmental Coalition of Orange County, Inc. v. Avco Community Developers, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 513, 115 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1974).
See also South Coast
Regional Comm'n v. Higgins, 68 Cal. App. 3d 636, 137 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1977).
297. In one case specifically upholding the constitutionality of the Coastal Act,
the court stated that "the Coastal Initiative is not a zoning measure." CEEED v.
California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 313, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 320 (1974).
See also State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 255, 524
P.2d 1281, 1292, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497, 508 (1974).
This fact, however, did not affect
courts' consideration or application of the vested rights doctrine. Justice Mosk stated,
"Although the [cited] cases generally involve a change in the zoning law which thereafter prohibited a use previously permitted, the [vested rights] principle is applicable
where, as here, a further requirement is imposed by change in the law, i.e., the need
for an additional permit from the commission." San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n
v. See the Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal. 3d 888, 894, 513 P.2d 129, 133, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377, 381
(1973) (dissenting opinion). Several cases referred to estoppel as the basis of the
vested rights doctrine, see, e.g., Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 58 Cal.
App. 3d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1976), but only one court considered the theoretical
implication of asserting an estoppel against the coastal commission on the basis of a
developer's reliance upon the acts of some other jurisdictional entity. Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 122 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1975),
vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1083 (1977). Cf. California Central Coast Regional Conservation Comm'n v.
McKeon Constr., 38 Cal. App. 3d 154, 112 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1974) (developer's rights
against the city do not affect rights against the coastal commission). See also Oceanic
California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 65,
133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
See notes 13347 & accompanying text supra.
298. One planned community covered almost 8000 acres, of which almost 500
lay within the coastal zone. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast
Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977). Another similar project covered 5200 acres within
the coastal zone. See Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional
Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 494
(1977).
299. Typically, developers before the coastal commission had received tentative or
final subdivision map approvals, specific plan approvals, and a host of other city or
county department approvals and permits. See, e.g., Aries Dev. Co. v. California
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Second, the purpose of the Act and the nature of its permit requirement were unique. It represented a major statement of public policy
regarding the need to preserve the state's coastal resources 300 and
established a new and independent administrative agency that reg30 1
ulated land use, to exist concomitantly with existant local bodies.
As a consequence of the extensive local control to which projects
had been subject before passage of the Act, developers vigorously
pressed claims of vested rights based upon their actions and expenditures in reliance on government approvals other than the issuance
of building permits. Because of the size and integrated nature of
many of the projects, the developers also raised questions of the
appropriate scope of any vested right to which they might be entitled.30 2 In turn, courts tended to construe strictly the exemption
provision because of the important public purposes and interim na303
ture of the Act.
Final DiscretionaryApproval Test
The case of Aries Development Co. v. California Coastal Zone
Conservation Commission3 0 4 illustrates well the vested rights claim
of a developer whose project had been subject to extensive municipal regulation prior to the passage of the Act. Aries had purchased
a one and one-quarter acre parcel located within the coastal zone in
October 1972, one month prior to the passage of the Act. At the
time of purchase, the local government had already given its approval for construction of 64 apartment units on the site. Aries
sought to alter this scheme, however, and build 45 condominium
units instead. To this end it had submitted a use permit application, site plan, and tentative tract map and by November 1st had
received approval from both the local planning commission and city
council. On November 6th, it had received a limited grading permit and immediately began work. It had not received final approval of its environmental impact report (EIR), however, until one
Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951.
300. See note 284 supra.
301. Many cases were concerned with matters of procedure because developers
were required to submit their exemption claims to the coastal commission before seeking judicial relief. See notes 292-93 & accompanying text supra.
302. E.g., Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State, 41 Cal. App. 3d 835, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 487 (1975).
303. See, e.g., Urban Renewal Agency v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Comm'n, 15 Cal. 3d 577, 542 P.2d 645, 125 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1975).
304. 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951

(1977).
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week after passage of the Act and had not received a building permit
from the city until January 23, 1973. Actual construction of the
condominiums had not begun until April 1973, and had been halted
at the insistence of the regional coastal commission. Aries then had
filed applications for both an exemption and a coastal permit, but
both had been ultimately denied.
Aries sought a writ of mandate. It conceded that it had not
complied with the express language of section 27404 because it had
not obtained a building permit prior to the passage of the Act.
Both Aries and the Attorney General argued the case, however, assuming that a "building permit may no longer be a sine qua non
of a vested right .. . if the preliminary permits approve a specific
project and contain all final discretionary approvals required for completion of the project.."30 5 The court decided the case on this basis
because it had been urged initially by both parties. 30 6
Aries contended that the city had given its final discretionary
approval when it approved the tentative map for the project. The
court disagreed, characterizing approval of an EIR as a discretionary
act 30 7 and noting that Aries' EIR had not been approved when the
Act was passed. The court further noted that Aries' conduct bore
the "indelible stamp of 'unseemly haste' and lack of good faith."' 30 8
Immediately prior to the passage of the Act, it had implored the city
to act quickly on its project because of the pending legislation. According to the court, the vested rights doctrine is based on principles
of equitable estoppel, and lack of good faith alone was sufficient to
preclude application of the doctrine.
The "final discretionary approval" test utilized by the court in
Aries was the result of developers' attempts to reform the vested
rights rule to reflect the realities of modern development. Its source
305. Id. at 544, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23. The full passage from the court's opinion
is worthwhile: "Although the cases speak of vested rights in terms of reliance upon
a building permit, the Attorney General, both in the court below and in his opening
brief on appeal, has argued the case on the assumption that a building permit may no
longer be a sine qua non of a vested right. He points out that under modem land
development practices various governmental approvals are required before the issuance
of a building permit, each approval pertaining to different aspects of the project, and
suggests that a vested right might arise before the issuance of a building permit if
the preliminary permits approve a specific project and contain all the final discretionary
approvals required for completion of the project." Id. (citations omitted).
306. The Attorney General recanted in his closing brief and urged strict adherence
to the express language of § 27404. Id. at n.7.
307. Id. at 546, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 324. See also Friends of Mammoth v. Board
of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
308. 48 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
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was the case law arising under the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA), which was applicable only to discretionary governmental acts.300 The test first appeared in the 1974 CEQA case,
People v. County of Kern.3 10 There, the Attorney General sued
to prevent the defendant county from issuing any building permits
for the construction of a large subdivision project. He alleged that
an adequate EIR had not been prepared and considered by the
county before it amended its zoning to allow for construction of
the project. Both the county and the developer contended that
rezoning the property and issuing building permits were ministerial,
not discretionary, acts. They argued that, because the county had
approved a tentative map and specific plan for the project, the developer had a vested right and was thus exempted from the requirements of CEQA. The court rejected these contentions. It held that
amendment of a zoning ordinance was by law a discretionary act of
local government, and for this reason, the developer could not have
by the
a "vested right in the development such that any future action
311
County pursuant to its police power would be ineffectual."
The notion of a vested right based upon some government act of
final discretionary approval of a development was carried over from
the CEQA case of Kern to a coastal zone case, EnvironmentalCoalition
of Orange County, Inc. v. Avco Community Developers, Inc.31 2 In
that case, the court upheld the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
restraining the defendant from proceeding with a project in the coastal
zone without a coastal permit because the defendant's contention that
it was exempt from the Act's permit requirement raised issues of fact
for the trial court. In passing reference, among the issues mentioned
were "those on the issue of whether, as contended by defendant, in
light of the approval given its subdivision and parcel maps further
governmental authorization to proceed with and complete its development, in whole or in part, involves ministerial action only, rather than
discretionary action .....*3

The court did not attempt to explain

the relevance of ministerial versus discretionary action.
After this case, the final discretionary approval test appeared in
the explicit language of Aries and later in another coastal zone case,
309. CAL. Pum. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 1977); CAL. ADMI.
15024, 15060 (1977).
310. 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1974).
311. Id. at 839, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
312. 40 Cal. App. 3d 513, 115 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1974).
313. Id. at 524, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 65.

CODE tit. 14, §§
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Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Commission.3 14 There the court
found that, although the plaintiff had received approval of a subdivision map and a grading permit, nothing in the record indicated
there had been a final exercise of governmental authority over construction in the plaintiff's subdivision upon which he could base a
claim of vested rights. Several months later, the California Supreme
Court considered the merits of this test and was not persuaded to
accept it.
Avco Community Developers, Inc.
The seminal case of the Coastal Act vested rights litigation was
Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Commission.3 15 Decided in August 1976, the case was the quintessential example of the collision between a large-scale modem development
project and an important legislative environmental protection act.
Indeed, at the outset of the opinion, Justice Mosk described the
problem presented as an "apparently irreconcilable conflict between
the interests of a land developer . . . and the interests of the
public . . .- 11
Avco, a large land development and construction company, owned
almost 8,000 acres of land in Orange County, California, including a
74-acre tract that lay within the coastal zone. Since 1968, the company had been developing its entire holdings as a planned community.
In 1971 the tract within the coastal zone, as well as a large portion
of Avco's other land, was zoned by the county for planned unit development. In 1972 the county approved a final map dividing the
coastal tract into 27 parcels primarily intended for multiresidential
use. Thereafter and until the February 1, 1973 permit requirement
date of the Act, Avco proceeded with rough grading of the tract and
installation of storm drains, culverts, street improvements, utilities,
and other related subdivision improvements on the basis of various
permits and approvals from the county. Expenditures and liabilities
incurred for this work totaled more than $2.8 million. Prior to February 1, 1973, however, the county had not seen or approved building
plans for the tract nor issued building permits for any particular
structures. For this reason the regional and state coastal commissions
denied Avco's application for exemption from the permit requirement
of the Act.
314. 58 Cal. App. 3d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1976).
315. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1083 (1977).
316. Id. at 788, 553 P.2d at 548, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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Avco sought a writ of mandate to compel the grant of the exemption, asserting that its right to construction had vested when it subdivided its land and installed the improvements authorized by the
county. The trial court, although sympathizing with the developer,
declined to issue the writ on the basis that a vested right to construct buildings could not be acquired without the prior issuance of
a building permit.
The California Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial
court. The court began its analysis of Avco's claim by stating the
common law vested rights rule that a property owner who has performed substantial work and incurred substantial liabilities in good
faith reliance upon a permit issued by the government acquires a
vested right to complete construction in accordance with that permit.
The court saw its task as determining "the point in the development
process at which a landowner can be said to have acquired a vested
right to construct buildings on his land."3 17 The court stated that

previous cases, Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monningl8 and Anderson v.
City Council,3'9 had answered this question and established the proposition that:
[N]either the existence of a particular zoning nor work undertaken pursuant to governmental approvals preparatory to construction of buildings can form the basis of a vested right to build
a structure which does not comply with the laws applicable at
the time a building permit is issued. By zoning the property or
issuing approvals for work preliminary to construction the government makes no representation to a landowner that he will be exempt from the zoning laws in effect at the subsequent time he
applies for a building permit or that he may construct particular
structures on the property, and thus the government cannot be
estopped to enforce the laws in effect when the permit is issued.320
The fact that no building permit had been issued prior to the new
law was fatal to Avco's argument.
The court acknowledged the position taken by the Attorney General that some permit other than a building permit might afford the
same specificity and definition to a project as a building permit and
could be the requisite basis of reliance for a developer's claim of
vested rights. The court declined to decide this issue squarely. It
suggested that, if the Attorney General were correct, only a permit
that related to identifiable buildings could be a proper substitute
317. Id. at 791, 553 P.2d at 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
318. 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 53 Cal. Rptr. 7, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966).
319. 229 Cal. App. 2d 79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1964).
320. 17 Cal. 3d at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
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for a building permit and determined that the county had issued
nothing of that nature to Avco.
The court also addressed obliquely the final discretionary approval
test. Avco asserted that approval of the subdivision map was the
final discretionary approval necessary for its construction on the land
and that issuance of a building permit was a ministerial act. Thus
arguing, it distinguished its position from that of the developers in
Spindler and Anderson who, building on a single tract of land, had
never received subdivision approval. The court did not consider
whether subdivision approval was in fact the last act of governmental
discretion in approving a development project. It noted "the general
rule that a builder must comply with the laws which are in effect at
the time a building permit is issued, including the laws which were
enacted after application for the permit" but concluded only that "a
landowner who has not even applied for a permit cannot be in a
better position merely because it had previously received permission
to subdivide its property and made certain improvements on the
land." 321 It did state in a footnote, however, that the Aries court
had applied the final discretionary approval test. 322 The court's observation in this regard was facially neutral; it could be read as tacit
disapproval 3 23 or as a failure to comment. Thus, the vitality of this
concept is questionable.
In conclusion, the court offered the rationale for its decision that
Avco had no vested right to proceed without a permit from the
coastal commission. It stated that it was not maintaining "an obdurate adherence to archiac concepts inappropriate in the context
of modern development practices or . . . a blind insistence on an
instrument entitled 'building permit.' "324 The court explained that,
if a vested right to construct buildings arose at the time subdivision
improvements were installed, a developer would be immune from
future changes in the law for an indeterminate period of time. Thus,
concession to Aveo's position could lead to "serious impairment of
the government's right to control land use policy," 325 a possibility that
the court was not willing to countenance.
Perhaps unwittingly, the court cast this case in a mold that allowed no other conclusion than that Avco had achieved no vested
321.

Id. at 795, 553 P.2d at 553, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.

322. Id. at n.6.
323. See Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63
Cal. App. 3d 57, 71, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 672 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
324. 17 Cal. 3d at 797, 553 P.2d at 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 394.

325.

Id.
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right. The court chose to determine the particular point at which
rights vest in the development process. It might have reached a
different conclusion had it analyzed more closely the differences between the effect of the coastal legislation on Avco's development and
the effect of the rezoning on developers in earlier cases.
The developer in Spindler had performed significant work on its
project before passage of the new law that thwarted its ultimate plans,
as had Avco. Also, in both cases, the work completed was a prerequisite for any development and was unrelated to any particular
type of development. The difference between the cases lies in the
type of legislation that intervened in the development process. The
rezoning in Spindler altered the type of physical development permissible on the landowner's property; the Coastal Act altered the
very possibility of development during its term. The landowner in
Spindler was guaranteed development that would incorporate the
work already undertaken albeit not the development it had originally
pursued. Avco had no such guarantee; the coastal commission was
in no way obligated to grant any development permission.
A better approach in Avco would have been for the court to
consider the possibility that, in the context of modem development
practices and land use legislation, to conceptualize the vested rights
doctrine as a zero-sum game that the developer either wins or loses
may no longer be appropriate. The alternative to determining a partfcular point of immunity in the development process is to recognize
the process as a spectrum along which rights vest in degrees. Possibly Avco had acquired at least a right to be assured some development reasonably consistent with both its work and the purposes of
the Coastal Act. Instead, the court ended its opinion by observing
that Avco "like all other landowners in the coastal zone who have not
acquired a vested right to develop their property, must apply to the
commission for a permit and, if the application is denied, then the
desired buildings on the tract cannot be constructed during the period
26
the Act is in effect."3
Shortly after Avco, in Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central
Coast Regional Commission,327 another large developer advanced more
abstract vested rights claims and was similarly rebuffed. The developer had purchased 5200 acres along the coast in 1963 and in the
326. Id. at 801-02, 553 P.2d at 557, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97. But see San Diego
Coast Regional Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal. 3d 888, 901, 513 P.2d 129, 138,
109 Cal. Rptr. 377, 386 (1973). See notes 359-60 & accompanying text infra.
327. 63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951

(1977).
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course of integrated development of the property received planned
community zoning and approval of a specific plan, subdivision maps,
various use pemits, and grading permits for some of its parcels. It
had received an exemption for much of the property, which was already actively under development at the time the Act was passed, but
sought an exemption for the entire project. Because most of the
contentions had earlier been rejected by the supreme court in Avco,
the court of appeal without difficulty discounted the developer's claim
to a vested right to develop facets of its project still in the design
stage when the Act was passed.
Administrative Anarchy and the Vested Rights Doctrine
A recent case discussing vested rights, although not a Coastal
Act case, provides a fitting conclusion to this compendium. It surveys the expanse of current regulatory practice and decries the rubble
perceived amidst the landscape of land use and environmental controls. Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency32-1 involved a large development pursued through a maze of modem regulatory procedures and multiple jurisdictions. The developer's plans
were impeded, not by the intervention of a new law, but rather by
an administrative change of mind regarding approval of the project.
Raley undertook development of a large regional shopping center
near Lake Tahoe in an area subject to county development controls
and also within the jurisdiction of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA ) 32 and its state component, the California Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency (CTRPA).330 Together these two agencies were
responsible for developing and implementing a regional plan for de3 31
velopment in the Lake Tahoe basin.
In 1973 Raley received preliminary approval for the project from
the county, conditioned upon approval of the TRPA, among others.
Raley received the TRPA's conditional approval, which included the
consent of the members of the CTRPA, in June 1973. Raley proceeded
with his planning. Ten months later, in April 1974, the CTRPA,
reorganized and virilified by the legislature's recent amendment of its
statutory authorization, 332 reconsidered particular elements of Raley's
328. 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977).
329. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66801 (West Supp. 1977).
330. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 67000-130 (West Supp. 1977).
331. See Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 553 (1971).
332. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 67041 (West Supp. 1977) as amended by 1973 Cal. Stats.
ch. 1064.
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development and asked the county not to issue permits for work on
the project. The CTRPA then adopted a resolution indicating that
it would reexamine all projects not under construction as of January
1, 1974, despite any prior approvals of the projects by the TRPA.
This edict applied to Raley's shopping center, and he sought to
block CTRPA's reconsideration by putting forth claims of estoppel.
Included within these claims was Raley's version of a vested rights
claim. He argued that the original TRPA approval, once issued and
acted upon, was final and could not thereafter be reconsidered by the
CTRPA.
The appellate court discussed the current status in California of
equitable estoppel. 333 The court determined that the doctrine required weighing the land developer's injury against the project's environmental consequences.8 3 4 The court held that the vested rights
doctrine offered Raley no ground for estoppel against further CTRPA
action. Although the court saw vested rights as a special expression
of the general estoppel doctrine, the court toed the line laid down in
Avco that issuance of preliminary development approval did not constitute a representation that a laidowner would be exempted from
land use regulations in effect at the time it applied for a building
permit. Raley could not point to any act of the TRPA that, if relied
upon, could form the basis of immunity from changes in the rules for
development. He had not acquired a building permit nor begun
actual construction of the project. Consequently, he had no vested
right; there was no estoppel.
The court in conclusion contemplated the facts of the case and
the law as it had found and applied it. The court saw Raley as "the
victim of maladroitly engineered environmental controls."88 5 The administrative process established to accommodate economic development and environmental protection was seen as producing an excess
of economic waste and personal frustration for developers. The court
was not loath to point an accusing finger at the law: "Handmaiden
of prevailing administrative anarchy is the vested rights rule ....
[It] gives a green light to administrative vacillation virtually up to
the moment the builder starts pouring concrete."336 The rule, accord-

ing to the court, had lost all tinge of the flexibility that was the historic
hallmark of equitable doctrine; it did not discriminate between legis333.

See City of Long Beach v. ManselL, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal.

Rptr. 23 (1970).
334. See notes 104-19 & accompanying text supra.
335. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
336. Id. at 985, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12.
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lative change in law and administrative change of mind. As a consequence, questionable government decisionmaking flourished at the
expense of legitimate private interests.
Certainly, the California case law demonstrates graphically the
inadequacy of the vested rights rule. That rule as currently formulated operates effectively but overbroadly and without subtlety to
protect the government's right to control land use policy. Unfortunately, the rule fails to foster responsible and efficient government
regulation. It also fails to recognize and account for the extensive
development planning mandated by present land use regulation and
undertaken by developers. The present statement of the rule varies
little from that developed in early comprehensive zoning cases. In
the light of present realities, such a rule clamors for revision.
IV.

Conclusion:

The Rule Reformulated

The observations developed in the preceeding chapters suggest
a means by which the vested rights doctrine as it is traditionally expressed can be reformulated. That formulation is well supported
by legal theory and the actual outcome of adjudicated controversies.
Observations on Application of the Vested Rights Rule
The present operation of the vested rights doctrine yields an
all-or-nothing result which is at once arbitrary and remarkably inefficient. If a court determines that a developer has acquired a
vested right to proceed, then very often the entirety of the project
will be accorded immunity from subsequent regulation, despite the
fact that some lesser version of the project might have fulfilled the
developer's entrepreneurial expectations and, at the same time, have
more closely accommodated the goals of the new regulation. As with
the nose of a camel, once allowed into the tent, the entire project inevitably follows. The converse applies as well. If the court declines
to find that a developer has acquired a vested right in the project, the
developer will stand to lose a potentially staggering sum; tens or
hundreds of thousands of dollars invested by the improvident developer in preliminary operations may be threatened by the apparent loss
of the development right.
The potential of an all-or-nothing outcome has a drastic effect
on the tactics and relative bargaining positions of the developer and
the regulatory agency. The regulatory agency is placed in a potentially unconscionable bargaining position because the threat of denial
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at some late and relatively insignificant step of the discretionary approval process gives the agency extraordinary leverage on a too-vulnerable developer, leverage which can be used to impose improper
exactions or unwarranted design changes. 33 7 For the developer, the
prospect of an all-or-nothing result poses an undue temptation purposefully to arrange the phasing of the project as a large, interconnected undertaking, incapable of separation into feasible phases or
subareas and thus incapable of being severed into vested and nonvested portions.
Another highly unfortunate consequence of the traditional rule
is an exacerbation of the inefficiencies already existant in the regulatory process. As inefficiency increases so too do the expenses of the
regulatory process, resulting in an escalation of development costs
which in turn are passed on to the consuming public. The judiciary
has shown increased concern for the crisis state of the present housing
market, 33 8 in which families with low and even moderate incomes
are effectively priced out of the market for new housing. At least
one partial solution to the problem would be reduction of the inefficiencies presently existing in the approval of planned unit developments and similar multiphase projects. 339 One way to improve the
efficiency of the regulatory process is to promote a rule of vested rights
which offers greater certainty and ease of application. Another means
is to reduce the size of the projects to which the rule must be applied
and thus reduce the complexities and uncertainties inherent in its
application. Indeed, moderate sized projects, rather than the behemoths that spurred California's recent case law, seem to be the future
340
of the housing market.
An essential feature of the modern planned development is the
opportunity to undertake planning, financing, and construction in
several phases or stages. The courts should modify the present vested
rights doctrine to accommodate the highly flexible planning and construction stages of the multistage development, rather than continue
to treat those developments as small projects for which discretionary
3 41
review and approval at a single moment is appropriate.
337. See, e.g., South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 168 n.6, 336 A.2d 713, 722 (1975).
338. Id., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557
P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,
72 NJ. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
339. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 523, 371
A.2d 1192, 1213 (1977).
340. See note 9 supra.
341. The developers strongly urged special treatment for planned unit develop-
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With the all-or-nothing approach a developer might assert that,
by virtue of actions taken during a project's early stages, a development right should be recognized for the entire project under the vested
rights rule. Thus arguing, the developer would be able to use the
all-or-nothing approach to gain an outcome favorable to the project.
The recent California decisions of Avco and Oceanic seem to indicate
that early approvals are of no consequence because, without the penultimate building permit, there can be no judicially recognized right
to proceed and that the developer therefore gets nothing. Somewhere between the two extremes a pragmatic accommodation should
be recognized. Indeed, several courts have dealt with single-stage
projects whose component parts were nevertheless apparently divisible
and those decisions indicate that techniques exist for determining the
scope of a developer's right to proceed with the several stages of a
multi-stage project.
In light of the policy considerations indicating that an all-ornothing rule is undesirable, it is unrealistic to assume that in practice all the parties involved have been content to adhere to a rule
whose consequences seem in so many ways to be counterproductive.
The reported judicial opinions probably do not reflect the operation
of the vested rights rule as it is applied in the workings of everyday
practice and may instead present a drastically skewed version of the
vested rights problem. Many proposed or partially completed projects
undoubtedly receive protection by virtue of legislatively imposed
grandfather clauses. Other projects, forced to submit to newly established permit processes from which they are unable to obtain statutory
or judicial exemptions, receive favorable or sympathetic treatment and
eventually enjoy some large portion of the authorization they had
originally sought.34 2 Yet other proposed projects probably collapse
of their own weight or their inability to survive protracted political
ments in both Avco and Oceanic. The policy arguments made were dismissed in Avco
with the observation that "approval of such a plan merely imposes a special zoning,"
which does not take it out of 'the general rule of vested rights. Aveo Community
Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 796, 553 P.2d
546, 553, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 393 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977). Accord,
Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d
57, 70, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 671-72 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
342. The developer in California Central Coast Regional Comr'n v. McKeon
Constr. Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 154, 112 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1974), failed to receive judicial
validation of his vested rights claim for a project of 216 condominium units. In subsequent permit actions, he received approval for a similar project containing 164 units.
Appeal No. 209-74, Minutes of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n,
October 4, 1974.
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or financial
wrangling in the face of threatened vested rights controversies and never reach a stage of planning advanced enough to
support a claim for a vested development right. Finally, many projects eventually receive some form of regulatory approval or survive
without additional approval, in both cases as a project of lesser scope
344
than that originally contemplated.
Thus, of the many vested rights problems faced by potential
projects, a relatively small proportion reach the point of actual adjudication. As with other fields of law, the controversies that survive
the winnowing-out process are frequently those with the most troublesome claims and rarely appear to be representative of common situations. A reformulation of the vested rights rule should therefore
recognize that an all-or-nothing outcome is essentially impractical
and does not reflect the actual outcome of vested rights controversies
as they are usually resolved in practice.
Slavish reliance on a nineteenth-century theory of development
rights can no longer be maintained in the face of the vastly expanded
exercise of the governmental power to regulate the existence and scope
of the right to develop and use the land resource.3 4 5 Increasingly,
the government regulatory power must be acknowledged as the source
of the development right, and in turn government agencies must be
required to exercise that power in an efficient and responsible fashion.
The revised attitude toward the concept of development rights is also
demonstrated by the teachings of the amortization cases. Under the
amortization law as it is presently developing, the rights of development or use that are applicable to a particular project consist primarily
of the present value of the economic investment represented by the
project; when the continuance of the project appears to contravene
the public welfare as represented by a new law, the development
right can be restrained and restricted to that minimal quantum. 346
As represented by the amortization cases, the judicial attitude regarding the development right appears less absolutist and more conducive
to a theory under which the scope of a particular development right is
established by the actual expenditures and commitments of the de343. See White, Nonfasanee with FeaAsiblity = Failure, U". LAND., Oct. 1976,
at 5.
344. See note 342 tupra. Many developers regularly propose projects of greater
site or density than they expect to budld in order to achieve a workable bargaining
position in their ndgotiations with the iegulatory agency.
345. See notes 14-99 8 lpmr
346. See notes 190-204 & accompanying text supra.
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veloper, rather than by the asserted potential economic magnitude
of the project.
Still another facet of the judicial attitude toward the vested rights
problem is reflected by the extensive material regarding the retroactive
application of new laws. The retroactivity cases emphasize that an
analytical process involving the examination and balancing of competing public and private interests is centrally important to a just
resolution of retroactivity controversies. All too often, however, the
vested rights doctrine and the similar rule of zoning estoppel fail to
examine the relative importance of the public interest represented by
the new law and instead emphasize the details of the private developer's alleged reliance. 3 47 Indeed, the all-or-nothing approach of the
traditional vested rights rule makes any balancing of public or private
interests very difficult because the interest of the private developer
is presented as a severe economic loss or a large economic gain, rather
than in more realistic terms of the actual expenditures committed to
date. Emphasis on the claims of the private developer appears to
ignore the emerging views of development rights and amortization,
which are less solicitous of a project proponent's claims. Many vested
rights cases may actually reflect a hostile judicial reception to fact
situations that are perceived as unduly harsh or unreasonable forms
of governmental regulation. Indeed, in a number of cases judicial
declaration of the invalidity of agency action and the court's subsequent grant of development permission seem to be punishment of the
government agency at the expense of the general public, redounding
to the benefit of the developer, who is in that instance essentially
merely an interested third party. The process is not unlike the application of the exclusionary rule of evidence. If the essential judicial
concern is for the propriety of the government's actions, the correct
means of addressing that problem is through substantive due process
review of the reasonableness of the regulatory action, rather than
mechanistic interpretation of a vested rights claim.
A Rule of Irrevocable Commitment
The gradual transitions in regulatory practices that have occurred
over recent decades require a redrafting of the vested rights rule in
order to accommodate present realities. The transition has been primarily from the traditional requirement of a single building permit
as authorization of a single structure to the new requirements that
347.

See note 105 & accompanying text supra.
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a developer obtain a series of development permits as authorization
for the variety of activities and structures that constitute a modem
planned project. Transitions have also occurred in judicial philosophies and theories regarding development rights and the police power.
A new rule should accommodate these several basic changes and as
proposed here, is termed the rule of irrevocable commitment.
The rule of irrevocable commitment protects from new laws any
project to which the developer has made a reasonable and irrevocable
commitment of resources. The scope of the protection granted, however,
is determined by a detailed analysis of the resource commitments, the
planned objectives of the project, and the concerns of the general welfare.
Each of the several elements and policies of a rule of irrevocable
commitment draws on the rules and observations described above,
and can be illustrated by examining a few of its major elements.
When is the Developer's Commitment "Irrevocable"?
A number of cases dealing with substantial investments of time
or resources in construction activity have demonstrated that when
an expenditure is unique to the proposed project and would not be
otherwise usable, it represents a "significant" investment that deserves
judicial protection. If the developer might otherwise utilize that
investment, however, the need to protect it pales considerably when
weighed against the other concerns of a vested rights controversy.
Thus, in Spindler, a California court was careful to note that the
grading undertaken by a developer was not unique to the proposed
project but instead "would have to be done to develop [the land] for
any purpose. " 348 The Supreme Court of Minnesota recently made a
similar distinction. In Hawkinson v. County of Itasca,3 49 that court
dealt with a nonconforming use statute as applied against a motel
project on which partial construction had occurred, in a district recently zoned for residential purposes only. After analyzing the construction and its relation to the developer's plans, the court noted:
The kind of improvements which were made on the outlots were
as consistent with the development of a residential area as with a
commercial-recreational area. The grading and clearing of the
land, and the dredging and development of the pond and stream
added substantial value to the property for residential purposes.
The effect and
expense applied to these outlots are not wasted by
3 50
the zoning.
348. Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 261, 53 Cal. Rptr.
7, 10, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966).
349. 304 Minn. 367, 231 N.W.2d 279 (1975).
350. Id. at 372-73, 231 N.W.2d at 282, accord, Clackamas County v. Holmes, 265
Or. 193, 198, 508 P.2d 190, 192 (1973).
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The obvious implication of such an observation is that a developer's
action or series of expenditures may represent a significant investment but not necessarily be irretrievably lost if the project failed
to receive the desired authorizations. If the concern of the law is
that a developer not be forced to make unnecessarily large expenditures, a significant expenditure would of course be a matter of concern. If, to the contrary, the concern of the law is that a developer
be protected only from the loss of expenditures made reasonably on
the expectation that they would receive legal protection as a species
of property, the protection still exists if the expenditures can be attributed to, or utilized for, some other legitimate end. Hence, if an
expenditure were unique to a particular project and the project were
made illegal by a new law, the landowner would suffer to a considerable degree and to a degree recognized by many courts as worthy of
judicial protection. If the expenditure could be put toward an altered version of the project, perhaps one of different design or scale,
and that version is allowed to go forward, however, the developer's
interest in the expenditure continues to be protected.
The concept of a unique expenditure is closely related to a general
consideration common to vested rights and nonconforming use cases
dealing with the substantiality of construction or other reliance by
the developer. The concept goes beyond the general and vague balancing process typical of the equitable estoppel cases which turn
on the substantiality of the construction. 351 The emphasis on the
uniqueness to the proposed project of the investment as represented
by the construction or other expenditure 352 relates less to the ma35 3
teriality of the hardship or prejudice visited upon the developer
than to whether the loss of the expenditure is one which could be
3
avoided, mitigated, or foregone. 54
Judicial concern with mitigating the loss of an expenditure is
demonstrated in cases dealing with the retroactivity of environmental
policy laws. Those decisions exempted construction projects from
operation of new laws if the projects involved had progressed to a
351. Heeter, supra note 93, at 84-90; Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13, 26 (1973).
352. See Clover Hill Farms, Inc. v. Lehigh Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 5 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 239, 241-42, 289 A.2d 778, 779-80 (1972).
353. Hawkinson v. County of Itasca, 304 Minn. at 377, 231 N.W.2d at 284 (1975).
354. Much of the concept of mitigation as used here is borrowed from Arlington
Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1332 (4th Cir. 1972), and later
federal cases concerning the National Environmental Policy Act. See generally ErVIRONMENTAL LAw

INSTITUTE, FEDERAL

ENvmoNMENTAL

LAw 396-410 (1974).

But

see Cooper v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. App. 3d 34, 41-43, 122 Cal. Rptr. 464,
468-69 (1975).
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stage where "the costs of altering or abandoning the project could
so definitely outweigh whatever benefits that might accrue therefrom
that it might no longer be possible to change the project [in order to
comply with the new law]." 3 55 These cases3 56 reflected the willingness to balance public and private factors typical of the retroactivity
doctrines, 35 7 while also recognizing that alteration of the design of a
project might be possible even at some point after the initial stages of
construction had been completed. If alteration to mitigate the adverse impact of the project were possible, the public interests represented by the new law could be attained, 858 while protecting the
developer's investment. This solution is not unlike the one suggested
by the dissenting justices in San Diego Coast Regional Commission v.
See the Sea, Ltd.,3 59 the case dealing with the enigmatic exemption
clause of the California Coastal Act. The dissenting opinion suggested that in situations when some builders might have misunderstood the operation of the Act, "a pragmatic accommodation of the
pervasive interest of the public with legitimate private rights" would
suggest that a builder to whom the Act is applied during the uncertain time period of its application
must apply to the commission for a permit but that the commission must issue the permit. In doing so, however, the commission
should be able to impose reasonable requirements upon a builder
to adhere to the purposes of the act. Such additional requirements may not be so stringent as to prohibit completion of the
development, but their imposition would provide
360 assurance that
gross emasculation of the act can be prevented.

Recognition that an irrevocable commitment should receive protection can also be discovered in the rationale underlying the nonconforming use cases. The rule of those cases, which apparently
applies as well to nonconforming structures, posits judicial protection
for investments that are physically manifested prior to a change in
the law. Judicial concern for avoiding a waste of resources might
indicate that a structure for which no other apparent use exists (a
"unique" commitment) should be given protection if, in doing so, the
355. Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1331
Cir. 1972).
356. Id., Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468
1164 (6th Cir. 1972); County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal.
377 (1973).
357. See notes 164-72 & accompanying text supra.
358. Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1333
Cir. 1972).
359. 9 Cal. 3d 888, 513 P.2d 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
360. Id. at 901, 513 P.2d at 138, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 386.

(4th
F.2d
Rptr.
(4th
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other policies embodied in the rule of irrevocable commitment can
be satisfied.
Drawing on the above observations, an "irrevocable commitment"
would be an action or expenditure that is unique to the project proposed by the developer and whose utilization in an alternative form
of the project is impossible or highly infeasible. If that irrevocable
commitment of resources were made reasonably, the project of which
it is a part should receive judicial protection.
When is the Developeis Commitment "Reasonable"?
Initially, of course, there seems to be little purpose in recognizing

a developer's commitment of time, money, or other resources when it
was accomplished with disregard for prevailing practices of the trade
or in circumstances generally regarded as unreasonable or highly
In such cases, concerns for the protection of property
speculative.31
interests may not even arise, because the developer can rarely be
said to have an expectation that such an investment would continue
to be of value. Of much greater importance is the problem of the
developer's "good faith" or "unseemly behavior."3 62 If the rules of
vested rights were to accept without question any irrevocable commitment by a developer, the canny proponent of a project threatened
by a new law would rush with "unseemly haste" to make such a
commitment and thereby assure the project's immunity from the new
prohibition. 36 3 Most of the courts dealing with this problem have
demonstrated a highly pragmatic interpretation of human behavior,
recognizing that the developer faces a hard choice. A justly famous
passage in Russian Hill Improvement Association v. Board of Permit
Appeals364 described the developer's dilemma:

the permittee could win immunity from such "ex post facto" revocation only by constructing a substantial portion of the structure
authorized by his permit in good faith reliance upon the prior
law. A permittee who delayed construction in the face of an impending amendment to the zoning laws might find that he had
not progressed far enough in time to qualify for immunity; one
who proceeded with unseemly haste ran the risk that his conduct
might bear the stigma of bad faith. No facile formula informed
361. There seems to be little judicial concern for land development investments
of a clearly speculative nature. See HFH Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 521,
542 P.2d 237, 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 374 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
362. Heeter, supra note 93, at 77-82; Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3d 43-52 (1973).
363. South Coast Regional Comm'n v. Higgins, 68 Cal. App. 3d 636, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 551 (1977); Stowe v. Burke, 255 N.C. 527, 122 S.E.2d 374 (1961); Donadio
v. Cunningham, 58 N.J. 309, 277 A.2d 375 (1971).
364. 66 Cal. 2d 34, 423 P.2d 824, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1967).
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the permittee how to strike the delicate balance which would afford the desired immunity.6 5
The difficulty of the choice has resulted in varied interpretations of
complex factual situations, which have compared and considered the
"good faith" on the part of the project proponent 36 6 and the "bad
faith" on the part of the regulatory agency, 367 all as part of the general
application of the vested rights doctrine. By narrow interpretation,
those factors would appear appropriate only to an equitable rationale,
in which the conduct of the parties might sway the court's deliberations. In practice, the good faith-bad faith considerations appear to
arise whenever either consideration is particularly appealing, no matter whether the rationale being employed is one of equitable estoppel,
retroactivity, or nonconforming uses.
Of the several considerations recognized, one of the most troubling
is that concerned with pending legislation: must a developer halt
his ongoing activities whenever he becomes aware that new, potentially
limiting legislation has been proposed, or may he nevertheless proceed, on the hope or in the belief that the proposed legislation will
never be enacted? The uncertainty of the situation makes it difficult
to ascribe a particular motive to the developer's actions. The problem is yet more difficult when the practical effect of the proposed
legislation is impossible to predict, as was the case with California's
Coastal Initiative of 1972. In the confused period during which that
legislation was proposed and after its passage, but before its effective
date, there was little consensus as to its effect on a proposed project.
Small wonder, then, that the California Supreme Court's resolution
of the controversy 6 8 carefully avoided consideration of the issue of
the good faith of those developers whose proposals were subject to the
new act, even though some of the claims appeared highly suspect.86 9
Insofar as the good faith element of the vested rights doctrine
implies clean hands or moral cupidity, it thus usually operates to
penalize the developer who is astute or sophisticated enough to recognize the threat of proposed legislation, while rewarding the devel365. Id. at 39, 423 P.2d at 829, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (footnotes omitted).
366. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13, § 6 at 43-47 (1973); Heeter, supra note 93, at
77-82.
367. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13, §§ 8-9 at 52-62 (1973). Also see note 178
supra.
368. San Diego Coast Regional Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal. 3d 888, 109
Cal. Rptr. 377, 513 P.2d 129 (1973).
369. Id. at 894-96, 513 P.2d at 132-34, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 380-82 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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oper naive or duplicitous enough to ignore the potentialities of the
legislative proposals.
Rather than making the moral judgment implicit in application
of the rule of good faith, a more realistic guide would involve a determination of whether a developer's irrevocable commitment was
"reasonable" according to the practices of the development industry.
To replace good faith with reasonableness is not the substitution of
one vacuous phrase for another but rather the adoption of a standard
that is more appropriate to the determination whether the developer
could have reasonably expected, at the time of making the commitment, to proceed with the project without interference from the new
or proposed law. "Reasonableness" should be defined to incorporate
many of the elements discussed in the good faith cases, but the definition would recognize the political and financial aspects of straightforward risk-taking for what they are, business decisions based on an
informed appraisal of the situation.
A requirement that the irrevocable commitment be reasonable
also offers a solution to the troublesome requirement that an ultimate
permit, usually a building permit, be obtained before a vested right
will be recognized. In recent California cases, 370 the courts have
appeared cautiously willing to entertain the possibility that a regulatory process designed to accommodate complex, multi-stage projects might recognize legitimate "vesting" based on regulatory approvals announced at some stage prior to that represented by the
ultimate permit. The development fraternity contended that a reasonable developer would correctly rely on those early regulatory approvals, because they were widely understood to represent the regulatory agencies' final, meaningful, discretionary approval of the proposal.3 71 If a project proponent could demonstrate that a permit
process was designed such that the effective approval had been
achieved at some finite stage short of the ultimate permit, that proof
would substantiate the reasonableness of a decision to commit resources irrevocably. To require the developer to forestall the commitment of resources further is to demand an unduly expensive and
370. See notes 304-14 & accompanying text supra. The cases have been collected
in Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Conmn'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d
57, 66-68, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 66970 (1976), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 494 (1977).
371. The argument was first advanced in Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal
Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal. App. 3d 534, 544, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322-23
(1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); the contention is restated in Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 795, 553
P.2d 546, 552, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 392 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
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apparently unnecessary 72 hiatus while the ultimate permit is pending. Nothing is furthered under a rule of irrevocable commitment
by postponing the eventual approval.
Concern remains, however, that a disingenuous developer might
attempt a deceitful or sham commitment of resources. Thus, being
fully aware that a new law might prohibit the actions contemplated,
a developer might purposefully undertake to create commitments
that would satisfy the various requirements of hardship or reliance.
The use of a rule of reasonable irrevocable commitments does not
guarantee protection against those spurious or hasty actions but instead subjects the resulting claim to a rule which applies the standard of the industry, including its built-in financial restraints, rather
than an imprecise and externally imposed notion of morally correct
good faith. One might therefore argue that use of the reasonable
irrevocable commitment rule would hinder or endanger the land development regulatory process by making it vulnerable to commitments that were designed to thwart or subvert operation of the vesting doctrine.
The California Supreme Court in Avco strongly rejected the suggestion that certain of a developer's actions undertaken prior to the
acquisition of the ultimate permit might be considered an adequate
basis for the recognition of a vested right to complete the development.3 7 3 The court expressed the fear that recognition of such activities would effectively "freeze" the permission to develop, rendering it immune to later legitimate changes in governmental land use
rules or policies. Such a freeze or immunization is, of course, precisely the object of a vesting rule; what is important here is the
court's discussion of the particular actions rejected as the basis for
a vested rights claim. The specific actions discussed in Avco were
the construction of various capital subdivision improvements, such
as storm drains and utilities, and county zoning of the contested tract
as "Planned Community Development."3 7 4 The court's concern evidently was not that some actions taken prior to issuance of the ultimate
permit might be interpreted as the basis for a claim of a, vested development right but rather that none of the actions actually taken
were of a nature sufficient to merit the recognition of an all-ornothing development right. The actions taken were, by all accounts,
372. A strong argument against the social utility of a rule that forces vesting to
occur late in the development process is found in D, Hagman, The Vesting Issue, 7
ENVmoNmumT L. 519, 529-35 (1977).
373. 17 Cal. 3d at 799, 553 P.2d at 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
374. Id. at 789, 797-98, 553 P.2d at 549, 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 389, 394.
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reasonable under the terms of the confused permit process in the
coastal zone, especially whei that process was applied to a large,
multistage project. 375 The rule of reasonable irrevocable commitment would recognize actions such as Avco's as having been reasonable under the circumstances and thereby sufficient to impute certain
development rights to the developers. Having legitimized the commitments, the rule would then require a court to undertake a second
analysis to determine the proper scope of the development right so
recognized.
Scope of the Development Right
A consideration not often discussed in traditional vested rights
cases is the scope of the alleged right to develop the proposed project. Does the development right recognized on a particular parcel
or enjoyed by a particular developer sanction with equal legitimacy
the construction of either a single-family residence or a large commercial center? Clearly not; the development right relating to a
particular parcel is never absolute but has inherent limitations owing
to accidents of history, topography, location, and the type and intensity of the surrounding uses. As governmental regulation becomes pervasive, the scope of the development right is further affected by the regulatory process. Thus, merely to allege the establishment of a right to develop is not sufficient; a claimant must also
be able to establish the type and intensity of the allegedly protected
project before the vested right becomes meaningful.
The rule of irrevocable commitment determines the scope of
the development right by requiring first, that the commitments be
analyzed relative to the plans of the proposed project and second,
that both the commitments and plans be evaluated in light of the
general welfare considerations represented by extant and newly enacted laws.
Unless undertaken pursuant to a plan, any commitment of resources by a developer would be a meaningless act. A developer,
relying on rationales discussed above, might assert a reasonable expectation that an investment of resources would receive protection
as a property interest or that it represented reasonable reliance on
government actions only if the investment had been made in furtherance of a project for which there was a coherent concept, design,
375. The trial court in Avco expressly found that the developer "reasonably expected" to continue without further permits, but this finding is clearly an arguable proposition. Id. at 797, 553 P.2d at 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 394. Compare id. with People
v. County of Kern, 62 Cal. App. 3d 761, 133 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1976).
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or plan of undertaking. The case law is therefore in general accord
that any claim of a vested right must be premised on objective proof
of a plan that shows with sufficient detail the scope of the proposed
project.3 76 The extent and specificity of the plan in turn determines
the outer limits of the scope of the right to proceed with development of the project.
The significance of a plan was explained by the California Supreme Court in 1968, when it ruled on the extent of a grandfathered
exemption to a new prohibitory regulation claimed by the town of
Emeryville, which had undertaken large scale filling of tidelands on
San Francisco Bay..7 7 The opinion was premised on a definition
of "project"; the court identified two constituent elements: (1) a
determination to accomplish a certain objective and (2) a detailed
and specific plan prepared in furtherance of that objective. Thus,
merely to show the determination to accomplish a particular objective, while lacking a plan, would be insufficient to establish a
project,
"because the means of achieving the ultimate objective are not
delineated sufficiently to permit prudent commencement of the
enterprise .... Only when that decision has been made and a
plan has been conceived in the detail necessary for prudent commencement
physical efforts to achieve the objective does a
'project' comeof into
being . . . . [Thus, the question becomes
whether the developer's actions] had been undertaken pursuant
to a specific and detailed plan.., or whether such acts had been
performed in some random manner unrelated to such a specfic
plan. Weighing only [the actions] without considering the existence of a basic detailed plan would tend to reward those [developers] who act precipitously .. .intending only to evade the
,378
act . "...
The requirement of specific plans also relates to authorizations
that may be granted by the appropriate government regulatory agencies. Those approvals can of necessity be only as detailed as the materials submitted with the application. If the applicant has submitted
only a "general concept" of the proposed project, the regulatory agency's authorization would be of a similarly limited scope. As noted
376. See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n,
17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083
(1977).
377. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Conm'n v. Town of Emeryville, 69
Cal. 2d 533, 446 P.2d 790, 72 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1968).
378. Id. at 545-46, 446 P.2d at 798-99, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 798-99 (1968) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted). Urban Renewal Agency v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 15 Cal. 3d 577, 586, 542 P.2d 645, 650-51, 125 Cal. Rptr. 485,
490-91 (1975).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

by the California First District Court of Appeal in Oceanic California,
Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Commission, "the scope of the
development which the developer has the right to complete . . . is
limited by the scope of the specific development theretofore approved
and permitted, and depends upon the good faith performance of substantial work and incurring of liabilities for the development so expressly authorized." 379 Similarly, in the Avco decision, the California
Supreme Court rejected the developer's contention that detailed plans
formed an adequate basis for a vested rights claim when those plans
were used only by the developer and had not been the basis for the
county's preliminary approval of the project. The court therefore
concluded that the developer could not have "reasonably expected
that it would be allowed" to undertake the project "without further
discretionary governmental approval."38 0
The rule of reasonable irrevocable commitment would similarly
require that the developer's commitments be undertaken pursuant
to, and in furtherance of, the implementation of the plan for the
proposed project. As with expenditures not unique to a proposal,
commitments that fail to lead to accomplishment of the plan do not
merit protection because they represent neither a reasonable eco81
nomic expectation nor justified reliance on government proposals.3
Nevertheless, there remains a large category of expenditures and
other irrevocable commitments of resources which receives no protection under the traditional vested rights rule. In this category
are the nonstructural, pre-construction, or pre-permit expenditures
which, because not undertaken after and in consequence of an ultimate building permit, are denied any effect under the traditional
vesting theories. 38 2 Should a developer be denied recognition of a
vested right to proceed because of reasonable and otherwise authorized acts that preceded the issuance of an ultimate permit?
The general rule denying recognition to "soft" pre-permit or
nonstructural expenditures requires close inspection. The rule in
379.

63 Cal. App. 3d 57, 67, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 670 (1976), cert. denied, 431

U.S. 494 (1977).

See also Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 58 Cal.

App. 3d 833, 844-45 n.7, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169, 176 (1976).
380. 17 Cal. 3d at 797, 553 P.2d at 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
381. In South Coast Regional Comm'n v. Higgins, 68 Cal. App. 3d 636, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 551 (1977), the court upheld the denial of a developer's exemption claims when
the developer's actions represented a "bad faith attempt" to avoid the Act, did not
constitute "substantial" construction, and were arguably neither unique nor irrevocable
in nature because the majority of the construction involved modular homes in a factory
distant from the construction site.
382. See note 256 & accompanying text supra.
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California is founded on theories of estoppel and longstanding reliance on the building permit as the ultimate required governmental
authorization.38 3 Operating under that rule, most courts have declined to recognize vested rights claims based solely on claims of
nonstructural commitments of resources, such as engineering or architectural fees or land acquisition costs. Even some forms of structural preparatory work, such as grading on the site38 4 or installation
of capital improvements,3

85

are similarly denied a vested right. The

rule also operates to exclude from protection nonstructural commitments which were made in reliance on an ultimate permit. Receipt
of the ultimate permit is insufficient; the developer must demonstrate
that commitments made in reliance on the permit were "substantial,"
or otherwise represent a sufficiently permanent or physical commitment to the project.3 86 The rationale for the general rule, however,
no longer justifies its use when the developer's intentions are specific
and well known to the regulatory agency and when the actions taken
involve expenditures recognized as necessary and prudent preparatory steps to actual construction. Indeed, in many cases, the contemplated construction would be irresponsibly undertaken if not preceded by careful preparation. Most important, the modern cases
vexed by the rule are those involving both multiple permits and
phased stages of construction. The traditional rule evolved in the
day of a single permit requirement and is no longer appropriate for
the vastly more complicated requirements of present practice. Both
Spindler and Avco dealt with regulatory ordinances that required
separate grading permits to be issued prior to the developer's application for building permits. 387

The requirement of separate pernit

383. In People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 838, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67,
73 (1974), the court restated the general view that the developer must possess not only
a building permit but all the necessary permits before a vested right can be recognized.
384. See Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal.
App. 3d 534, 539, 544, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315, 319, 323 (1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
951 (1977); Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning, 243 Cal. App. 2d 255, 260, 264, 53
Cal. Rptr. 7, 9, 12, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 975 (1966).
385. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17
Cal. 3d 785, 789, 553 P.2d 546, 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389 (1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
386. There is a widespread and well-founded concern that a developer's commitments to a site be genuine, so that the public will be protected from the financial and
environmental dangers of half-constructed projects or incomplete subdivisions. This
factor was clearly a consideration in the Avco decision. 17 Cal. 3d at 798, 553 P.2d
at 554, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
387. 17 Cal. 3d at 789, 553 P.2d at 549, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 389; 243 Cal. App. 2d
at 263, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 11. Cf. Environmental Coalition of Orange County, Inc. v.
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processes is highly undesirable; the government, for instance, should
not authorize potentially damaging grading, unless the grading is
understood to be part of an integrated and planned project. Separate authorization processes create the possibility that the eventual
project will never materialize resulting in numerous unplanned holes
in the ground. 388 Most modern planned unit development ordinances require a series of planning approvals and may be part of
a regulatory system which also requires separate use permit, grading,
subdivision, or other approvals 8s9
A more logical and pragmatic result is achieved by using a rule
that acknowledges the prudent basis for prestructural expenditures,
when they satisfy the test of reasonable irrevocable commitments,
and then entertains the proofs necessary to determine the precise
scope of the project to which the developer has thereby become
entitled. In all probability, that scope, limited by the magnitude
of the commitments, the plans, and the considerations of the general
welfare, will be substantially less than would have been allowed by
the all-or-nothing operation of the traditional vested rights rule. In
fact, the amortization cases indicate the law would be obliged to
recognize only so much of the proposed scope of the project as would
be necessary to recover the investment represented by the reasonable
irrevocable commitments of resources! It is that limitation on the
scope of the project which is at the heart of the proposed rule of irrevocable commitment.
In the context of the traditional vested rights cases, the traditional rule made eminently good sense. Developers were well aware
of the absolute requirement of a building permit and could not
claim reasonably to have relied on assumptions which ignored that
requirement. A ready rationale existed in the nonconforming use
cases, moreover, which allowed judicial protection only for those resource commitments that had acquired either physical or structural
existence. When an attenuated modern approval process instead
requires a series of governmental authorizations and approvals, often
Avco Community Developers, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 513, 521-22, 115 Cal. Rptr. 59,
61-64 (1974) (development under grading permits issued before coastal permits required not subject to coastal permit requirement).
388. Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48 Cal.
App. 3d 534, 553 n.2, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328 (1975), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 951
(1977) (Gardner, P. J., dissenting).
389. For representative listings see, e.g., id. at 544-45, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23;
Oceanic California, Inc. v. North Central Coast Regional Comm'n, 63 Cal. App. 3d

57, 64, 133 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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in ever greater detail and specificity, however, the developer must
undertake various expenditures on the basis of the early authorizations merely to qualify for the later authorizations. Certain expenditures and commitments no doubt represent part of the regular speculative investments made by any entrepreneur and cannot be claimed
to represent irrevocable commitments to a specific project, but a
significant portion of the resource investment is very reasonable under the circumstances.
When construction of a proposed project is or could be planned
in several stages or phases, the rule of reasonable irrevocable commitment requires that the commitments be related, allocated, or
credited only to the appropriate phase. Rather than dictating the
all-or-nothing result, the rule of reasonable irrevocable commitment
exempts from the new law only that part of the total plan furthered
by the commitment or necessary for a reasonable recovery of the
investment represented by the irrevocable commitment. 390 In effect,
the expenditures and other commitments are treated as though they
were nonconforming uses whose further expansion was prohibited
but whose value was a protected economic interest.
The rule of reasonable irrevocable commitment would therefore
treat a vested rights claim much as a businessman might treat an
investment that was suddenly perceived to offer a smaller return
than originally expected. Some portion of the project or investment
would be completed, but the remainder would never be undertaken.
The extent of completion would be decided by an analysis of the
amount of return or revenue necessary to make possible the recovery
of the initial investment, but no additional funds would be committed to the project beyond those necessary to complete the portions that were to be retained. 391
390. The similar amortization rule is found in text at note 200 supra. Section 519
(4) of the Restatement of Property (1944) sets out a similar rule for real property
licenses that have been rendered irrevocable because of the licensee's reasonable reliance on the licensor's representations. The section provides that the licensee "is
privileged to continue the use permitted by the license to the extent reasonably necessary to realize upon his expenditures." The rule has enjoyed scattered adoption, the
cases usually turning on the substantiality of the licensee's expenditures. See, e.g.,
Rouse v. Roy L. Houck Sons' Corp., 249 Or. 655, 660, 439 P.2d 856, 858 (1968).
391. Such decisions are pervasive in our society, affecting large as well as small
developments. For instance, notwithstanding completion of one-third of the construction, representing a cost of about $70 million, the Cross Florida Barge Canal was
halted becouse of environmental problems. The Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers later recommended that it not be completed and that the already completed
portions be used for recreation and transportation. [1976] 7 ENviR. Bin,. (BNA)
1678 (Mar. 4, 1977).
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The scope of the protected right to complete some portion of
the project is thus determined by an intensive analysis of the commitments made to date, their relationship to the plans approved or
authorized, and the degree to which the project is capable of physical, legal, and financial segmentation. Basic phasing decisions are
made by the developer based on considerations of financing, including the security interests in the site, topography, and construction
schedules and can be analyzed relative to the need to regard the
entire project as an integrated whole, which is, of course, one of the
chief advantages of planned unit regulations. The evaluation of the
project to determine the severability of its portions is a question of
fact ascertainable by either judicial or administrative triers of fact,3 92
and determination of such questions is a process to which the courts
393
are not strangers.
The parties and amici in both Avco 394 and Oceanic3 95 attempted
an attack on the traditional rule, urging that an exemption should
arise from the authorizations gleaned under various preliminary authorizations during the planned unit development approval process.
The California Supreme Court in Avco declined to accept that contention. 396 The vestige of the traditional vested rights rule which
remains at issue appears to be not so much the nature of the commitments as the concern that a desirable new law, important to the
general welfare, might be hampered in its operation or prevented
from being applied to an immunized project. This concern for the
general welfare, as represented by new laws, is the factor that is fully
treated by the cases concerning the retroactive application of new
laws, and those cases form the basis for the last segment of the reasonable irrevocable commitment rule, discussed below.
Evaluation of Planned Commitments
It is possible under the rule of irrevocable commitment to analyze and evaluate the actions taken by a developer for the purpose
392. Sierra Club v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal. App.
3d 149, 153-57, 129 Cal. Rptr. 743, 746-48 (1976); Patterson v. Central Coast
Regional Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d 833, 843, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169, 175 (1976); Environmental Coalition of Orange County, Inc. v. Avco Community Developers, Inc., 40

Cal. App. 3d 513, 523, 115 Cal. Rptr. 59, 65 (1974).
393. E.g., Urban Renewal Agency v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n,
15 Cal. 3d 577, 585-88, 542 P.2d 645, 649-51, 125 Cal. Rptr. 485, 489-91 (1975);
South Coast Regional Comm'n v. Higgins, 68 Cal. App. 3d 636, 137 Cal. Rptr. 551

(1977).
394.
395.
396.

17 Cal. 3d at 791, 553 P.2d at 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
63 Cal. App. 3d at 61, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
17 Cal. 3d at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
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of determining whether those actions should receive protection
against new laws and, if so, the scope of the proposed project to be
protected. The final element for consideration regarding the scope
of protection must therefore be the court's evaluation of the developer's commitments as they affect the general welfare. The "general welfare" is not without definition, and is embodied in the applicable planning and regulatory laws, including the newly enacted
law which gives rise to a particular vested rights controversy. The
concept of the general welfare embodies groups of the citizenry and
areas of the entire region on which the proposed project may have
an impact.39 7
When an evaluation of a developer's claim indicates that reasonable irrevocable commitments were made and that an estimate
of the scope of the project to which they relate is possible, the court
can undertake to balance the magnitude of the developer's interests
against the significance of the state interest served by the new law.
This process requires a court to make precisely the sort of balancing
judgment that was absent in Avco 398 and that was found wanting in
Raley.399 The same power of equitable balancing also allows the
court to determine that the magnitude of the developer's commitment, and thus the magnitude of the impact of applying the new law
against the proposed project, can be altered or mitigated as necessary by adjusting the final scope of the project for which a vested
right will be recognized. A court might therefore recognize the
lower limits of a proposed phased project's scope when its apparent
impact on the general welfare will be great and recognize the upper
limits of a proposed project's scope when that project's impact on
the general welfare is relatively insignificant. Only by recognizing
the traditional flexibility of equitable jurisdiction and the changing
attitudes toward property rights can the courts infuse into the
vested rights tests the individualized considerations required by the
complex and pressing considerations involved in modem land use
regulation.
397. Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d
473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). See also notes 164-72 & accompanying text supra.
398. See note 396 & accompanying text supra.
399. 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1977). See notes 104-32 & accompanying text supra.

